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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the British naval blockade imposed on Imperial Germany 
between the outbreak of war in August 1914 and the ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles in July 1919.  The blockade has received modest attention in the 
historiography of the First World War, despite the assertion in the British official history 
that extreme privation and hunger resulted in more than 750,000 German civilian deaths.  
This revelation of a humanitarian disaster may be the main reason why the British 
government delayed public release of the history for nearly thirty years after its 
completion in the 1930s.  Yet scholarship has focused on the initial establishment of the 
blockade, and the complex legal, economic, and diplomatic issues that made it ineffective 
during the first part of the war.  Much less has been written about its subsequent 
evolution into a powerful weapon, and less still on the Allies’ continuation of the 
blockade after the Armistice to compel German acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Britain first implemented the naval blockade of Germany not as a merciless 
hunger blockade, but rather as a time-honoured maritime strategy intended to weaken the 
enemy’s military resources and thereby assist the Allied land war on the Continent.  
However, its function changed over the course of the war, as Britain broadened the 
classes of goods subject to interdiction, from a traditional naval strategy focused on 
military supplies, into a much broader “weapon of starvation,” in the words of Winston 
Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, by 1918-1919.  The aim of this 
dissertation is to illuminate how and why this military transformation occurred and detail 
some of the political and moral consequences of the blockade’s expansion and its 
prolongation in full force through the whole of the treaty negotiations at Versailles. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
FOOD AS A WEAPON, 1914-1919 
 
Introduction  
“All is fair,” remarked Admiral John Fisher in an April 1904 naval document on the 
tactics and strategies that Britain’s Royal Navy would employ in the event of war.  The 
soon-to-be-appointed First Sea Lord qualified his remarks by asserting rather matter-of-
factly “[that] moderation in war is imbecility.”1  This statement was certainly indicative 
of the Admiralty’s blockade policy of Imperial Germany throughout the First World War.  
Indeed, Great Britain, France and, later, the United States maintained a rigorous naval 
blockade of Germany from August 1914 to July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was 
eventually ratified.  The blockade has received relatively little attention in the 
historiography of the First World War, despite the assertion in the British official history 
that extreme privation and hunger resulted in more than 750,000 German civilian deaths2 
– a third of which occurred after 11 November 1918.3  While past scholarship has 
emphasized the blockade’s early imposition and its complex legal and economic 
framework, it has yet to sufficiently detail its use as an instrument of war and, equally, 
potent bargaining chip at the Paris peace table.   
This doctoral dissertation has three primary objectives.  Firstly, it will assess the 
political and military considerations that resulted in Britain’s tightening and prolongation 
of the blockade.  It will seek to answer to what degree anti-German propaganda 
                                                        
1 Admiral John Fisher, ‘Submarines,’ 20 April 1904, National Archives, ADM 116/942.  
2 Archibald C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated with Her 
in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-1918 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 
1937), 672-674.  
3 N. P. Howard, “The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 
1918-1919,” German History 11, no. 2 (1993): 166. 
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influenced the British public and American official support for the denial of foodstuffs to 
Germany.  Secondly, it will consider the impact of the blockade’s prolongation after 11 
November and the Allies’ ability to ratify the Treaty of Versailles on 12 July 1919.  
Lastly, it will briefly explore the postwar legacy of the naval blockade in Britain and 
Germany.  How did the British government and press, for example, reconcile the 
blockade as a “weapon of starvation”4 with the need to rebuild relations with Germany in 
the peace process?  Does the “retention of the hunger blockade symbolize the great lost 
opportunity for postwar Europe... [where] the new reality was founded not upon Wilson’s 
high principle but upon unnecessary starvation,” as one historian has suggested?5     
The majority of First World War blockade studies have approached the topic from 
a strictly economic perspective, on the one hand, or as operational military history, on the 
other.6  It is my intention to redress the historiographical imbalance by focusing on 
British civil-military relations in the latter war years and immediate post-Armistice 
period.  These “politics of hunger”7 not only governed the British decision to employ a 
commercial blockade of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and, 
after October 1915, Bulgaria), it also informed Allied and German naval policy 
throughout the conflict and conditioned the uneasy peace settlement that was to follow.8   
Thus, by limiting the study of British economic warfare to the early war years, the history  
                                                        
4 This phrase was first employed by Winston Churchill as British Secretary of State for War in 
March 1919 and it is from here that I derived the title of the dissertation.  See, Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph 
Haswell Lutz, The Blockade of Germany After the Armistice, 1918-1919 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1942), 744. 
5 C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (Ohio: 
University of Ohio Press, 1985), 164.  
6 The works of S. N. Broadberry and Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914-
1919 (New York: Frank Cass, 2004) are an example of this economic approach, whereas Bell’s official 
history is indicative of more traditional military history. 
7 Vincent.  
8 Bane and Lutz, esp. 430-495. 
 3 
 
 
 
of the naval blockade has been written in a piecemeal fashion.   
This thesis ultimately addresses the post-1915 period of the blockade’s imposition 
and offers new insights on the Anglo-American and German war effort and peace 
negotiations in 1918-1919, as well as the morality of democratic states targeting civilians 
in war.  I anticipate this work with its interdisciplinary focus and politically relevant 
discussions on propaganda and morality will be of interest to scholars in security studies 
and international relations, and, more significantly, to military and naval historians given 
the centenary of the First World War. 
Historiography 
Much of the early scholarship prior to the Second World War focused on the blockade’s 
limited effectiveness from August 1914 until early 1916.  The British government’s two-
decade-long suppression of its official histories only served to prolong the interwar 
assertion of inefficacy, which fitted the period’s focus on the Treaty of Versailles as a 
failed and unjust peace.9  But the question as to whether Germany faced starvation in the 
latter war years has occupied much of the post-1945 scholarship.  These works were 
influenced by the broader Sonderweg or “special path” trend in German historiography, 
which viewed 1914-1918 through the lens of the Second World War and the Third Reich.  
For example, Fritz Fischer’s Germany’s Aims in the First World War (1961) refuted the 
National Socialist charge that the Kaiserreich was defeated on the home front in 1918.10  
A similar consensus prevailed among German economic historians in the late 1960s and 
1970s, who rejected the notion that Imperial Germany experienced mass food shortages 
                                                        
9 Michael Graham Fry, “British Revisionism,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 
75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Gläser (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 565-602.  
10 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1967), 27-30.     
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and chronic malnourishment.  More recently, historians and political scientists have again 
extended the discussion to Germany’s home front.  These works shed light on the 
political and economic dislocation that accompanied the Allied naval blockade.  This 
recent scholarship has shown that to minimize the blockade’s effectiveness would be to 
bypass a vital chapter of the First World War and postwar peace negotiations. 
 Three British official histories on the blockade were commissioned 
immediately following the Armistice; each was written by different historians and treated 
not as separate volumes but as companion pieces to James E. Edmonds’ official history 
of the British Expeditionary Force, Military Operations: France and Belgium.11  
Lieutenant Commander William Arnold-Forster’s The Economic Blockade, 1914-1919: 
Before the Armistice and After and H. W. C. Davis’ History of the Blockade both 
appeared in 1920.  Neither discussed the peace negotiations and instead concerned their 
analyses with the functioning of the blockade on a day-to-day basis throughout the First 
World War.  Success was measured in stark economic terms; detailed charts and graphs 
recounted the weight and breakdown of enemy goods seized each month.12  It was even 
estimated that the blockade resulted in German casualties equal to the 772,736 war dead 
of the British Expeditionary Force.13  One is left to wonder whether the prospect of 
having these statistics released was deemed too great a risk to British postwar credibility.  
It certainly would have added more grist to the mill of those, like British economist John  
Maynard Keynes, who regarded the peace settlement with Germany as overly harsh. 
                                                        
11 Marion C. Siney, “British Official Histories of the Blockade of the Central Powers during the 
First World War,” American Historical Review 68, no. 2 (January 1963): 392. 
12 These statistics even determined that Germany’s gross domestic product declined over four 
years by 75 percent of its prewar level.  See, William E. Arnold-Forster, The Economic Blockade, 1914-
1919: Before the Armistice and After (London: Clarendon Press, 1939), 34-35.  
13 Bell, 672-674.  
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 Even after the release of Arnold-Forster’s work in 1942, the book was not 
widely available in circulation and rarely was it cited as a primary source in subsequent 
blockade literature.  Moreover, although a copy of Davis’ History of the Blockade was 
given to the British Museum in August 1921, it was not released for public distribution 
nor was it entered into the government’s Suppressed Book Catalogue.  These attempts to 
stall further inquiry have led one prolific scholar on the blockade to conclude that 
“apparently the Foreign Office forgot (conveniently or genuinely) that a copy had been 
deposited….”14  But the most telling piece of British postwar concealment was in relation 
to the third and final official history completed by Archibald C. Bell with the Historical 
Section of the Committee on Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) in 1937.  Initially, it was 
promised to Bell that his A History of the Blockade of Germany would be showcased in 
the same manner (i.e. for public distribution) as Archibald Hurd’s The Merchant Navy 
(1921-1929) and C. Ernest Fayle’s Seaborne Trade (1924-1929).  He was sorely 
disappointed to learn, however, that both the British government and military still 
deemed any research on the naval blockade suitable for official eyes only.  Stuck on a 
shelf in the library of the C.I.D. until 1961, the blockade began to fade from academic 
interest and popular memory.15  This was an unfortunate end for an extremely well 
documented and thought-provoking work.   
In place of Bell’s official history, the most widely cited text became Rear Admiral 
Montagu W. W. P. Consett’s Triumph of Unarmed Forces (1923).  This book placed a 
great deal of emphasis on the occasions where goods en route to Germany passed 
                                                        
14 Siney, 392-3. 
15 The book was only discovered in the late 1950s, at which time scholarship had turned its 
attention to the foreign and domestic policy of totalitarian governments and the waging of the Second 
World War.  Ibid., 394    
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undetected by the Royal Navy.  Consett served as a British naval attaché in Stockholm 
during the war, but his knowledge of the blockade’s wider impact on the German war 
effort and home front was very limited.  He did not, for example, have access to the 
classified documents from the British Foreign Office and Robert Cecil’s Ministry of the  
Blockade.16  Thus the socio-economic and military effects of the blockade would remain 
uncharted waters for later historians to navigate.  
The political climate in which these post-1945 accounts were produced was no 
more conducive for an objective reading of the blockade’s impact.  In fact, several  
German historians in the 1960s and 1970s sought to dismiss its effectiveness altogether.17  
This scholarship unquestioningly accepted Admiral Consett’s view that the Kaiserreich 
was able to circumvent Allied measures by trading with the neutral Scandinavian 
countries.  Gerald Feldman’s Army, Industry, and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918 (1966) 
maintained that German food shortages had far more to do with inept food provisioning 
and an over-ambitious War Ministry than the Allied imposition of a naval blockade.18   
Feldman’s work became a benchmark study in First World War civil-military 
relations.  His decision to forego even a brief mention of the blockade’s impact 
effectively laid the groundwork for subsequent economic interpretations in the 1970s and 
1980s.  Both Gerd Hardach’s The First World War, 1914-1918 (1977) and Avner Offer’s 
The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (1989) were quick to discount the 
possibility that Imperial Germany had been defeated on the home front.  Accordingly, 
                                                        
16 Marion C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1957), 249.  
17 The latent power of German “illiberalism” preoccupied much of the post-1945 German 
scholarship on the First World War.      
18 Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 95.  
 7 
 
 
 
Hardach and Offer argued that a compromised diet of ersatz goods would not lead to 
malnourishment.  Both historians acknowledged the issue of hunger, but remained 
unconvinced that Germany experienced famine as a result of the naval blockade.19   
Conversely, there emerged from the mid-1980s a noticeable shift in the tone and 
focus of First World War blockade studies advanced by Anglo-American historians.  
These groundbreaking works include C. Paul Vincent’s The Politics of Hunger: The 
Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (1985) and Belinda J. Davis’ Home Fires 
Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (2000).  This newer 
scholarship scarcely lingered on the issue of whether the Kaiserreich had faced 
starvation.  Most post-1980s works on the blockade accepted that Imperial  
Germany had become a “beleaguered fortress” in the last years of its existence.20    
Influenced by the writings of Peter Loewenberg and S. William Halperin’s 
Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (1963), 
Vincent concerned himself less with the illegality of the blockade or the day-to-day 
mechanics of how it functioned.  He focused instead on the effects of the blockade in 
both a physiological and political sense.  Vincent’s work succeeds admirably in providing 
a closer look at how the Kaiser’s army coped with the challenges of economic warfare.  
His work has increased scholarly awareness on the blockade to the point where many 
newer monographs on the First World War provide the reader with a brief overview of 
the Allies’ trade restrictions.21   
                                                        
19 Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), 31.  See also, Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 53.   
20 This phrase was employed disparagingly by Gerd Hardach and like-minded Cold Warriors to 
refute the earlier claim of starvation.  See Hardach, 31-32.  
21 This cursory treatment of the blockade is a vast improvement on the interwar “amnesia” that 
plagued the three British official histories upon their release.  These post-Vincent scholarly works include:  
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So too, Belinda Davis’ Home Fires Burning functions as a valuable companion 
piece to Vincent’s work on the cumulative impact of the blockade.  Her narrative focuses 
on the day-to-day struggle of “women of lesser means” (minderbemittelte Frauen), 
specifically their resorting to theft and symbolic acts of violence in the latter war years.   
Davis consulted Berlin police and court records from 1913-1920 and noted the 
correlation between the number of crimes22 committed by women and the severity of 
food shortages on the home front.  Theft convictions in Berlin, for example, increased 
from 40,000 in 1917 to 50,000 by the war’s end.23  Malnutrition forced many women of 
lesser means to steal, beg, and borrow in order to survive the “Turnip Winter” of 1916-
1917 and nationwide food riots of January 1918.24  But does it logically follow that these 
women entered the political arena in the process?  This claim underpins much of Davis’ 
work, although she fails to establish how theft convictions in 1918 were associated with 
the desire for greater political participation.25   
Davis is therefore at her best when she concentrates on the little-known stories of 
the minderbemittelte Frauen.  This is not to suggest that the average Hausfrau remained 
apolitical during the German revolution of 1918-1919.  Rather, Davis’ failure to directly 
link the struggle for food with women’s receptivity to political extremism sadly undercuts 
her thesis.  This is one methodological reservation in what is otherwise a perceptive and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 
1997); John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten 
Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities; and David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World 
War as a Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004); idem, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory 
and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
22 Namely, fraud, embezzlement, theft, forgery, and receipt of stolen goods.   
23 Belinda J. Davis, Homes Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I 
Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 223.  
24 Mass food riots in January 1918 were spurred by the public’s frustration regarding the 
exorbitant price of food.  By 1918, the power of the black market prevented the average German family 
from purchasing what few goods there were left in market stalls and storefronts.   
25 Davis, 238-239.  
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engaging book.  Davis skillfully demonstrates how food shortages on the home front 
exacerbated tensions between the haves and the have-nots, even if her discussion of 
women’s apathy towards the war effort is often unsatisfying.  Her case study of women in 
wartime Berlin is proof that scholarship on the blockade is still relevant in the era of 
micro-histories and postmodern works.  Davis’ and Vincent’s research has influenced my 
thesis in that both reject the increasingly anachronistic 1960s and ‘70s notion that  
Imperial Germany was not adversely affected by the blockade.  
A more recent but controversial trend in the historiography of the naval blockade 
has been the counter-factual approach taken by a number of historians and non-historians 
alike.  For instance, naval scholar Paul G. Halpern suggests in a recent book chapter “… 
[that] if one of the many German offensives [in the spring of 1918] had succeeded, and 
the tide of the battle shifted in their [Germany’s] favour, then the naval blockade might 
not be studied today.”26  For Halpern, this is a purely rhetorical exercise.  He does not 
provide any evidence to support the claim that a reversal of fortune was even possible for 
German troops beyond the opening salvo of Operation Michael (21 March 1918).  
Ultimately, counter-factual what-ifs are of little help in assessing the blockade’s wider 
significance and, in the case of Patrick J. Buchanan’s Churchill, Hitler, and the 
Unnecessary War (2008), they can lead to unfounded generalizations on the origins of the 
Second World War.   
A journalist by trade, “Pat” Buchanan is known more for his staunch neo-
conservative politics than historical inquiry.  He nevertheless wrote a New York Times  
bestseller criticizing Winston Churchill and other British statesmen for needlessly  
                                                        
26 Paul G. Halpern, “World War I: The Blockade,” in Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies 
and Counter-strategies, 1805-2005, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 91.    
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entering the First World War against Germany.  Buchanan attributes German grievances 
and political radicalism in the 1920s and 1930s to the “Carthaginian Peace” imposed by 
the Allies at Versailles.27  Here Buchanan is influenced by the fiery writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, principally, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920) and Niall 
Ferguson’s “defiantly revisionist work,”28 The Pity of War: Explaining World War I 
(1999).  Unlike Keynes, however, Buchanan argues that “the success of Churchill’s 
starvation blockade” contributed foremost to the postwar chaos that bred “a poisonous 
spirit of revenge.”29  It is true that Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty initiated the 
blockade at the onset of hostilities.  But he did not oversee its imposition after early 1915, 
occupying, instead, various other posts unrelated to economic warfare.  Furthermore, as 
one will see, Churchill was a proponent of lifting the post-Armistice blockade.30    
Still more tenuous is Buchanan’s underlying claim that the Second World War 
was an unnecessary conflict wrought by British capriciousness:  
Had Britain not declared war on Germany in 1914…Germany would have  
been victorious, perhaps, in months.  There would have been no Lenin, no  
Stalin, no Versailles, no Hitler, no Holocaust.  Had Britain not given a war 
guarantee to Poland in March 1939, then declared war on September 3… a  
German-Polish war might never have become a six-year world war in which  
                                                        
27 Patrick J. Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost its Empire 
and the West Lost the World (New York: Random House, 2008), 75, 98. 
28 R. J. Q. Adams, “Review of Niall Ferguson’s The Pity of War,” American History Review 105, 
no. 3 (June 2000): 881.  This is certainly an apt description of The Pity of War.  Each section of Ferguson’s 
book is devoted to answering one of ten rhetorical questions posed in the introduction.  Questions include: 
“why did British leaders decide to intervene when war broke out on the Continent?,” “why did men stop 
fighting [in 1918]?,” and “who won the peace?”  Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I 
(New York: Basic Books, 1999) xxv-xxvi.   
29 Buchanan, 78.  
30 Bane and Lutz, 721. 
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fifty million would perish.31         
Buchanan’s work is both provocative and revisionist but it remains speculative “history” 
at best.  One is likely to agree more with naval expert Peter Padfield’s assessment that “it 
is neither possible nor useful to speculate in what different ways the century might have 
unraveled had the first war not started when and how it did.”32  Churchill, Hitler, and the 
Unnecessary War overstates Britain’s culpability in both conflicts and, as a consequence, 
demonstrates firsthand the methodological pitfalls of interpreting history post facto. 
The most recent book-length study on the blockade was undertaken by a young 
American political scientist at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia.  Eric 
W. Osborne’s Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914-1919 (2004) is an 
economic history of the blockade with the aim to offer “a more complete view” by 
demonstrating how it became “one of the greatest weapon’s in the Entente’s arsenal 
against Germany….”33  He openly criticizes earlier works for their failure to consider the 
blockade after America’s intervention in the war.  Yet Osborne’s book devotes 152 of its 
194 pages to the first two and a half years of the war.  Furthermore, the last year of 
combat and continuation of the blockade after 11 November 1918 are discussed in a brief 
twenty-page chapter.34  Thus, far from providing a more complete view of the blockade, 
Osborne’s monograph has taken a step back in terms of focus and periodization.       
Methods and Themes 
 
My research differs considerably from these earlier accounts both in terms of 
methodology and scope.  I argue that the naval blockade of Germany was conceived not  
                                                        
31 Buchanan, xvii-xviii.  
32 Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 
(Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd., 2005), xiii.  
33 Osborne, 3-4.  
34 Ibid., 173-193. 
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as a merciless starvation or hunger blockade, but rather a time-honoured maritime 
strategy intended to weaken the enemy’s military resources and assist the Allied land war 
on the Continent.  However, its nature and function changed over the course of the war 
from an accepted naval strategy in 1914 into a weapon of starvation by 1918-1919.  The 
aim of this study is to illuminate how and why this military transformation occurred and, 
finally, detail some of the political and moral consequences of the blockade’s protracted 
imposition.  In structuring this dissertation, I introduce three interrelated themes or 
explanations to account for the blockade’s efficacy after 1915.  Broadly, they are:  
  1. The Streamlining of Civil-Military Bureaucracy, 1916-1917 
  2. The Role of Lord Northcliffe and British Propaganda, 1917-1918 
  3. The Blockade as Political Leverage, 1918-1919  
I have deliberately eschewed the familiar – 1914-1918 – chronological narrative, weighed 
heavily in favour of the first two years of the war, for a more conceptual approach.  It is 
not my intention to write a “History” of the naval blockade, for that has been competently 
done before with the three British official histories35 commissioned immediately 
following the Armistice and, again, with Marion C. Siney’s The Allied Blockade of 
Germany, 1914-1916 (1957).  Nor do I want to suggest that these factors alone account 
for the success of Allied economic warfare.36   
 Rather, this thesis endeavours to provide a more nuanced look at what allowed  
                                                        
35 Arnold-Forster, Bell, and the H. W. C. Davis Papers, Hoover Institution Archives (thereafter 
cited as HIA), Stanford University, Stanford, California. 
36 The Wilhelmine government’s ad hoc requisitioning of food supplies left many civilians to 
depend on the vagaries of the black market.  War profiteering thrived throughout the blockade’s existence, 
increasing prices to often ten times the prewar rate.  The Great Powers’ adherence to the short war illusion 
also meant that Germany did not adequately devise a contingency plan for nationwide food shortages.  The 
bureaucratic nightmare of food provisioning in wartime Germany is dealt with admirably in George Yaney, 
The World of the Manager: Food Administration in Berlin during World War I (New York: Peter Lang, 
1994), 4-6 and B. J. C. McKercher, “Economic Warfare” in The First World War: A New Illustrated 
History, edited by Hew Strachan, (London: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 212-213.   
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Britain and the Allies to cross the moral “Rubicon” and tighten trade restrictions on 
Germany in 1916-1919.  Initially, British statesmen viewed the blockade’s retention after 
the Armistice as a necessary political expedient to ensure peace on Allied terms.  But 
subsequent army occupation reports of the widespread malnutrition in Germany caused 
others, such as Winston Churchill, Herbert Hoover, and General Herbert Plumer, to 
denounce the post-Armistice blockade as needless and reprehensible.  An international 
relief effort to revictual Germany exerted pressure on the Allies to lift the blockade, but 
not before the peace treaty was formally signed on 12 July 1919.37   
In what follows, I highlight the politics, propaganda, and morality of the 
blockade’s wartime and post-Armistice imposition.  Chapter 2 traces the evolution of the 
blockade from its modest paper origins to an effective hunger blockade by 1916.  
Particular attention is given to the 11 March 1915 Order in Council that stipulated the 
immediate seizure of all goods (including foodstuffs) bound for Germany.  This period in 
the blockade’s existence was characterized by legal and political manoeuvring on the part 
of Sir Edward Grey’s Foreign Office, which was given the vital task of creating an 
international blockade apparatus.  The United States, Sweden, and Norway,38 however, 
were able to stymie much of the early momentum of the blockade by upholding their 
neutral rights at sea and continuing to trade with Germany.  Yet the chapter aims to place 
this inefficacy and inter-service rivalry of the Foreign Office and Admiralty within the 
context of the early war years, a period characterized by ad hoc policies and trial and 
error for all belligerent powers.         
       Chapter 3 explains how and why the British government was able to overcome this  
                                                        
37 Bane and Lutz, 456.  
38 In addition to the neutral northern European countries of Belgium, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands.   
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international stalemate or, “transatlantic quandary” as I have termed it, to create a potent 
weapon of war and bargaining chip for peace.  There has been some promising 
scholarship on British food exporters in the First World War,39 which suggests that many 
continued to trade with their best customer – Imperial Germany – and thus pursued a 
clandestine policy of trading with the enemy based on economic self-interest.   
This much is axiomatic, but it is the idea articulated in John McDermott’s article 
“‘A Needless Sacrifice’: British Businessmen and Business as Usual in the First World 
War” (1989) that raises some significant questions for my research.  He argues that 
attitudes towards the blockade changed only when Britons deemed it necessary to 
reconcile their isolationist and liberal capitalist views with the patriotic needs of King and 
country:  
Both the business community and the Liberal government were imbued  
in 1914 with a strong laissez-faire tradition in a state that was dependent  
upon exports to pay its way in the world… [But] under the pressure of total  
war and growing hatred of Germany the government finally established a 
consistent and effective blockade policy in late 1916, and the end of American 
neutrality in April 1917 eliminated a major concern for British policymakers.40 
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between the tightening of the blockade and the  
intensification of anti-German propaganda released under Lord Northcliffe in the last  
                                                        
39 Namely, Jonathan S. Boswell and Bruce R. Johns, “Patriots and Profiteers? British Businessmen 
and the First World War,” Journal of European Economic History 11 (1982): 423-445; John McDermott, 
“A Needless Sacrifice: British Businessmen and Business As Usual in the First World War,” Albion 21, no. 
2 (Summer 1989): 263-282; idem, “Total War and the Merchant State: Aspects of British Economic 
Warfare against Germany, 1914-1916,” Canadian Journal of History 21 (April 1986): 61-76 and “Trading 
with the Enemy: British Business and the Law during the First World War,” Canadian Journal of History 
33 (August 1997): 201-220. 
40 McDermott, “‘A Needless Sacrifice,’” 263-264.  Additionally see, idem, “Trading with the 
Enemy,” 201-202.  
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year of the war.  Northcliffe, as Lloyd George’s Director of Propaganda in Enemy 
Countries, was able to reach an unprecedented audience through his ownership of such 
popular and widely read newspapers as The Times and the Daily Mail.41  The Times was 
particularly critical of Prime Ministers Herbert Henry Asquith’s and Lloyd George’s 
governments for their failure to stop British businessmen and neutral countries from 
trading with the enemy.  How was this growing anti-German sentiment depicted in 
British propaganda and the press?  To what extent did Northcliffe’s control of print media 
influence British and American support for the blockade in the latter war years and, more 
significantly, convince Britons to support the denial of foodstuffs to Germany after the 
Armistice?  These are vital questions that have yet to be asked by historians of the Allied 
naval blockade.  They are, however, at the core of my discussion in Chapter 4 and will 
aid to explain how wartime propaganda coloured Britain’s response to German requests 
for food relief in the post-Armistice period.  
The final section of the thesis will consider in chapters 5, 6, and 7 the last nine 
months of the blockade’s imposition with reference to questions of morality and political 
expediency.  Ultimately, the British War Cabinet and Allied Supreme Economic Council 
deemed that German civil unrest was a valuable tool to ensure peace.42  Chapters 5 and 6 
therefore utilize the newly available records of the postwar Supreme Economic Council 
and Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration.  These archival documents offer a 
closer look at the controversial Allied decision to prolong the blockade after the ceasefire 
agreement of 11 November 1918.  Chapter 5 focuses on the period from early November 
1918 to late February 1919, paying particular attention to the Supreme Economic 
                                                        
41 Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), 146-147.   
42 ‘The Blockade,’ pp. 2, 19 February 1919, TNA, CAB 24/150.  
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Council’s 31 December 1918 decision to prolong the blockade after official talk of its 
relaxation occurred as late as 25 December.  What political exigencies arose in this week-
long period to remove all talk of lifting the blockade?  Research suggests that this 
decision was not unanimously reached.  In fact, Winston Churchill as Secretary of State 
for War, John Maynard Keynes as a representative of the Treasury Department, and 
Robert Anderson as the U.S. Board of Trade liaison were three notable diplomats in 
favour of allowing foodstuffs into Germany.  Were there other politicians who raised 
concern?  Was this purely a political consideration in order to stem the tide of 
Bolshevism in Germany?43   How did morality figure in their discussion of raising the 
blockade and did Lloyd George’s re-election campaign in December 1918 dictate 
postwar blockade policy in any way?    
Chapter 6 then details the efforts of Herbert Hoover (Allied Food Director) and 
Lord Robert Cecil (Chair of the Allied Blockade Committee) to persuade the “Big Four” 
Powers to raise the blockade before Germany collapsed further into political and social 
dislocation.  The signing of the Brussels food agreement on 14 March 1919 marks a vital 
signpost in the relaxation of the blockade and will be discussed at length.  Henceforth, 
Germany could import up to 370,000 tons of food per month from any country.44  These 
shipments, however, did not reach German ports until three months after the Brussels 
accord.  Ultimately, this has led one historian to note that, “German acceptance of the 
                                                        
43 The installation of prominent socialists in Max von Baden’s provisional government, along with  
the growing threat of Karl Liebknecht’s radical left-wing Spartacus movement, was proof enough for many 
Anglo-American politicians that postwar Germany was rife with Bolshevism.  Arthur S. Link, ed. The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 51 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 415; Klaus Schwabe, 
Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985), 139; Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, eds. War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in 
Europe after the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 42-43.    
44 Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power: the Blockade, 1914-1919, and its Significance for 
a World State (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1924), 186-187. 
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Treaty of Versailles came under the shadow of the economic blockade put in place by the 
British in 1914.  Its final legacy was not as a weapon of war to destroy an enemy, but one  
to insure peace under Allied terms.”45      
Chapter 7 explores the postwar legacy of the naval blockade in Britain and 
Germany.  Not since Marion Siney’s 1963 article “British Official Histories of the 
Blockade” has a scholar analyzed postwar perceptions of the blockade.46  Thus, I will 
seek to answer how the rampant hunger and attendant political instability in Germany 
was regarded in a post-Versailles landscape.  Was the blockade still seen as a legitimate 
wartime strategy or a dubious weapon of starvation, as Churchill claimed?  What effects 
or implications did these civilian deaths have on Adolf Hitler’s decision to attack the 
Soviet Union – the breadbasket of Europe – in the summer of 1941?  
Finally, Chapter 8 ends this study with a summary of the dissertation and briefly 
addresses Vincent’s question as to whether the blockade symbolized a lost opportunity 
for lasting peace in 1919. 
A Note on Archival Sources 
 
Archival collections on the First World War are both voluminous and comprehensive in 
scope.  One could, for example, spend decades mastering the origins of the conflict 
without addressing technological innovations, domestic politics, combat on the various 
fronts, or how and why the war finally ended.  Nevertheless, they would have their choice 
of archives from London to Washington, Paris to Vienna, and a host of fine collections in 
between.  It is, therefore, the challenge of the researcher to locate archival holdings 
specific to their topic yet diverse enough to offer an innovative and balanced reading of 
                                                        
45 Osborne, 189. 
46 Siney, “British Official Histories of the Blockade,” 395.  
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the war years.  In the case of Britain’s “hunger blockade” of Germany, research material 
is readily available in North America and the United Kingdom, but collections are 
scattered geographically.  
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Archives possess vast holdings on Allied 
economic warfare, British propaganda, and, of course, the papers of U.S. Food 
Administer Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration.  The Hoover 
Archives are a world leader in preserving documents on the First World War and Paris 
Peace Conference; well-indexed collections in French, German, and Italian, in addition to 
English, make it a formidable research institution.  In particular, the Herbert Hoover 
Subject Collection and Edward Frederick Willis Papers offer an intimate look at the 
decision-making process of the Supreme Economic Council and American Relief 
Administration.  Hoover was a key liaison between the two organizations in an effort to 
streamline the Allies’ postwar reconstruction of Europe.  They also provide a much-
needed look at the counter-intuitiveness of using food as a weapon to restore the global 
balance of power.   
This moral dimension of targeting civilians in war is similarly documented in the 
Graham Lusk and Ralph Haswell Lutz Papers.  The latter was a prominent Stanford 
historian whose papers include the work of American freelance journalist Stephen Miles 
Bouton (who reported on the grave food conditions in Berlin c. 1918-1919) and army 
intelligence reports from the General Staff of the U.S. Third Army occupying the 
Rhineland.  Finally, the Mary C. Rixford Papers and British pamphlets from the Director 
of Propaganda in Enemy Countries act as a valuable counterpoint to the discussion on the 
morality of denying food to the Central Powers. 
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 Equally comprehensive is the National Archives, formally the Public Records 
Office, in Kew, Richmond outside of London, England.  The Foreign, War, and Cabinet 
Office as well as the Board of Trade, Customs, and Treasury Department papers are held 
here.  These once confidential records provide a government consensus on the blockade 
throughout the war and post-Armistice period.  Indeed, one can reconstruct a 
department’s opinion of the blockade based on official cables, letters, and heated round-
table discussions concerning its political and military value.  Particularly useful were the 
Foreign and Cabinet Office documents (FO 6684, 88867 and CAB 23/14, respectively) 
that dealt with the political reasons for the continuance of the blockade after 11  
November 1918.  
 In contrast, the Papers of Rear Admiral Dudley De Chair and Private Papers of 
H. A. Gwynne at the Imperial War Museum in London provide an earlier assessment of 
the blockade c. 1915-1916.  Admiral De Chair was the commander of Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron – the group in charge of the day-to-day patrolling of the Atlantic and North 
Sea.  Yet his account is laden with minute details (i.e. the exact shipping tonnage of 
Swedish iron ore in May 1915) and, consequently, adds little to the historian’s knowledge 
of the complex machinery associated with Allied economic warfare.  More useful is 
Gwynne’s correspondence with the Minister of the Blockade Lord Robert Cecil.  As the 
editor of the ultra-Tory mouthpiece The Morning Post, Gwynne’s political connections 
were exhaustive.  Similar to Northcliffe, Gwynne envisioned himself as a de facto adviser 
to prominent cabinet members.  His political aspirations are thinly veiled in his letters to 
Cecil.  But it was his “constructive” criticism of the government’s blockade policy – he 
thought it too lax and wrote as much in The Post – that finally caused the Minister of the 
 20 
 
 
 
Blockade to rebuke him.  Cecil, nevertheless, begrudgingly heeded the press baron’s 
advice and carried out a series of reforms in the Foreign Office and the Blockade 
Ministry that mirrored Gwynne’s suggestions for a tighter blockade.  Ultimately, these 
letters highlight the inextricable link between civil and military bureaucracy in the 
development of British blockade policy after mid-1916.          
    Lastly, the collection of blockade related material at the Liddell Hart Centre for  
Military Archives at King’s College, University of London, nicely augments the 
discussion of morality versus political expediency in war.  Sir William Beveridge’s tract 
The Blockade and the Civilian Population was written during the lead-up to the Second 
World War and published as an Oxford pamphlet in December 1939.  In it, he advocates 
that Britain employ a naval blockade of Nazi Germany, as it was “one of the strongest 
weapons in the British armoury” against Germany in the First World War.  Furthermore, 
Beveridge addresses the supposed “immorality” of targeting Germans on the home front 
by asserting, “that the hardships of the German civilian population in 1914-1918 were the 
result, less of the British blockade directly, than of general exhaustion brought on by all 
the operations of war, of mismanagement, and of placing military demands before 
civilian needs.”47   
This is a recurring statement made by several interwar British policymakers.  
They tout the blockade’s efficacy in bringing the war to a close, but are reluctant to attach 
any wider significance to the complete breakdown of German civilian morale in 1918 or 
the issue of deliberate starvation after the Armistice.  Instead, Beveridge focuses solely 
on the inept food provisioning by the German War Food Office.  It is a convenient straw 
                                                        
47 William Beveridge, The Blockade and the Civilian Population (Oxford, 1939), 3, 27-28.  
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man, but the myriad reports of the British and U.S. armies and the American Relief 
Administration at the Hoover Institution Archives tell a far different and grimmer story.                   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A TRANSATLANTIC QUANDARY: BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION  
AND INTERNATIONAL STALEMATE, 1914-1916 
 
The Hunger Blockade Contextualized 
When the Dutch navy of Philip William, the Prince of Orange, blockaded Flanders on 27 
July 1584 he declared what naval historians and legal scholars have termed the “first 
formal naval blockade” in history.48  Numerous coastal cities and ports were subject to 
naval sieges throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, but these earlier attempts were a 
means by which land forces would generally invade and occupy a given territory.  The 
Dutch blockade of Flanders differed markedly because an amphibious invasion was never 
the goal.  Rather, it was the young Protestant prince’s intention to challenge Catholic 
Spain’s control of the Flemish coast and the newly united Seventeen Provinces or 
Netherlands.  Habsburg trade routes were eventually severed in the southern provinces 
(specifically, modern-day Belgium, Luxembourg, and parts of France), causing Spanish 
troops to be ill fed and provisioned throughout most of the mid-to-late 1580s.  This 
episode was part of a wider Dutch and, indeed, Protestant revolt against Habsburg 
domination in Europe that culminated in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the 
Dutch Golden Age (1580-1670).49 
Britain, France, and the Netherlands imposed naval blockades over the next 
century and a half with often little regard for the rights of neutral countries or rival 
belligerent powers.  Admittedly, international law regarding the rules of war at sea was in 
                                                        
48 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Naval Blockade and International Law” in Naval Blockades 
and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005, ed. Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 11.   
49 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 196-200.  See also, Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail, 1650-
1850 (London: Cassell and Company, 2000), 52-53.   
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its infancy.  Yet this did not stop neutrals such as Denmark, Russia, and Sweden from 
protesting the “fictitious blockades” erected by the world’s three most powerful navies. 
In 1780, for instance, Russia’s Catherine the Great denounced the irksome practice of 
“paper blockades,” whereby a naval power like Britain would search and seize a neutral 
merchant vessel regardless of the ship’s cargo and without having formally declared war 
on a particular country.  Catherine claimed that the English Channel and North Sea were 
international waters and, therefore, could not be arbitrarily blockaded by one power over 
another.50   
This tension between the Great Powers made plain the need to establish certain 
criteria as to what rendered a naval blockade legal and binding.  Here, the Tsarina posited 
that in order to be legal a blockade must be “effective” (i.e. imposed with sufficient 
military force rather than a mere paper declaration).51  This caveat forced navies to 
reconsider the use of a blockade for strictly diplomatic ends.  It by no means eradicated 
the use of paper blockades, nor did it completely mitigate the grievances of smaller 
neutral countries.  However, it was an acknowledgement that neutral rights must be 
considered in concert with the rights of more powerful belligerent nations.  By the mid- 
nineteenth century, in fact, Britain routinely championed the cause of freedom of the 
seas.  Two developments made this stunning reversal possible; a realignment of British 
foreign policy followed by an economic consideration that had far-reaching domestic and 
global implications.52  
                                                        
50 In 1780, Sweden, Russia, and Denmark formed the League of Armed Neutrality in protest 
against historic Franco-British disregard for neutral rights at sea.  Osborne, 7.    
51 Heinegg, 12.    
52 There are several studies on the changing nature of nineteenth century British foreign policy, 
including: Christopher Howard, “The Policy of Isolation,” History Journal 10, no. 1 (1967): 77-88 and 
John Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power, and the Origins of the First World War 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999).      
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Britain’s foreign policy stance changed from a nation frequently at war (e.g. with 
Holland in the late seventeenth century and France and America in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century) to a more detached arbiter content to preserve the balance of 
power in Europe following Napoleon’s defeat in 1815.53  Historians and contemporaries 
alike referred to this shift as a period of “splendid isolation” for Great Britain.  
Isolationism afforded British statesmen the opportunity to worry less about Continental 
entanglements and focus, instead, on domestic concerns and the maintenance of a vast 
overseas empire.  As George Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, proudly remarked 
to a Conservative gathering in February 1896: “Our isolation is not an isolation of 
weakness, or of contempt for ourselves; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we 
choose in any circumstance that may arise.”54  The problem with this policy, however, 
was that it could not be maintained long term.  There were occasions where intervention 
was necessary to uphold the existing geopolitical order, but as in the case of the Crimean 
(1854-1856) and First World Wars, protracted involvement on the continent irrevocably 
altered the alliance system of the Great Powers.         
 The second development that caused Britain to support freedom of the seas was 
equally pragmatic.  Access to world markets benefitted the interests of British financiers, 
industrialists, and businessmen who traded freely around the globe until the outbreak of 
the First World War.  Whether it was stocks and bonds being traded in the City of 
London or cheaper livestock imported from New Zealand and Argentina, free trade and 
                                                        
53 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1976), 149.  See also, David F. Krein, The Last Palmerston Government: Foreign Policy, Domestic 
Politics, and the Genesis of ‘Splendid Isolation’ (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1978); Bernard 
Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica 
(Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Maartje M. Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-
1914 (Cambridge: University Press, 2014).    
54 Howard, “The Policy of Isolation,” 80.   
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naval supremacy were the twin pillars of nineteenth century Pax Britannica.55  These 
factors help to explain Britain’s willingness to sign an international treaty respecting 
maritime rights in the wake of the Crimean War in April 1856.  This Declaration of Paris 
marked a watershed in the development of maritime law, establishing five principles that 
must be met for a blockade to be deemed lawful; (1) proper establishment, (2) adequate 
notice, (3) effective enforcement, (4) impartial application, and (5) respect for neutral 
rights.56   
Proper establishment meant that a naval blockade applied only to countries 
officially at war with one another.  The blockading power then had to issue a formal 
declaration to the various countries under blockade, as well as notify any neutral states 
known to trade with either belligerent.  A general time frame also had to be devised and 
communicated to neutrals and the enemy, informing them which ports were blockaded 
and for approximately how long.57  Thirdly, effective enforcement sought to end once 
and for all the customary practice of paper blockades.  To be legally effective was to say 
that a blockade “must be maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the  
enemy coastline… and must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.”58  The principle of 
impartiality was a bitter pill for the Admiralty to swallow given their tendency to let 
through merchant vessels favourable to the commercial interests of Britain.  Finally, 
respect for neutral rights became the most contentious issue of blockade law,  
                                                        
55 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 175.  The repeal of the protectionists 
Corn Laws in 1846 removed the final impediment to free trade in Britain.     
56 Francis Upton, The Laws of Nations Affecting Commerce during War (London: Methuen & Co., 
1863), 276-277.  See also, Thomas Gibson Bowles, The Declaration of Paris (London: S. Low, Marston, 
and Company, 1900).   
57 Michael G. Fraunces, “The International Law of Blockade: New Guiding Principles in 
Contemporary State Practice,” Yale Law Journal 101, no. 4 (January 1992): 896-898.  
58 Effective enforcement was first established with the Declaration of Paris and reaffirmed in the 
1909 London Declaration.  London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, Article II, Chapter I, 
26 February 1909.  
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underscoring much of the acrimony between Britain, France and neutrals such as the 
United States, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway throughout 1914-1916.   
It is the aim of this chapter to detail the strategy behind Britain’s naval blockade 
of the Central Powers and examine its use during the first two years of the war.  It seeks 
to answer why it initially proved so difficult for the Allies to impose an effective 
blockade against Germany.  Was it a lack of commitment on the Admiralty’s part?  How 
did the Foreign Office quash allegations of the blockade’s illegality and disregard for the 
rights of neutrals?  How, for instance, did they reconcile the fact that Britain entered the 
war to defend the neutrality of Belgium yet violated daily the concept of freedom of the 
seas?  To answer these questions it is first necessary to explore the key socio-political and 
economic trends influencing military and naval policy in prewar Britain.   
Imperialism and Anxiety in Edwardian Britain 
In 1904 there was nothing inevitable about a war between Great Britain and Imperial 
Germany.  The decade to come was punctuated by periods of instability in Morocco 
(1905-1906 and 1911) and the Balkans (1912-1913), to be sure.  Yet these ethnic and 
territorial conflicts were not in themselves a precursor for war, let alone a world war in 
which 35 million soldiers and civilians were either killed or wounded.59  It is, therefore, 
worth considering the opening sentence in Paul Kennedy’s The Rise of the Anglo-German 
Antagonism (1980), which reads: “Why was it that the British and German peoples, who 
had never fought each other and whose traditions of political co-operation were 
reinforced by dynastic, cultural, religious, and economic ties, drifted steadily apart in the  
                                                        
59 Stevenson, Cataclysm, 442-443.  See also, Ferguson, 296.    
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?”60  It is Kennedy’s contention that 
historians must consider in tandem the economic and ideological constraints (i.e. the 
vagaries of the “Official” Minds in London and Berlin) that informed much of the foreign 
policy decision-making of late Victorian/Edwardian Britain and Wilhelmine Germany.  
He maintains that the surest cause of the rivalry was the decline in Britain’s world power, 
precisely at a time when Germany sought to challenge the staid nineteenth century 
balance of power via naval construction and the outbreak of war in 1914.61   
That Britain was in a position of imperial decline is hardly in doubt.  By the early 
1890s the empire was dependent on imports for its very economic survival.62  In fact, 
trade between Great Britain, continental Europe, North America, and Asia astonishingly 
doubled over a twenty-year period from 1870 to 1890.63  This was a level of 
unprecedented economic growth and yet it deeply concerned many conservatives who 
warned against British dependence on world markets.  The journalist and war 
correspondent L. S. Amery was one of those men.  In 1905, he acknowledged the 
sobering fact that “every year the competition for power among the great world states is 
getting keener,” while arguing that “unless we continue to hold our own, unless we can 
keep our invincible Navy… our Empire and our trade will be taken away from us by 
others and we will be starved out, invaded, trampled under foot and utterly ruined.”  
Simply put, the policy of isolationism no longer seemed quite as “splendid” as it had  
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several decades before.64     
This fin-de-siècle anxiety over British decline gave rise to the Tory movement of 
tariff reform in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Its leader was the charismatic 
politician Joseph Chamberlain, a Birmingham manufacturer who entered politics late in 
middle age.65  He served first in Liberal cabinets before joining Lord Robert Salisbury’s 
Conservative-Unionist government as Colonial Secretary in 1895.  Although prone to 
ardent speeches denouncing the corruptible and plutocratic nature of Whitehall, he also 
won many supporters for his pragmatic views on empire.  Chamberlain preached the 
necessity of imperial unity at a time when the United States and Germany were 
narrowing the gap and, in some cases, almost outproducing Britain in terms of 
industrialization and trade with new overseas markets.   
Far from being a Germanophobe, Chamberlain admired the sheer scope and 
practicality of the German customs union or Zollverein reconstituted by Otto von 
Bismarck in 1866-1867.66  Bismarck was then Minister President of Prussia and 
Chancellor of twenty-two loosely united provinces known as the North German 
Confederation.  Prussia was the predominant member of the Confederation and possessed 
the last word on economic matters as they affected the entire customs union.67  In 
Germany’s Zollverein Chamberlain saw the underpinnings of a viable economic model of 
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neo-mercantilism, one that Britain ought to emulate with her colonies in order to 
safeguard home markets and solidify trade within the empire.  Consequently, 
Chamberlain formed the Tariff Reform League (TRL) with several leading politicians in 
July 1903.  The League’s mandate was to promote imperial unity and address directly 
what they believed to be the most pressing issue of contemporary geopolitics – staving 
off British decline.68  The movement called for the melding of free trade with 
protectionist tariffs on essential goods like wheat, sugar, meat, and wool, with Britain 
functioning in the role of customs administrator as in Bismarckian Prussia.  
Imperial preference lay at the heart of the Chamberlainites’ conviction that 
tangible economic solutions could reverse British imperial decline, and, at the same time, 
forge closer bonds between colony and metropole.  This proposed system of preferential 
tariffs was a polarizing topic.  Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, for example, was 
very much in favour of an economic alliance with Britain.69  Yet others closer to home 
felt that tariff reform was too cumbersome and intricate to sell to an increasingly working 
class electorate more concerned with their immediate standards of living than future gross 
domestic product.  The tariff movement failed, in part, to translate staunch initial support 
for the cause into long-term policy gains.  Or, as one historian more candidly put it, “by 
the beginning of 1913, the Unionist leadership had given the Tariff Reform League ten  
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years of political rope with which to hang itself.”70   
The often-overlooked issue of tariff reform clearly illustrates the growing concern 
among conservatives that the empire was in jeopardy.  Furthermore, it parallels the 
unique challenges wartime Britain faced in trying to convince the international 
community it was preferable to trade with Anglo-French businesses to the exclusion of 
Germany.  This remained a perennial topic of contention among Liberals and 
Conservatives, free traders and trade protectionists, not least with patriotic politicians and 
businessmen from neutral countries.  It is in this light that Edwardian Britain’s 
preoccupation with imperial defence must be viewed in the lead-up to economic warfare 
with the Central Powers. 
Strategy and Finance: The Fisher Revolution in Naval Warfare?  
Doing more with less.  That is exactly what “Jacky” Fisher promised the Admiralty he 
would accomplish in the position of First Sea Lord.  The Royal Navy faced a lean period 
in 1903-1904 stemming from massive spending cuts laid out in the annual budget 
expenditure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer two years prior.71  A systematic 
redistribution of government funds was called for in the wake of the Second Boer War 
(1899-1902).  The South African conflict drained both significant financial and material 
resources from an over-extended treasury.  The cost of the war, for instance, increased 
the national debt by more than 25 percent and, when the repayment plan on the war loan 
was taken into account, the national debt actually rose 50 percent over three years (c.  
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1900-1903).72   
One must be mindful not to over-dramatize the decline of the British Empire or 
see in these financial constraints a parallel to the austerity measures undertaken by 
Western governments in our own time.  The last gasp of empire came not in 1914 but in 
the late 1940s and 1950s with the violent struggle for Indian independence and rapid 
decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the West Indies.  The empire was highly profitable at 
the turn of the twentieth century and still relatively inexpensive to govern.  Britain’s 
status as a Great Power in 1914, in fact, cost less to maintain per annum than any rival 
nation.73  This is a striking detail that must not be overlooked in the haste to depict 
militarism as the inexorable cause of the First World War and handmaiden of Britain’s 
imperial decline.74  
 But it is true that nations do not just “slither into war.”  Policy is developed at the 
top echelons of government and these decisions are arrived at, in part, because they seek 
to ameliorate a specific issue or concern.75  In October 1904, Admiral Fisher was 
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appointed first sea lord following the retirement of Admiral Walter Kerr.  He was 
charged with the task of reducing naval expenditures while simultaneously preparing the 
navy for war in the twentieth century.  There has been a great deal written on Fisher’s 
promotion of small, fast, torpedo armed crafts, including submarines for the economical 
“flotilla defence” of British home waters; his preference for fast, lightly armoured battle 
cruisers over the slower, heavily armoured “Dreadnought” battleship for high seas 
operations; and the conversion of the navy’s modern fuel supply from coal to oil.76  In his 
1995 article “British Naval Policy, 1913-1914,” and the books Sir John Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution (1999) and Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First 
World War (2012), naval scholar Nicholas A. Lambert argues that Britain’s Royal Navy 
was in a state of strategic flux on the eve of the First World War.  These works challenge 
the perception among historians that the Admiralty entered the war “with an outdated 
strategic thinking better suited to a navy from the age of sail than the age of steam.”77   
This dissertation accepts as axiomatic many of Lambert’s claims regarding 
Fisher’s plan to re-conceptualize the cash-strapped navy and the resistance he 
encountered from senior naval staff and government officials in trying to do so.  This 
chapter diverges, however, from Lambert’s thesis in two important ways.  Whereas he 
treats Fisher as an underappreciated visionary who could have created a stronger fleet if 
given the chance, I am fundamentally more concerned with what did happen and how it 
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shaped the inefficacy of the Allies’ blockade campaign during the first two years of the 
war.  Many of Fisher’s reforms were reversed by his traditionalist successor Admiral 
Arthur Wilson early in 1910, whose priority was the strengthening of the main battle 
fleet.  Although in October 1911 the dynamic thirty-six-year-old Winston Churchill 
became first lord of the Admiralty, and was sympathetic to Fisher’s balanced fleet theory 
(strong torpedo craft and fast battle cruiser forces), prevailing strategic opinion lobbied 
for two things: heavily armoured battleships to rival German naval construction and plans 
for a comprehensive blockade of Germany.78    
It is important to remember also that First Sea Lords did not determine national 
policy;79 they were ultimately forced to work within the bounds of a given cabinet’s 
purview.  By 1907-1908, naval budgets under Liberal Prime Ministers Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman and H. H. Asquith, who succeeded Campbell-Bannerman after the 
latter’s death in April 1908, were trimmed even more than in the post-Boer War era.  In 
December 1908 Asquith’s cabinet insisted the Admiralty draft a war plan elucidating the 
pros and the cons of waging economic warfare against Germany.  This document, entitled 
“The Economic Effect of War on German Trade,” argued that Germany’s economy 
would be crippled by a stoppage of imports via the North Sea and determined that even a 
slight rise in the price of raw materials and foodstuffs would significantly compromise 
the German war effort.80  It is therefore counter-intuitive to claim that the Royal Navy 
underwent a complete revolution in strategic direction and policy under John Fisher.  
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Fisher’s balanced fleet theory was no less visionary, but it took the stalemate of the First 
World War at sea, as it did on land, to fully demonstrate the need for better coordination  
of the fleet and armed services, as a whole.81            
Lambert concludes his new research on economic warfare by asserting that “the 
failure to make the blockade effective was not a function of the Royal Navy’s inability to 
carry it out, or the consequence of the continued neutral resistance (which admittedly 
remained considerable); rather, it was largely a result of the incapacity of the British 
system of government to coordinate and integrate departmental action.”82  He is correct to 
point out the incapacity of the state to properly manage the blockade, particularly during 
the first eighteen months of the war.  Regrettably, though, his analysis ends in February 
1916 with the appointment of Robert Cecil as Minister of the Blockade.  This is precisely 
when the British state began to comprehend the international scope and vast 
administration required to enforce these strict economic measures.  Consequently, this 
chapter ends in early 1916, while subsequent chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) explain this 
fundamental shift in policy with the growth of an efficient civil-military bureaucracy 
under David Lloyd George.  In effect, Lambert’s work ends where this present analysis 
begins. 
Prewar Planning and International Law 
 
Anglo-German tensions reached their apogee in the July Crisis (28 June - 31 July) that 
led to the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914.  The Royal Navy at once implemented a 
blockade of Germany in accordance with a 1909 recommendation from the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, which stated: “We are of the opinion that a serious situation would be  
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created in Germany owing to the blockade of her ports, and that the longer the duration  
of the war, the more serious the situation would become.”83  One must remember that 
naval blockades were prohibited unless they could be deemed legally “effective” (i.e. 
maintained with enough military force – as opposed to a paper declaration – while not 
blocking neutral vessels from entering or exiting their ports).  This principle was 
established with the 1856 Declaration of Paris and reaffirmed in the London Declaration 
Concerning the Laws of Naval War in 1909. 84                    
 In late 1908, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey invited senior diplomats 
from France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, 
and the United States to discuss, among other topics, what constituted contraband in 
times of war.  Sixty-four articles on international maritime law were drawn up in the 
British capital on 26 February 1909.85  Ultimately, the London Declaration decided which 
goods could be withheld from a belligerent nation on an “absolute” or “conditional” 
basis, and those that would have to remain on a “free” list of non-contraband items.  
Absolute items were non-negotiable goods that were considered essential to war 
production and, therefore, must be denied to the enemy.  These included explosives, 
guns, warships, armour, and military vehicles.  Conditional items, however, could serve 
both a military and civilian function – foodstuffs, clothing and fabrics, gold and silver, 
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paper money, and oil.86  Additionally, any of these essential items could move from the 
conditional to absolute contraband list if the blockading power felt it necessary when 
prosecuting the war effort.  
 Each nation at the conference wanted specific concessions to protect its food 
supply and maintain a basic standard of living if a global conflict were to arise.  Germany 
came to the table wanting to safeguard its ability to trade with northern neighbours such 
as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands.  For centuries Holland functioned as 
a natural entrepôt for goods entering and exiting Germany; Swedish iron ore, Norwegian 
copper, and American grain and cotton were all shipped to the Reich via the bustling port 
of Rotterdam.87  This helps to explain the German General Staff’s decision not to violate 
Dutch neutrality during the invasion of Belgium and France in the opening days of the 
war.  Indeed, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger noted that trade with the Netherlands was 
absolutely vital to Germany’s survival in a pan-European war: “For us, it will be of the 
utmost importance to have in Holland a country whose neutrality will assure imports and 
exports.  It will have to be our windpipe that enables us to breathe.”88  
British strategic planners also recognized the importance of neutral countries, but 
many were unsure how to seize contraband without violating their rights and the principle 
of freedom of the seas.  For John Fisher, however, the decision was quite simple.  In 
private correspondence with fellow diplomat Ernest Satow, senior conference delegate 
Sir Eyre Crowe recounted a frank conversation with the admiral:   
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Sir J. Fisher told me personally three days ago that in the next big war, our 
commanders would sink every ship they came across, hostile or neutral, if it 
happened to suit them.  He added, with characteristic vehemence, that we  
should most certainly violate the Declaration of Paris and every other treaty that  
might prove inconvenient.89   
The Foreign Office was aware of the Admiralty’s determination not to squander the 
economic and military advantages of a blockade of Germany.  Yet Grey could not 
disregard international law so easily.  He pressed for the participating nations to ratify the 
London Declaration, thereby binding the leading maritime powers, including Britain, to a 
strict code of what could and could not be seized in war.  The treaty passed through the 
British House of Commons with little controversy.  It required, however, the approval of 
the House of Lords, who collectively refused to ratify a document that clearly 
subordinated the Royal Navy’s command of the sea to the rights of neutral countries.  
Without the support of these powerful lords in the upper chamber of Parliament, Britain 
was forced to leave the naval treaty unsigned, as did the other nine countries invited to 
the conference proceedings.90  
When war broke out on 4 August 1914 the Asquith government adopted neither  
Fisher’s proposal to sink all ships, nor Grey’s insistence on adhering to the conventions 
set forth in the London and Paris Declarations.  Instead, the Liberal cabinet passed 
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several Orders in Council (most notably two on 21 September and 29 October 1914), 
which stated that goods initially safeguarded under the Declaration’s non-contraband free 
list could be arbitrarily seized.  Moreover, neutral countries previously not subject to 
search and seizure on the high seas had to prove that their cargo was not bound for the 
Central Powers.  Finally, in retaliation for Germany’s decision to declare a war zone 
around the British Isles, Britain extended the blockade on 11 March 1915 to cover all 
items passing through the Atlantic, North, and Mediterranean Seas.91 
 The Short War Illusion and Business as Usual 
Prewar expectations of a short war undeniably conditioned the Foreign Office and Board 
of Trade’s attitude to economic warfare.  Despite recent protracted conflicts such as the 
American Civil War (1861-1865), the “short war illusion” prevented politicians and 
military leaders from conceiving war plans beyond the first five months of combat.92  It is 
not surprising then that brokers in the City of London and businessmen throughout the 
country were given so little direction on economic policy if the war was to be over by 
Christmas.93   
The government encouraged companies to adopt a policy of “business as usual,” 
which entailed maintaining trade relations with countries that were not members of the 
Central Powers and establishing even friendlier relations with countries known to trade 
with Germany. “This war will have a most excellent effect,” proclaimed Liberal M.P. and 
economist Leo Chiozza Money, “upon [the] British economy and British enterprise.  The 
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British trader, therefore… may confidently count upon several years [of] freedom from 
German competition.”  The war, in short, provided a rare opportunity to supplant with 
British goods some of Imperial Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s estimated £400 
million in annual trade. 94  Yet many companies grew ambivalent about cutting off 
supplies to Germany – Britain’s largest trading partner – once the expectations of a short 
war proved illusory.   
Morality did not figure in most businessmen’s discussion of Germany in the early 
war years nor was it a lack of patriotism that caused British businesses to continue 
trading with the enemy.  Pragmatism, rather, informed their day-to-day mindset.95  Trade 
between the Allies and Central Powers was also made easier by the accepted laissez-faire 
attitude of the Board of Trade.  The Board’s president Walter Runciman openly 
supported free trade, while the War Trade Department, whose task it was to issue trade 
licenses to export aboard, was woefully understaffed and often hurried the investigation 
process to facilitate greater trade.96  Justices of the Peace had to notarize these licenses 
and ensure that the applicant sufficiently detailed a cargo manifest and specified a final 
destination for the goods.  It was not uncommon, however, for magistrates to pre-
authorize trade licenses or even permit an applicant to write in pencil, thereby allowing 
companies to submit doctored papers whose contents and destination were never 
officially verified.      
These trade violations were innocuous at first, beginning with the magistrates’ 
expeditious licensing of British goods, but they were nonetheless indicative of a laxness 
                                                        
94 Leo Chiozza Money, “British Trade and the War,” Contemporary Review 106 (July-December 
1914), quoted in John McDermott, “Total War and the Merchant State,” 63. 
95 David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1982), 73-76; McDermott, “‘A Needless Sacrifice’,” 265. 
96 McDermott, “Trading with the Enemy,” 207.   
 40 
 
 
 
in the blockade administration.  The Home Office, who oversaw the war effort on the 
home front, ultimately came to a similar conclusion in a report to the C.I.D. in early 
1915: “… these instances seem to throw considerable doubt upon the efficiency of such 
declaration as a safeguard against enemy trading.”97  Recent research suggests though 
that the Home Secretary Reginald McKenna would have resigned had the practice of 
business as usual fallen by the wayside in August 1914.  Like Runciman at the Board of 
Trade, McKenna was a devout free-trader who believed that stopping all trade to 
Germany would do more harm than good to the British economy.98 
Indirect Trade and the Northern Neutrals 
As a result of this haphazard administration and the liberal capitalist tendencies of 
Asquith’s cabinet, raw materials and foodstuffs still reached German ports in 1914-1915 
and continued unimpeded until mid-1916.  In fact, large quantities of Dutch meat, 
potatoes, butter, and eggs were imported to Germany throughout 1915 at five times the 
prewar rate.  The Dutch were without question the “windpipe” that enabled Imperial 
Germany to breath, especially after the 11 March 1915 British Order in Council 
stipulated that food was now contraband.99   
Why did neutral countries continually break the Allied blockade and risk 
unnecessary involvement in the First World War?  This question is not only vital to 
understanding the varying motives of neutral powers, but also sheds light on the early 
inefficacy of the blockade machinery.  Perhaps Grey articulated this transatlantic 
quandary best when he addressed the House of Commons on 26 January 1916: “You 
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have no right to deprive neutrals of goods which are genuinely intended for their own 
use… You cannot take over the administration of neutral countries… It is not in our 
power to do that under whatever system you have, whether you call it blockade, or 
whatever name you give to it.”100  There were several objections to Grey’s viewpoint, but 
he persisted in arguing that Germany was bound to receive supplies via the neutrals and it 
would be far more advantageous to offer them trade incentives than a public rebuff or, 
worse yet, a heavy-handed threat.101  This was a common assumption in Asquith’s 
government; the United States notwithstanding, neutral countries were geographically 
situated between hegemonic land and sea powers.  Britain and Germany demanded 
respect and economic cooperation in their quest for victory.  Germany, however, was 
more willing to resort to coercion.  
The sinking of the RMS Lusitania off the Irish coast on 7 May 1915 stands as one 
of the defining moments of the war.  The ocean liner was bound for New York when a  
German submarine (Unterseeboot or U-boat) torpedoed and sank the ship, killing nearly 
1,200 people onboard, including 80 children and 128 Americans.102  The Imperial 
German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine) reasoned that the British passenger liner was 
carrying war matérial to the Entente powers and was thus fair game.  This act marked the 
midway point of Germany’s initial use of unrestricted submarine warfare to offset its 
commercial shipping losses inflicted by the Allied blockade at the start of the war.  Yet 
the main difference between the two modes of blockade – the Allied surface blockade 
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versus the German U-boat – was that the Royal Navy did not sink enemy or neutral 
vessels without warning and citizens of neutral countries were not deliberately killed to 
demonstrate one’s naval superiority.103   
The long-term ramifications of U-boat warfare will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter.  In the short term, however, these reprisals had the effect of scaring 
neutral countries into compliance with German trade demands.  Consequently, most 
neutrals felt “bound to give Germany the largest quantity of foodstuffs they could, as 
otherwise the Germans would… torpedo their vessels without mercy.”104  The sinking of 
the Lusitania did not immediately compel the United States to enter the war.  It did, 
however, temporarily undercut Allied trade with ambivalent neutrals and reinforce the 
fact that this was a total war where morality could be subordinated for the “good” of the 
war effort.105  This was both a costly and dangerous precedent to set.    
French Economic Tactics: Too Little, Too Late? 
From August 1914 to April 1917 the naval blockade of the Central Powers was ostensibly 
a British affair.  But this should not diminish the supporting role of the French.  The 
Third Republic was stretched both financially and militarily by the German invasion and 
subsequent race to the sea that bogged down the Deutsches Heer and solidified the 724 
km stretch of Franco-Belgian territory known as the Western Front.  Unlike Asquith’s 
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Britain, the centrist government of President Raymond Poincaré could not devote 
considerable time or resources to a program of economic warfare when the need was 
much greater at the front.  From the outset of the war the blockade tactics of the French 
were clearly meant to support British policy rather than being developed in tandem with 
it.106                  
 Very little has been written about France’s role in the Allied blockade, but the 
work that does exist – both in French and English – is certainly worth considering.  The 
closest one gets to an official history is Louis Guichard’s The Naval Blockade, 1914-
1918.  Published in 1930 with the aid of documents from the historical section of the 
French Navy, the monograph is sympathetic to the predicament of French policymakers, 
who were consistently thwarted by the British policy of business as usual.107  Where the  
French wanted to isolate Germany economically, the British second-guessed this strategy 
for the sake of diplomatic appearances.  Where the British were lenient with companies 
caught trading with the enemy, the French advocated decisive policies to eradicate trade 
leakages.  This is the tone of Guichard’s narrative for the early war years.  The author 
was a lieutenant in the French Navy during the Great War, which partly explains his 
frustrations with inter-Allied diplomacy and the blockade machinery as a whole.   
Guichard is not wrong to suggest that the blockade was “marked by two years of 
infirmity of purpose born of fear of offending the neutrals.”108  Yet he is incorrect to 
assume that the machinery’s flaws and inefficacy were entirely British in design.  In fact,  
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France’s difficulty in mounting an effective program of economic warfare had little to do 
with the size of the French Navy or their headstrong ally across the Channel.  From the 
war’s outset the government discussed what economic options were available to it.  In 
November 1914, Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé proposed that an inter-ministerial 
committee be established to handle all matters pertaining to the blockade.  He used as an 
example the British model of the Restriction of Enemy Supply Committee to gain 
Parliament’s assent.109  Moreover, he discussed the committee in detail with 
representatives from the Ministries of War, Finance, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and 
Foreign Affairs, who all agreed to share departmental resources with the creation of the 
Comité de Restriction des Approvisionnements et du Commerce de l’Ennemi (more 
commonly known as Comité R.).   
Delcassé’s plan, while not wholly original, was a practical option that could have 
centralized the French blockade effort.  The committee initially investigated the re-
exportation of goods from neutral Switzerland to Germany, while Britain concentrated 
their efforts on the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.  In early 1915, the 
French determined that Italy, a country rich with olive trees, was suddenly importing a 
vast amount of olive oil from Spain.  When cross-referenced with their prewar imports, 
the Comité could see that Italy did not typically purchase olive oil from Spain or any 
other country for that matter.  Further investigation revealed that the Italians were 
importing the oil only to re-export it to Germany via Switzerland.  The cooking oil was 
then used by the German army as a substitute for gasoline, which was considered  
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“conditional” contraband under both the Declaration of London and more extensive 11  
March Order in Council.110  This is merely one example of the kind of work undertaken 
by the French Foreign Ministry to eradicate trading with the enemy.  The Italian case was 
partially rectified with its declaration of war against the Central Powers in May 1915.  
Indeed, with Italy joining the war on the Entente side, exports to Switzerland dried up, 
leaving the Reich to fend for itself in both the production and distribution of oil.111   
 Despite the Comité proving to be an efficient and reliable means of curtailing 
trade with the enemy, Parliament and the War Ministry vehemently resisted any attempt 
to expand its discretionary powers.  For instance, Delcassé appropriately advocated 
preclusive purchasing of neutral goods bound for the Central Powers.  This policy 
entailed monitoring closely what items Germany regularly purchased from neutral 
countries – be it cattle from Switzerland or sulfuric acid from Norway – and stockpiling 
them to deprive the enemy of essential goods.  Admittedly, it would have required a 
substantial commitment from the government to finance such a project.  The War 
Ministry cried foul, claiming that francs should not be needlessly diverted from the front 
to sponsor preclusive purchasing of “random” goods.  Parliament, meanwhile, baulked at 
the thought of its prerogative powers being usurped by an inter-ministerial body, even 
though the Comité possessed no decision-making rights.112  One can see that France’s 
greatest problem with the blockade in 1914-1915 was financial in nature, made worse by 
inter-service rivalry that hampered a viable policy of economic warfare.   
It is telling that interest in preclusive purchasing was revived in February-March  
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1916 at the behest of French Premier Aristide Briand and General Joseph Joffre.113  
Joffre, as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, experienced devastating losses at the 
Battle of Verdun (roughly 140,000 deaths over a two month period), as the Fifth German 
Army attempted to “bleed the French white” and knock them out of the war altogether.  
The brutal fighting continued for an additional eight months with total death figures 
exceeding 300,000 men on each side.114  Briand looked to the Comité to facilitate a trade 
deal with the Netherlands, whereby France would purchase meat from the Dutch above 
market value to deprive Germany of a vital source of protein.  By 1916, the war of 
attrition as experienced daily at Verdun and the Somme was now waged over the 
distribution of food on the home front.115       
American Neutrality and the Moral Predicament  
The United States was the most powerful country to proclaim its neutrality at the start of 
the First World War, much to the consternation of the Allies who struggled to persuade 
the Americans as to the “righteousness” of their respective blockades.  U.S. neutrality 
was a hard fought principle dating from George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality 
in April 1793, which gave Congress the right to decide when to go to war.116  The  
Proclamation and more extensive Act of Neutrality (1794) made plain that the United  
States’ neutrality was non-negotiable and their loyalty not for sale in the ongoing Anglo-
French wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  
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Woodrow Wilson echoed Washington’s sentiments upon Germany’s violation of 
Belgian neutrality and the Entente’s declaration of war against the Central Powers.  The 
Democratic President publicly stated that although “the United States is on terms of 
friendship and amity with the contending Powers,” the government would not tolerate 
acts of war on American territory or in their jurisdiction and, equally, forbade U.S. 
citizens and companies from participating in the European war.117  Wilson’s speech 
outlined the nature of American neutrality by identifying specific acts that were 
considered tantamount to violating U.S. sovereignty.  Broadly, they were:  
(1) Accepting a commission or post in a belligerent’s land or sea force. 
(2) Enlisting to serve in a belligerent’s land or sea force. 
(3) Hiring or retaining a person to enlist in said belligerent’s military. 
(4) Procuring arms for a belligerent.  
(5) Aiding in any way a vessel known to be a ship of war. 
(6) Engaging in privateering.  
 
The President concluded by noting that America would not permit belligerent vessels to 
frequent its waters for the purposes of engaging in hostile activity.  He referenced the 
likelihood of a naval blockade in the Atlantic and cautioned Americans to avoid, at all 
costs, transporting soldiers or contraband of war.118  
 Wilson’s Proclamation of Neutrality did not distinguish between a legal versus 
paper blockade, but critics of the Allied blockade policy certainly did.  The State  
Department told the U.S. ambassador in London on 26 September 1914 to remind Grey 
that the Declaration of London was not a document of convenience.  Its principles ought 
to be adhered to rather than enforcing certain ones acceptable only to the British 
Admiralty.  The Americans believed Britain was flagrantly violating articles in the 
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declaration that ran counter to their long-distance blockade of Germany.  In particular, 
the State Department objected to Britain’s liberal application of the doctrine of 
“continuous voyage,” which permitted the Royal Navy to seize a neutral ship’s cargo on 
the presumption that it was destined for the Central Powers.  Here, the British did not 
have to prove that the ship’s captain had foreknowledge of the contraband (i.e. 
establishing intent to transport sensitive matérial), or that all of the cargo was bound for a 
belligerent power.119  Thus neutral ships were more likely to be seized under the current 
British blockade system. 
Did the Royal Navy aggressively apply the doctrine of continuous voyage and, in 
the process, seize many neutral goods unintended for enemy use?  The answer is 
affirmative in both cases.  Yet, as the papers of Admiral M. W. W. P. Consett, a British 
naval attaché stationed in Sweden and Denmark, and Rear-Admiral Dudley De Chair, 
Commander of the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron attest, there were many instances 
where contraband passed undetected in 1914-1915.120  Moreover, the Americans were not 
entirely in a position to criticize Great Britain’s right to blockade.  Throughout these 
early diplomatic talks the United States held firm that Britain was enforcing a large scale 
paper blockade, which had been outlawed in the Declaration of Paris nearly six decades 
prior.  But the problem was that the Americans, like the other delegates at the naval 
conference, never ratified the London Declaration.  Furthermore, unlike Britain, France,  
and Prussia, the United States was not a signatory of the Declaration of Paris, and was  
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thus unable to invoke its provisions.121    
There was also the issue of historical precedent to take into consideration.  On 2 
April 1915, the State Department took exception to Britain’s Order in Council that 
declared the entire North Sea and Atlantic a war zone.  There is little doubt that American 
statesmen such as presidential advisor Colonel Edward M. House and Walter Hines Page, 
the U.S. ambassador to Britain, were sympathetic to the Allied cause.  What they 
objected to, though, was the stoppage of American vessels carrying non-contraband items 
and the cordon of Royal Naval Reserve cruisers restricting neutral ports.122  Even the 
sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 did not lessen the State Department’s opposition to 
the Allied blockade, which Secretary of State Robert Lansing denounced in November as 
totally “ineffective, illegal, and indefensible.”123   
Recent history, however, played in Britain’s favour.  The British had experienced 
similar economic injury under the Union blockade of the Confederate states during the 
Civil War, during which the English cotton industry was decimated without supplies 
from the American South.  In 1861 President Abraham Lincoln stated that neutral trade 
would not be interfered with, but any ship – regardless of nationality – caught running the 
blockade would be stopped and its cargo potentially seized.  Additionally, the North 
would not permit merchant vessels to come within a certain radius of a blockaded port or 
coast.124  To circumvent the Northern blockade British merchants began trading in greater 
volume in the West Indies, particularly in Bermuda and the Bahamas, which lay 
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strategically close to the Confederate ports of Wilmington, North Carolina, Charleston, 
South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia.125  British and Confederate vessels repeatedly 
ran Lincoln’s blockade in an attempt to maintain trade relations with one another and, in 
the case of the former, reaffirm their naval superiority in the age of Pax Britannica.  
Despite Britain’s neutrality and the Paris Declaration that prohibited blockading 
neutral ports, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that blockades did not have to be enforced at 
close range to be legally effective.  This caveat was decided in the heat of battle to give 
the North greater latitude in their fight against the South.  It was done without consulting 
international maritime law yet it established a precedent that allowed navies to more 
efficiently deploy their fleet at strategic points rather than forming a ring around a single 
port or body of water.126  Ultimately, the Union blockade of the American South 
demonstrated the ideal way to establish a blockade at a safe distance, which better suited 
modern navies equipped with new weapon systems and wireless technology.  
 This caveat placed the United States in a unique moral predicament throughout 
1914-1916.  The Royal Navy, after all, was employing the American practice of a distant 
blockade but on a grander scale.  When the situation had been reversed during the Civil 
War, the United States redefined the parameters of belligerency – legally and 
geographically – by expanding the blockade radius to cover up to 1,000 miles off the 
southern U.S. coast.127  There, the Northern fleet could lie in wait for neutral or 
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belligerent vessels attempting to run the blockade. The irony was not lost on British 
journalists and intellectuals who spoke openly about the hypocrisy of American opinion 
on the Allied blockade.   
In a tense exchange in the pages of The Atlantic Monthly, Oxford classicist 
Gilbert Murray rebuked American journalist and, later, Committee on Public Information 
(CPI) propaganda expert Arthur Bullard for his belief that “We have apparently started ‘a 
wholesale repudiation of legal restraints [and] decided that there is no sea law’.”128  
Bullard, of course, argued that neutral countries ought to have greater control over their 
transatlantic trade and, secondly, that an international prize (naval) court should be 
established to protect neutrals from the vagaries of belligerents’ war aims. This is what 
Grey asked of the Great Powers at the London Declaration in 1909.  Thus the failure to 
ratify the naval treaty and establish a prize court129 led Bullard to wonder whether, “he 
[Grey] has been effaced by the British Junkers and, no longer directing British policy, is 
now reduced to the rôle of registering it and trying – not very successfully – to justify 
it?”130  His accusations spoke to the prevailing opinion among U.S. nationalists that  
America alone shouldered the burden of freedom and democracy while old world Europe 
was tearing itself apart. 
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 These moralistic sentiments did not sit well with Professor Murray and other 
British writers who put pen to paper to remind the United States that they, too, neglected 
freedom of the seas in favour of a wartime blockade against the enemy.131  Moreover, 
these writers invoked history to discredit the official German claim that Britain was 
willfully starving women and children on the home front to hasten an Allied victory.  
Doubt was cast, for example, on Germany’s adherence to international law with the 
“rape” of Belgium in the opening days of the war.  The extent of the German army’s 
cruelty and cowardice was recounted in popular verse with the 1915 poem In The Trail of 
the Hun:  
Women screen your firing-line/Villages burned down to dust/  
Torture, murder, bestial lust/Filth too foul for printer’s ink/  
Crimes from which the apes would shrink/Strange the offers that you press/  
On the God of Righteousness!132 
In pamphlets published for both British and American readership writers continued to 
juxtapose British morality with the seeming inhumanity of the German High Command 
or Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), who sacrificed innocent lives – be they Belgian, 
French, German or American – for the sake of an additional three hundred feet of 
territory or one less ship carrying potential war matérial.133   
This increasing disregard for civilian lives and the greater need to assert one’s 
national rights, in the end, pushed neutral countries towards a more active form of  
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participation in the First World War.  For the United States it was a thirty-two month 
evolution from neutral to belligerent, while Scandinavia and the Netherlands continued to 
moderate a fine line between proud neutrality and collaboration with Allies and the 
Central Powers with often varying degrees of success.  Britain entered the First World 
War with definite assumptions concerning the nature and scope of the conflict in 
Europe.134   What appeared to be a war for dynastic power and territorial aggrandizement 
in the Balkans turned into a global conflagration.  Prewar expectations were quickly 
replaced and tempered with limited victories and high mortality rates.   
Ultimately, Asquith’s Liberal government experienced a steep learning curve with 
the naval blockade of the Central Powers and spent the first two years of the war 
placating neutrals and British businessmen.  Taken together, the blockade policy of the 
Allies c. 1914 to early 1916 lacked a coherent strategy and an inter-departmental 
administration to implement necessary changes.  Yet 1916 was a year in which 
belligerents and neutrals were tested like never before.  Verdun and the Somme 
completely disavowed the Great Powers of the short war illusion and helped to remind 
them “… we are now proceeding on the assumption that this will be a long war,” 135 
where business as usual would no longer suffice.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BEYOND A “NEEDLESS SACRIFICE”: TOTAL WAR AND THE 
TIGHTENING OF THE BLOCKADE, 1916-1918 
 
New Players, New Approach  
 
By early 1916 there was a widespread belief in the British Parliament that the current 
prosecution of the war was simply not enough to achieve victory at the front.  
Commenting on the difficulty of breaking the strategic deadlock, Britain’s Secretary of 
State for War, Lord Kitchener, said in dismay: “I don’t know what is to be done.  This 
isn’t war.”136  After nearly eighteen months of continuous fighting, and seeing no clear 
end in sight, politicians scrambled to reassure soldiers and civilians that their sacrifices 
were not in vain.  The British public and the Press demanded more accountability of 
Prime Minister H. H. Asquith’s government and, in return, more was expected of the 
country in its fight against Imperial Germany.137  Ultimately, 1916 was the year in which 
the Entente and the Central Powers ratcheted up the military, political, and socio-
economic stakes in a process that military historian Alan Kramer has aptly referred to as 
the “radicalization of warfare” between 1914 and 1918.138  
This chapter explores the crucial ways in which the naval blockade of Germany 
was increasingly tightened during the last three years of the war (i.e. January 1916 to 
November 1918).  It argues that drastic changes were made to the existing machinery of 
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the blockade after 1915, which fostered greater inter-allied and departmental cooperation 
and wrecked havoc on German food supply and morale. 
The creation of a separate Ministry of the Blockade in February 1916, for 
example, provided the British government with an opportunity to more clearly define its 
economic and naval policy vis-à-vis belligerent rights.  Several important changes were 
made by the Ministry to halt the flow of goods entering Germany, which allowed the 
Foreign Office to exert more control over the commerce of neutral countries.139  It has 
been said, “… that the chief achievement of the British Navy [throughout the First World 
War] was to conquer the co-operation of the world.”140  At first glance, the word 
“conquer” may seem misplaced because Britain did not silence its allies’ opinion or 
conquer neutral countries in their fight against the Central Powers.  What they insisted 
on, however, was tacit cooperation to overwhelm the enemy to the point of defeat.  In the 
face of these new stringent demands, the United States and neutral Scandinavian 
countries were forced to rethink the price of neutrality.141 
The sweeping changes to Britain’s blockade policy, along with the global crop 
failure of 1916, had a devastating impact on German food supply.  During the “Turnip 
Winter” of 1916-1917, caloric intake plummeted on the home front as scarce foodstuffs 
were diverted to soldiers at the front.142  Although resourceful substitutes were found for 
staple items like milk, pork, cheese, and butter, the vast majority of the country survived  
on a poor diet of watery turnips and stale bread.  
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 In order to overcome the increasing hunger and economic isolation, Kaiser  
Wilhelm II ordered the Imperial German Navy to resume the policy of unrestricted 
submarine warfare.  Beginning on 1 February 1917, German submarines were stationed 
in the Atlantic Ocean and the North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas with the aim to sink 
all ships – even neutral vessels – destined for Britain.143  It was a reckless gamble that 
failed primarily because the German High Command (OHL) did not adequately consider 
the ramifications of targeting neutral ships.144  They incorrectly believed that the loss of 
neutral and Entente shipping would starve Britain long before the U.S. could mobilize its 
navy or a sizable expeditionary force.145   
Indeed, the United States promptly broke off diplomatic relations within two days 
of the Kaiser’s declaration and cited submarine attacks on American shipping in its 
declaration of war on the Kaiserreich on 6 April 1917.  The entry of the United States as 
an “associated power” of the Entente marked a decisive turning point in the First World 
War.  American intervention brought about what has been described as the third and final 
phase of the conflict.146  An examination of the “hunger blockade” and its effects on 
Germany c. 1917-1918 will show that this assessment could not be more accurate.   
The creation of the Allied Blockade Committee (ABC) in December 1917 finally  
allowed the Allies to secure an airtight blockade of the Central Powers.147  It was the  
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culmination of more than three years of diplomatic manoeuvring to convince the United 
States that economic reprisal was the only responsible course of action against German 
belligerency at sea.  In the next chapter, “Chapter 4: Print War and the Art of 
Persuasion,” I discuss the lengths to which British press baron Lord Northcliffe went to 
sway U.S. public opinion in favour of intervention and capitalized on their involvement 
in a propaganda campaign that played on Germany’s fear of hunger and isolation.   
In this chapter, however, I examine the broader implications of the hunger 
blockade’s success.  How did the Allies completely prohibit neutral countries from 
trading with the Central Powers and what sort of physical effects did the Germans 
experience as a result of sustained malnutrition?  The answer to both questions will show 
that Britain’s blockade underwent massive structural changes starting in early 1916, 
which gradually wore down Germany’s resolve and undeniably aided in its defeat.148       
Administrative Changes and the Price of Neutrality 
 
As the war entered its second winter in December 1915, Britain’s top politicians, military 
personnel, and the press took stock of the year’s successes and failures both on land and 
at sea.  Admittedly, there was not much success to celebrate.  Highly publicized failures 
like the Battle of Loos (25-28 September), where, among other tactical errors, a poorly 
timed chlorine gas attack on German positions accidentally killed or wounded more than  
2,500 British troops,149 and the recent evacuation of the Allies from Gallipoli (beginning  
on 15 December 1915),150 confirmed for the British that even a strong numerical  
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advantage, use of chemical weapons, and considerable assistance from the Dominion 
countries had failed to turn the tide against the Central Powers.  If more troops from far-
flung corners of the world was not the key to victory, what then was the answer?    
  The Commander of the Grand Fleet, John Jellicoe, proposed that the government 
should tighten the naval blockade of Germany using whatever means possible.  In private 
correspondence with John Fisher, who retired as First Sea Lord over the Gallipoli fiasco 
in May 1915, Jellicoe voiced his disgust with the timidity of the Foreign Office in its 
handling of the Allied blockade: “I write letter after letter on the blockade questions, but 
the FO seems quite imbecile.  They are afraid of their own shadows and imagine that 
every neutral is anxious to go to war with us and can do us harm.  I don’t believe it and 
never shall till I see the declaration of war.”151   
Although Jellicoe’s words were harsh, he only voiced them to senior naval staff 
after learning that the Foreign Office quietly permitted the Northern Neutrals to stockpile 
domestic goods.152  He believed that there was only one reason why neutral countries 
would import and hoard commonplace items like grain, textiles, meat, and coffee – in 
order to re-export them to Germany at a much higher price.  In a separate meeting 
arranged by Arthur Balfour, current First Lord of the Admiralty and cousin of Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, Jellicoe discussed his concerns 
with the parliamentary under-secretary in early December.  Above all, he believed that 
greater pressure had to be applied to the neutrals; if they were not willing to voluntarily 
comply with Allied trade demands, then Britain would have to force them.   
Cecil, for his part, expressed how hamstrung he felt by Grey’s cautiousness and  
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did not bristle at Jellicoe’s advice to clamp down on neutral trade.  In fact, he welcomed 
suggestions on how to better exploit the economic angle of the war.  For the next several 
months, Cecil sent Jellicoe several confidential documents on the government’s blockade 
policy, in which he asked the admiral to critique the work of the Foreign Office.153  This 
entire exchange was done without Grey’s knowledge, but that, of course, was the whole 
idea.   
Grey, like Asquith, increasingly found himself without many allies as the war 
entered 1916.  Cecil intentionally distanced himself from his superior and watched while 
the criticism mounted.  As Lord Beaverbrook, the Anglo-Canadian owner of the London 
Evening Standard, later described the problem of Britain’s wartime leadership c. 1915-
1916: “The politicians gave little credit to the generals.  The generals denounced the 
politicians.  The soldiers and sailors serving in the forces had little confidence in either.  
The public had no heroes.”154       
By early February 1916, word had spread throughout the government that 
Britain’s blockade “leaked at every seam.”155  All signs pointed to the continued 
placation of the neutrals by the Foreign Office.  Conservative newspapers happily seized 
upon the opportunity to publish headlines denouncing the “make-believe blockade” as a 
“farce” perpetrated by an overly cautious foreign minister.  These were followed by 
subsequent newspaper articles and a heated debate in the House of Commons on 23 
February 1916 that clearly indicated Grey’s days were numbered when it came to the  
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blockade.156  The foreign secretary was well aware of the criticism he was garnering both 
in the media and in Parliament and wrote to Asquith to voice his concerns.   
Grey told the prime minister that he was unable to devote the proper time to 
effectively manage the naval blockade.157  He found that dealing with the neutrals took 
too much time away from his other duties and requested that Robert Cecil oversee all 
future blockade matters in his place.  In fact, this arrangement suited all the parties 
involved.158  The British press, Admiralty, Tory opposition, and even his colleagues in 
the Foreign Office all maintained that Grey did not have the stomach for total war.  
Therefore, his letter presented the government with an opportunity to reevaluate their 
priorities and craft a more cogent blockade policy in regards to belligerent rights.  Grey, 
meanwhile, could still retain his position as foreign minister – at least until Asquith’s 
government fell in December 1916 – while not compromising his stance on the 
preservation of neutral rights.159 
The prime minister took Grey’s advice seriously and consolidated the various 
trade departments (e.g. War Trade Department, War Trade Intelligence Department, War 
Trade Statistical Department, Rationing Committee, Foreign Trade Department, Section 
on Financial Transactions, and the Contraband Department) into one larger Ministry of 
the Blockade headed by Cecil.  Although Grey may have divested himself of the day-to-
day management of the blockade, Cecil’s workload increased exponentially.  He still 
                                                        
156 “The Make-Believe Blockade,” Morning Post, 15 February 1916; “The Blockade Farce,” Daily 
Mail, 16 February 1916; MP Major Hunt, Speech to the House of Commons, 23 February 1916, 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 80, col. 775.  See also, Armin Rappaport, The British 
Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 77; Richard Evans, From the 
Frontline: The Extraordinary Life of Sir Basil Clarke (Stroud: History Press Spellmount, 2013), esp. 
Chapter 10. 
157 Lambert, Planning Armageddon, 496.   
158 Excluding the neutrals, of course.    
159 Osborne, 120.  
 61 
 
 
 
served as the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, yet was now in charge of a 
complex new portfolio that answered directly to the Foreign Office.  As Minister of the 
Blockade, he also represented that department as well as the Foreign Office in 
Parliament, which brought with it another level of public visibility that ensured his work 
would – for better or worse – not go unnoticed.160 
 News reports of Cecil’s appointment were overwhelmingly positive.  For 
example, an editorial piece in The Spectator, Britain’s oldest politically independent 
magazine, remarked that:       
His appointment is a very important one.  It marks a new stage in the  
highly delicate business of managing the blockade… What Robert Cecil  
is required to do, and we are perfectly confident [he] will do, is to  
remember in every act that the blockade is a naval engine of war, and  
cannot be employed as though it were an engine of peace.  The object of  
the blockade must never be lost sight of for a moment.161 
Both the British press and the government agreed in rare unanimity – the naval blockade 
of Germany desperately needed tightening and Robert Cecil was considered the most 
capable politician for the job.     
A lawyer by profession, Cecil was well aware of the various legal constraints 
facing the Allies in their haste to end the policy of “business as usual.”162  Unlike Grey, 
however, he was willing to violate certain principles of international law in order to rule  
the waves.163  His first task was to limit the flow of exports from the neutral Scandinavian  
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countries to the Central Powers in a controversial practice known as forcible rationing – 
that is, forcing the Northern Neutrals to agree to prewar level imports on “absolute” and 
“conditional” contraband.  Beginning in late February and early March 1916, Cecil met 
with several legal advisors and trade officials regarding the status of Britain’s trade 
agreements with the Northern Neutrals.  Above all, he wanted to ascertain exactly how 
many goods were finding their way into German hands and, secondly, if there was legal 
precedent for restricting Allied exports to the neutrals.164    
 Cecil found the answer to both questions in a Foreign Office memorandum 
written by legal expert A. Pearce Higgins.  Higgins’ research into the legality of reducing 
neutral trade to prewar figures revealed that a myriad of goods (food, oils, and textiles) 
still passed undetected to Germany each month via Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland.  The importation of American wheat, for instance, 
collectively increased in the neutral European countries by over 31 million bushels from 
October 1914 to October 1915.165  This discovery, along with Jellicoe’s assertion that the 
forcible rationing of neutrals was the only solution for a tighter blockade, ultimately 
compelled Cecil to find a legal basis for such action.   
 Independent of Cecil’s request, Higgins studied countless documents on maritime  
and international law in order to find a legal precedent.  Try as he might though Higgins  
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could not find a suitable justification for forcible rationing.  Part of the problem stemmed, 
of course, from the fact that Britain had been a champion of the rights of neutral countries 
since 1856.166  After the March 1915 Order in Council that stipulated all goods destined 
for Germany were considered contraband, the neutrals agreed to voluntarily ration 
exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.167  But that was as much as the neutrals were 
willing to concede; they still refused to commit to specific amounts of exports and would 
most certainly baulk at the mention of limited imports from the Allies. 
 Nevertheless, it was Higgins’ recommendation that Britain should disregard the 
neutrals’ concerns in this particular instance.  He believed that the introduction of forced 
rations could be “morally justified” because the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 and 
the use of floating mines in international waters proved that Germany was not adhering to 
the same moral code of conduct.168  The neutrals were involved at this point whether they 
liked it or not.  Forced rations were seen as a small price to pay for ending the war as 
quickly as possible.169    
 In addition to the introduction of forced rations in neutral countries, the Ministry 
of the Blockade undertook two other measures to tighten its economic stranglehold 
against the Central Powers.  Starting in late February 1916, and continuing until the 
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in July 1919, the British compiled a list of 
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international companies with known ties to German banks and businesses.  These 
companies were publically blacklisted; their names were published on a “Statutory List” 
and distributed to foreign governments worldwide.170  To associate with a blacklisted 
firm was to endure the ultimate form of bureaucratic red tape.  Embassies in neutral 
countries were notified that all ships suspected of carrying blacklisted cargo would be 
immediately detained and subjected to a lengthy search and seize process.171   
The blacklist system was implemented by Cecil to dissuade the neutrals from 
trading with the enemy.  But he also realized that the neutrals required an incentive to 
completely suspend trade with such a lucrative and sizable market.172  In return for 
adhering to prewar levels of imports and limiting trade with the Central Powers, Britain 
did its best to expedite “legitimate” (i.e. permissible) trade between the United States, 
Entente, and the Northern Neutrals.  Beginning on 4 March 1916, American exporters 
were given the opportunity to ship goods through the Allied blockade zone without any 
interference from the Royal Navy.  They simply needed to apply to the British embassy 
in Washington, D.C. two weeks beforehand for what was called a “navicert” – a 
commercial passport that guaranteed the ship free passage to its destination.173   
Cross-referenced with the Statutory List, the embassy would either grant or deny  
the request for a navicert based on the applicant’s answers to six pertinent questions.  The 
Ministry of the Blockade wanted to know: (1) the name of the ship, (2) name of the 
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steamship line responsible for shipping the goods, (3) anticipated date(s) of shipment, (4) 
name and address of the American consignor, (5) name and address of the consignee in 
Britain, France, or the neutral Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, and, most 
importantly, (6) a list and detailed description (with exact figures) of the goods requested 
for shipment.  If the items did not notably exceed prewar levels and both the steamship 
line and U.S. consignor were not on the blacklist, then the certificate was usually 
granted.174   
The addition of navicerts made it far easier for goods to flow unimpeded across 
the Atlantic provided that they were sanctioned beforehand via the blacklist, while the 
introduction of forcible rations in neutral Europe ensured that extra food and other 
contraband did not fall into enemy hands.175   Statistics compiled by the Foreign Office in 
the first six months of the Ministry of the Blockade’s existence revealed that trade 
between the neutrals and Germany decreased as a result of these more stringent measures.   
For instance, the figures in Table 1 indicate that Danish exports to Germany 
dropped considerably between the summer of 1915 (i.e. prior to the introduction of 
forced rations and the Statutory List) and the autumn of 1916 (i.e. after their 
implementation).  Conversely, Danish exports to Britain steadily increased during the 
same period due to newly cemented trade agreements with the Entente and the influx of 
American goods expedited by the navicerts.176  The chart below is merely an example of   
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A Sample of Danish Exports to Britain and Germany, July 1915 – October 1916 
 
[Table 1] Source: Archibald C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated 
with Her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-1918 (London: H. M. Stationary 
Office, 1937), 476. 
 
the quantities and type of foodstuffs imported by the British and the Germans from  
Denmark; the trends were similar with Swedish, Dutch, and Norwegian exports.177  
Despite the fact that neutral exports were still reaching Germany into late 1916, the 
Ministry of the Blockade was actively working to stem the tide.  The salient point to 
remember is that these figures are representative of the deliberate and wholesale 
tightening of the blockade of Germany by the British in 1916.178   
Germany and the Turnip Winter of 1916-1917 
As early as October 1914, when the price of potatoes rose for the first time since the  
beginning of the war, Germans displayed “significant unrest” at the difficulty of  
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     Goods Exported from Denmark 
          (measured in metric tons)   
     To Britain   To Germany 
                Butter:                     
                July – December 1915         4,380         4,048 
                January – May 1916         4,720         3,529 
                June – July 1916         5,143         3,378 
                August 1916         4,844         3,639 
                September – October 1916         5,140         2,796 
                     
                Bacon:                   
                July – December 1915         7,353         2,514 
                January – May 1916         7,284         1,751 
                June – July 1916         7,216            721 
                August 1916         6,938         1,773 
                September – October 1916         8,264         1,345 
   
 67 
 
 
 
affording the food they readily consumed in peacetime.179  Yet it was not until the so-
called “Turnip Winter” (Kohlrübenwinter) of 1916-1917 that the food situation in 
Germany could be truly classified as dire.180  An early frost in the autumn of 1916 
destroyed the majority of the potato crop and ushered in an extraordinarily cold winter 
with average temperatures ranging from 0° to –32° Celsius.181  
 In place of potatoes as a staple item in the German diet, people on the home front 
reluctantly turned to the swede turnip (rutabagas) for their daily source of carbohydrates.  
Unlike potatoes, Germans rarely ate turnips prior to 1916.  In fact, they were widely used 
as pig fodder before the war,182 but the exceptionally poor harvest, harsh weather, and the 
simultaneous tightening of the naval blockade by the British183 were all factors that 
combined to make the winter of 1916-1917 a very challenging time for German 
civilians.184     
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The war diaries of Princess Evelyn Blücher, an educated Englishwoman who 
married into German nobility, were one of the first sources in English to describe the 
blockade’s impact on the day-to-day life of Germans who lived under its grip.  
Commenting on the precarious food situation in Berlin during the Turnip Winter, she 
states:  
 We are all growing thinner everyday, and the rounded contours of the 
German nation have become a legend of the past.  We are all gaunt and 
bony now, and have dark shadows round our eyes, and our thoughts are  
chiefly taken up with wondering what our next meal will be…185  
Blücher’s work is of unique interest to historians of the naval blockade and home front 
Germany c. 1914-1918.  Given that her ties to Lancashire were not entirely severed, she 
was an English lady living in enemy territory that had been her permanent home for more 
than a decade.  Far from being the poetic musings of a wealthy woman, Blücher’s 
writings attest to the fact that Allied success was achieved at a substantial cost to 
Germans on the home front.   
Initially, the slow denial of foodstuffs to the Central Powers had the effect of 
producing a tenacious and thrifty mindset in the German people.  Not content to live 
without basic items, ersatz items or substitutes were to be had for almost every 
conceivable good.  According to the German War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt or 
KEA), butchers could make over 800 “certified” varieties of sausage that substituted 
various items for protein and fat, while ground walnut shells and corn served as viable 
substitutes for coffee (the Germans were used to drinking ground chicory before the war) 
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and coarse Kriegsbrot or rationed bread was made from a combination of rye and wheat 
flour mixed with several substitute items (including turnips, of course).186 
But as the naval blockade tightened, conditions on the home front greatly 
deteriorated and substitutes became far more dubious in quality.  The government 
instituted more meatless days to conserve what little supplies of protein it had left.187  As 
one housewife from Leipzig wryly noted in her diary, she was quite content to eat the 
substitute for chicken or beef, which was rat.  It was only when the Germans were 
reduced to eating “substitute rat” that she truly felt aggrieved.188  To make matters worse, 
the War Food Office devised a new system of rationing in the autumn of 1916 that 
assigned extra meat and carbohydrates to skilled labourers and munitions workers, while 
“weak Germans”189 had their rations of meat and milk drastically reduced.  Although 50 
percent of all the work done in the munitions industry was carried out by women in 1917, 
the loss of rations for “weak” children and the elderly (i.e. those who did not work in the 
war industry) made for hungrier, more desperate families overall.190  
In 1913, a study conducted by doctors with the British Royal Society found that  
the average man expended approximately 3,000 calories a day.  Ideally, he should  
consume a minimum of 3,300 calories per day in order to account for a 10 percent loss in 
digestion.  Similarly, the study revealed that the average woman expended 2,300 calories 
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a day and, therefore, required roughly 2,650 calories to maintain proper nutrition.  The 
German government guaranteed its citizens at least 1,985 calories a day as late as April 
1916.191  Yet during the Turnip Winter the average middle to lower class German 
subsisted on only 1,000 calories a day.  Government rations could be supplemented, of 
course, but with the price of common foodstuffs increasing by nearly 800 percent on the 
black market over the course of the war, very few people ever had enough to eat.192     
 In contrast to wartime Germany, the standard of living improved for the average 
working class British family over the course of the war.  Social and military historian Jay 
Winter aptly describes this phenomenon as the “paradox of the Great War.”193  His 
research, along with other studies on Britain’s food supply 1914-1918, shows that while 
British civilians were not immune to rations, long food lines, and minor civil unrest in 
early 1918, they did not experience hunger or serious deprivation.  In fact, wage increases 
and temporary demographic shifts caused by soldiers being employed and fed by the 
state, women working long hours in factories, and a decline in the birth rate, meant that 
the average family’s buying power actually increased.  Overall, this “…is why even 
though aggregate food supply declined during the war, nutritional levels rose.”194           
Conversely, by 1917 in Germany, the search for food consumed the majority of  
people’s free time on the home front.  Most days began the same way.  The household 
awoke early to frigid, damp air, having chosen to conserve their supply of coal for 
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cooking.  Breakfast, however, left much to be desired; usually a stale piece of Kriegsbrot 
and, depending on the age of the children, a small glass of watered down milk or ersatz 
coffee.195  If a person was employed in the munitions industry, they were forced to work 
seven days a week for fifteen hours a day.196  This grueling work schedule denied them 
the opportunity to stand in line for rations, which had become a fulltime job – typically 
ten hours a day – during the last two years of the war.  In place of their parent(s), children 
began skipping school in order to stand in breadlines from dusk to dawn.  Truancy rates 
skyrocketed, although very little could be done to enforce attendance because “hunger, 
exhaustion, cold, inflation, mass conscription, and emotional trauma had uprooted the 
traditional relationships of authority in nuclear families.”197 
 Many Germans simply resorted to theft when the monotony of queuing for rations 
became too time-consuming.  In fact, the term “self-help” was coined late in the war as a 
euphemism to describe the increasing theft of everyday items like coal, food, and 
clothing.198  Butcher shops and grocers were routinely looted and groups of 
schoolchildren (some as young as twelve-years-old) took to robbing freight trains and 
tram/passenger cars en route to urban areas.  Stealing was not just a young person’s game  
either.  Theft rates among women increased by 82 percent from 1914 to 1918.199   Many  
farmers and food purveyors refused to sell their products at urban market stalls because 
gangs of women and children repeatedly stole from them.200               
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Types of Crimes Committed by Women in Berlin, 1913-1918 
 
        [Figure 1] Source: Statistics from Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food Politics, and Everyday    
        Life in World War I (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 223.  Chart  
        from David A. Janicki, “The British Blockade during World War I: The Weapon of Deprivation,”  
        Student Pulse: International Student Journal 6, no. 6 (2014): 5. 
 
For example, Figure 1 shows the correlation between Germans’ standard of living 
on the home front and the rise in the number of thefts perpetrated by women in wartime 
Berlin.  Incidences of fraud, forgery, and embezzlement remained virtually unchanged 
from their prewar rate, which is important to note in relation to the massive increase in 
female theft convictions starting in 1916, when the Allies effectively tightened their 
blockade against the Central Powers, peaking in 1918 with 50,000 convictions after two 
years of a starvation diet.  Meanwhile, the police regularly sent informers to stand in 
ration lines as a way to measure the “mood of the people” in major German cities.   
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Informants reported hearing chants of “finish up with that ridiculous war, we’re croaking 
of hunger!” and “enough with that murder at the front… we don’t want to starve any 
longer!”201 
Given that material goods were in short supply both at home and on the 
battlefield, German police were known to enter homes unannounced throughout 1917 and 
search for “excess” goods to be sent to the front.  Policemen typically raided closets in 
search of spare and mismatched bits of clothing.202  By the end of the brutal Turnip 
Winter, it was obvious to the authorities that Germans on the home front were hungry, 
exasperated, and slowly starving to death.  How long could the home front realistically 
hold out given these extreme conditions?  That was the question on everyone’s mind.  
The Imperial German government ultimately decided that it, too, should ratchet up its 
naval operations in an effort to end the war as quickly as possible.           
U-Boats, American Intervention, and the Allied Blockade Committee 
Tired and hamstrung by the increasing “strategic passivity” of the Imperial German  
Navy, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff was convinced that his country could defeat 
the British by waging a more aggressive counter-blockade against Allied merchant 
shipping.  The head of the German Admiralty Staff became a vocal proponent of 
reinstituting unrestricted submarine warfare – the sinking of enemy and neutral vessels 
without warning – after the Allies took steps to tighten the blockade against Germany  
in early 1916.203   
Using statistics compiled by the influential German banker Dr. Richard Fuss, 
Holtzendorff wrote several proposals over a ten-month period in which he advocated the 
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German navy attack all merchant ships bound for Great Britain.  Given the British Isles’ 
dependence on seafaring trade, he wagered that if the German navy sank 600,000 tons of 
goods en route to Britain each month, the Allies would be forced to sue for peace no later 
than August 1917.204  Holtzendorff wrote more than half a dozen versions of the same 
memorandum espousing the advantages of unrestricted submarine warfare, but it was his  
22 December 1916 report that finally convinced Kaiser Wilhelm II to proceed.   
It was this now-or-never mentality that appealed to the German High Command at 
the end of 1916 (especially the new Chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg, and 
First Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff).  Crop failure and colder temperatures 
were widespread throughout Western Europe during the latter half of the year.  However, 
the Allied naval blockade exacerbated the poor living conditions in Germany by denying 
civilians the opportunity to offset their meager food supply with imports from around the 
world.  Although the Germans were facing their coldest and leanest year in recent 
memory, Holtzendorff truly thought that Germany could turn the tables on Britain with 
its “strategic” use of U-boats and win the war.205  Even Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg, who was Holtzendorff’s biggest critic regarding the use of 
unrestricted submarine warfare begrudgingly stated, “… if the military authorities  
consider the U-boat war essential, I am not in a position to contradict them.”206    
 Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917.  The 
controversial decision violated international law and further isolated Germany from the 
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international trading community.  Woodrow Wilson, for instance, immediately severed 
all diplomatic communication with the Kaiserreich and encouraged other neutrals to 
follow suit.207  The real turning point came less than a month later when a British ocean 
liner (RMS Laconia) was sunk off the coast of Ireland.  The Laconia was traveling from 
the United States back to England when a German U-boat torpedoed the ship on 25 
February 1917, killing two American citizens – a woman and her young daughter – four 
British civilians, and six British crewmembers.208  In his 2 April address to Congress on 
the eve of America’s entry into the war, President Wilson referenced the incident, 
arguing: “that neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is 
involved… and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic 
governments… We have seen the last of neutrality under these circumstances.”209             
Even before the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) saw combat on the  
Western Front, it was the United States’ economic contribution to the Allied war effort 
that helped turn the tide against the Central Powers.210  As the most powerful neutral in 
the world, America’s decision to abandon its neutrality forced other neutrals to rethink 
their position on the war.  Geography was a key factor for neutrals on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  South American countries like Brazil, Guatemala, and Bolivia were very quick 
to side with the United States and promptly joined the Allied embargo of the Central 
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Powers in April 1917.211  The Northern Neutrals, however, were far more reluctant to 
sever all ties with Germany given their proximity to Central Europe and longstanding 
history of commercial trade.  
Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare further compounded the 
problem of allegiance.212  Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian ships, in fact, refused to sail 
across the North Sea to Britain for fear of being attacked by German U-boats.  As 
Minister of the Blockade, Lord Cecil openly chided the Northern Neutrals for not 
complying with pre-existing trade agreements stating: “if you go on playing the game of 
the Germans, you will be starved [too].  We’re going to apply some very drastic 
measures.”213  This was no idle threat on Cecil’s part.  He was frustrated with neutral 
Europe and seriously considered reneging on Britain’s promise to expedite sanctioned 
trade between Europe and North America.   
American intervention ultimately ensured that the Allies could adopt an even 
harsher stance with Germany and the European neutrals with virtually no 
repercussions.214  The goal was to make the blockade as airtight as possible and the 
United States had very definite ideas on how to best achieve economic and naval 
predominance in the final years of the war.  In addition to joining the naval blockade of 
the Central Powers, the U.S. State Department announced a partial embargo of U.S. 
exports to the Northern Neutrals in the summer of 1917 for staple items like steel, iron, 
minerals, oil, meat, fodder, fertilizer, and grain.215   
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The Wilson administration also insisted on the creation of a new inter-allied 
council to oversee the day-to-day running of the blockade.  Knowing full well that the 
Ministry of the Blockade was answerable only to the British prime minister and the 
Foreign Office, the U.S. government was reluctant to impose such harsh economic 
measures without an equal say in the formation of policy.216  France was the first country 
to broach the idea of creating a blockade council compromised of British and French 
policymakers in September 1915.  The Asquith government immediately rejected the idea 
and France grudgingly agreed to leave the day-to-day organization of the blockade 
primarily to the British.217  Two years later, though, and facing the German U-boat 
menace alone, Britain realized that it needed to cooperate more with its allies. 
 Therefore, in December 1917, the British Foreign Office called a meeting with 
Robert Cecil and various trade officials from the United States, Italy, and France to 
discuss the creation of a joint council known as the Allied Blockade Committee 
(ABC).218  Using the Ministry of the Blockade for its administrative framework, the ABC 
named Lord Cecil its chairman, appointed war trade officials from each of the Allied 
countries, and also included a representative from the Foreign Office.  It is important to 
note that even after the U.S. entered the war, with three out of six committee members 
hailing from Britain, there was no denying that the British were still in charge of the 
Allied naval blockade.219  In theory, this joint venture provided the Allies with a unified 
voice in matters of economic and naval policy.  In practice, however, the Allied Blockade 
Committee merely continued the work of the Ministry of the Blockade under a more  
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palatable name.   
The first major initiative passed by the ABC made it more difficult for  
German U-boats to openly attack Allied shipping.220  The U.S. Navy advocated creating a 
vast minefield in the North Sea that would stretch from the Scottish Highlands to the 
southern tip of Norway and act as a buffer between the British Isles, Allied and neutral 
commerce, and enemy submarines.  Construction of the “Northern Barrage,” as it was 
called, began on 3 March 1918 under the direction of U.S. Mine Force Commander 
Joseph Strauss.  The joint Anglo-American project took eight months to complete.  In 
total, the Allies painstakingly laid 70,000 mines packed with a combined weight of 21 
million lbs. of dynamite.221  Official estimates from the U.S. Navy reckoned that the 
mines were responsible for destroying four U-boats and damaging twelve others.222   
In an excerpt from a poem written by several members of Mine Force Squadron  
One, the main group tasked with completing the Northern Barrage, the men proudly 
characterized their role in the Allied war effort as follows:  
At fall of dusk we softly steal/From out each firth; and forth/ 
Seeking the aid of night’s dark tide/To strike hard from the North… 
Until the world is safe again, And each Boche crime set is right/ 
The Hun shall know no mercy from the ‘Raiders of the Night.’223 
The Northern Barrage was the final nail in Germany’s coffin when it came to neutralizing  
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the U-boat menace.  American intervention galvanized the British to seal any remaining 
leaks in the naval blockade via the Northern Neutrals and fiercely guard its commercial 
interests in the North Sea and the Atlantic.224  
Deprivation, Illness, and Defeat 
Despite the evidence in the British official history on the blockade, various memoirs and 
first-person accounts of the level of deprivation on the German home front – including 
startling reports from Allied army officers stationed in Germany after the Armistice225 – 
there has been some debate among scholars over the actual severity of the food crisis.  
Avner Offer and Gerd Hardach, two economic historians writing in the late 1970s and 
1980s, rejected the idea that any non-combatants starved as a result of the Allied naval 
blockade.226  The majority of academic research since the mid-1980s, however, largely 
supports the contention that the Allied naval blockade not only played a significant role 
in the collapse of the Kaiserreich, but also directly contributed to the deaths of several 
hundred thousand enemy civilians.227  A postgraduate scholar at the University of 
Oxford, in fact, discovered new evidence that sheds light on the veracity of the “hunger 
blockade” claim. 
Mary Elisabeth Cox, a researcher studying trends in the black market in wartime 
Germany, recently uncovered several documents at German state libraries and archives 
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that confirm “… the [Allied] blockade inflicted severe nutritional deprivation on children 
and other non-combatants.”228  Specifically, she found a book that contained a list of the 
height and weight of German schoolchildren gathered by the Imperial Statistical Office 
(Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt) over a ten-year period from 1914 to 1924.229  There are 
nearly 600,000 measurements in total; the vast majority deal with children from lower 
and working class backgrounds (350,695 to be exact), although statistics were compiled 
for children of the upper and middle class as well.  
 The documents show that even prior to the war the average height of German 
children varied slightly depending on their families’ income.  In 1914, for example, the 
average height of a ten-year-old girl in Stuttgart was 130 cm (4’2”) at the lower end of 
the social spectrum (this label encompassed everything from the poorest segments in 
society to the average working class family) compared to 133 cm (4’4”) for middle class 
ten-year-olds and 136 cm (4’5”) for girls from more prosperous families.  Young German 
males experienced a similar growth trend at the start of the twentieth century.  The 
average ten-year-old boy stood at 130 cm (4’2”) if he was from a poor or working class 
family compared to 132 cm (4’3”) from a middle class family and 134 cm (4’4”) from a  
more affluent background.230   
The outbreak of the First World War continued this German prewar trend of 
height discrepancy in childhood relative to household income and greatly exacerbated it 
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as the conditions on the home front deteriorated for the first time during the Turnip 
Winter of 1916-1917.  Applying this growth metric, it should come as no surprise that 
German children from lower socio-economic classes lost far more weight over the course 
of the war than children from wealthier families.  The raw data indicates though that all 
three social classes – upper, middle, and working/lower class – were directly impacted by 
the lack of food and poor living conditions relative to their age, gender, and household 
income.  By 1917, the Imperial Statistical Office determined that the median height of  
ten-year-old boys and girls measured 2 cm shorter than their 1914 counterparts.231   
Growth discrepancy was even more pronounced in terms of overall weight loss.  For 
instance, following German unification in 1871, children routinely submitted to 
anthropometric measurements as part of a government initiative to record the height and 
weight of all school age children.232  
 The figures collected at the end of 1917 revealed that children weighed between 
1.8 and 3.6 kg, or between 4 and 8 lbs. less than they had before the war.233  This 
information ultimately provides a useful timeline to view the cumulative effects of 
malnutrition on the German civilian population.  A fifteen-year-old child should 
theoretically weigh more than their twelve-year-old self provided that they have 
sufficient food.  Government rations of 1,000 calories a day were certainly not enough to 
promote growth in children or maintain proper weight in adults.234  Drastic weight loss 
was indicative of the level of deprivation on the German home front following the failed 
crop harvest of 1916 and significant changes to the administration of the Allied naval 
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               [Figure 2] A doctor examines German children during the war.  The boys are clearly under- 
               weight and showing obvious signs of malnourishment.  Source: Andrew Donson, Youth in  
               the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918      
               (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 128. 
 
blockade under Cecil.  
Indeed, the Germans only referred to the economic sanctions as a “hunger 
blockade” after Britain, France, and the U.S. restricted indirect trade with Germany via 
the neutrals in 1916-1917.235  Although the Allied press denounced these “exaggerated 
reports of the food shortages” as a “masterstroke by the psychologists in Germany… to 
appeal to the heart and pocketbook of [the neutrals],”236 the loss of neutral imports and 
dwindling domestic resources proved that the “hunger” label was entirely apt.  Moreover, 
the figures quoted by Mary Elisabeth Cox do not even take into consideration that many 
children stopped going to school after 1915 because they were either too sick to attend or 
forced to stand in long ration lines throughout the day.  In fact, in order to accommodate 
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the grueling daily search for food, German school administrators shortened the school 
day by half.237  Yet the truncated school day only encouraged more families to pull their 
children from the classroom.  The height and weight of these “truant” children may well 
differ from the official measurements given that malnutrition and related health issues 
increasingly prevented more children from attending school and, thus, regularly being 
weighed in the first place.238  
Lastly, there is the issue of the deadly 1918 influenza pandemic to consider.  The 
influenza of 1918, known colloquially as the “Spanish Flu,” was a variant of the H1N1 
virus that swept the globe in a matter of six months and infected more than 25 percent of 
the world’s population.239  Although estimates vary, historians and the medical 
community generally agree that at least 50 million people (i.e. 4 percent of those 
infected) died as a result of contracting the virus.240  Unlike other influenza outbreaks  
either before or after the First World War, the 1918-1919 flu was especially deadly, as it 
attacked otherwise healthy individuals in the prime of life.  Political scientist Andrew T. 
Price-Smith recently described the unique killing pattern of the Spanish Flu as forming 
the letter “W” – with deaths occurring across all segments of society but particularly 
among children, healthy younger adults (twenty to forty-year-olds), and older people – as 
opposed to traditional influenza outbreaks that typically kill only the very young and the  
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elderly.241 
 The influenza virus spread across Europe in three waves.  The first wave (spring 
1918) primarily affected soldiers when newly infected American troops and Chinese 
Labour Corps members arrived in Britain and France via North America in March 1918.  
Incidences of death were rare during this period, however, as those who became infected 
experienced normal flu-like symptoms.  Yet the second (late summer 1918) and third 
(autumn 1918) waves were much deadlier than the first and affected soldiers and civilians 
alike.  The 1918 flu proved exceptionally lethal in densely populated areas like Southeast 
Asia, where 17 million people died in India from the disease, and in major urban centres 
across Europe and North America.242  Individuals who contracted the virus in the late 
summer – early autumn waves died not so much from the virus itself, but rather a 
secondary infection from pneumonia, tuberculosis, or through massive blood loss.  The 
lack of oxygen to the lungs and heart caused victims to turn a distinct bluish colour in the 
final hours of their life, which has been described by one historian as a hallmark of “this 
strange and terrifying epidemic.”243      
 The Spanish Flu thrived in city centres and areas with poor sanitation and 
hygiene, and the virus particularly wreaked havoc on people with compromised immune 
systems and soldiers stationed in trenches along the Western Front.  Take, for example, 
the high mortality rate of infected Allied soldiers; one British solider died from the 
influenza virus for every ten British soldiers killed on the battlefield, while the ratio was 
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one out of six for French troops and, notably, one flu related death for every American 
soldier killed on the battlefield.  In comparison to the Allies, though, the German army 
fared even worse with infection rates as high as 80 percent in some units (1.5 million 
infected in total).  The number of critically ill patients overwhelmed German army 
hospitals to the point that staff actually stopped counting flu related deaths in mid-
1918.244     
Likewise, the nutritional deprivation experienced by Germans on the home front 
led to extremely high rates of mortality from the Spanish Flu.245  An estimated 400,000 
German civilians died from the influenza pandemic in 1918 and although the death toll 
was higher in America (450,000 civilians), Germany suffered proportionately more flu 
related deaths given the country’s smaller population of 65 million people compared to 
103 million in the United States.246  Moreover, as the two charts in the chapter appendix 
(Tables 2 and 3) on female and infant/adolescent mortality in Germany c. 1913-1921 
illustrate, 247 there was a significant spike in civilian mortality long before the pandemic 
ever struck.  The year 1917 was the first time that deaths on the home front markedly 
increased from previous combat years.  The death rate for young adults (ages fifteen to 
twenty) jumped from roughly fifteen per one thousand people in 1916 to twenty per one 
thousand in 1917.  Mortality was even higher for young children (ages one to five) in  
                                                        
244 Price-Smith, 64-70.  
245 This was also the case in Austria.  See, Dr. Böhm, “Sanitary Statistics and Mortality of the 
Population of Vienna during the War, 1914-1918,” Table III, 18 March 1919, in the Ralph Haswell Lutz 
Papers, HIA.  Dr. Böhm was the chief medical examiner in Vienna throughout the war.  The document 
includes very detailed autopsy reports conducted on a cross-section of the Viennese population from mid-
to-late 1918.  Each report, regardless of the final cause of death, described the “highly lean” and “weak” 
appearance of the dead due to “insufficient nourishment.”  See also, Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of 
the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 307.  
246 Price-Smith, 61.  
247 Refer to the chapter appendix on pp. 89. 
 86 
 
 
 
1917 with twenty-two dying per one thousand than in either 1918 (roughly eighteen per 
one thousand) or 1919 (thirteen per one thousand people).248  This evidence indicates that 
the high rate of civilian mortality in wartime Germany cannot be solely attributed to the 
virulence of the Spanish Flu in the final months of the First World War.  
The Allied naval blockade was the common denominator that applied sustained 
economic and political pressure to isolate Germany and its allies from the international 
trading community.  As discussed in Chapter 2, German cries of illegality were quickly 
silenced by the might of Britain’s Royal Navy and the combined power of the French and 
British economies to establish a commercial blockade of the North Sea, Mediterranean, 
and the Atlantic.  In practice, however, it was the neutrals – the U.S. and the Northern 
Neutrals such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden – that truly prevented the British from 
ensuring that no contraband made its way to the Central Powers.    
 Early negotiations with the neutrals were fraught with tension and political 
posturing on either side.  Yet the British chose to force the neutrals’ hand at the 
beginning of 1916 with the creation of a separate Ministry of the Blockade under the 
direction of the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil.  
Cecil promised to tighten the naval blockade through comprehensive trade agreements 
with the neutrals, blacklisting international businesses with German ties, and lessening 
the wait time involved with transporting “approved” goods from the U.S. to the Allies  
and neutral Europe with the use of navicerts or commercial passports.  
These new measures greatly clamped down on indirect trade with the enemy and 
helped to sway the United States to the Allies’ side in April 1917 after Germany 
                                                        
248 E. Roesle, “The Mortality in Germany, 1913-1921: The Effects of War Casualties and Famine 
on Mortality,” Journal of American Statistical Association 20, no. 150 (June 1925): 168-171. 
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torpedoed multiple commercial vessels off the coast of the British Isles.  Germany’s 
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare caused the U.S. to reevaluate the price of 
its neutrality in light of mounting civilian deaths at sea.  Indeed, the blockade of Germany 
was no longer viewed as a “needless sacrifice” by cautious businessmen and politicians 
looking to play both sides.249  American intervention in the First World War allowed the 
British to close gaping holes in the blockade where goods from the U.S. previously 
traveled unimpeded to the Northern Neutrals and, eventually, made their way to 
Germany. 
In a bid to flex their economic might, the U.S. War Trade Board insisted in the 
winter of 1917 that Britain delegate more power to its allies in the form of the Allied 
Blockade Committee to oversee all aspects of transatlantic trade.  This committee 
attempted to equalize the decision-making on Allied economic warfare by sharing the 
responsibility of patrolling the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean through the convoy 
system and the creation of an elaborate minefield between Scotland and Norway (the 
Northern Barrage).  It would be an understatement to claim though that the Allied 
Blockade Committee was anything other than a larger Ministry of the Blockade with the 
“Allied” label added largely for diplomatic reasons.  Both the U.S. War Trade Board and 
the French government agreed that Cecil should remain the Minister of the Blockade.250   
Moreover, the ABC consisted of three representatives from Britain in comparison to two  
each from the United States and France.  
Germany, meanwhile, was plunged into a state of deprivation on the home front 
after the Turnip Winter of 1916-1917 when average caloric intake consisted of only 1,000 
                                                        
249 McDermott, “‘A Needless Sacrifice,’” 282.   
250 Guichard, 62-67.  
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calories a day.  The newly tightened Allied blockade, colder than normal temperatures, 
and a widespread shortage of oil and coal meant that many homes went without heat or 
an evening meal.  The rest of 1917 brought little change from the hardship of the 
previous winter, as American intervention ensured that the world’s most powerful neutral 
country now turned its full attention to defeating the Kaiserreich.   
The collapse of Imperial Germany came after four years of fighting the Allies in 
Europe, East Africa, and at sea.  The nutritional deprivation at home and on the Western 
Front exacerbated the deadliness of the 1918 influenza in Germany.  German civilians 
and soldiers were affected by the totality of the First World War in a way that the Allies 
never experienced.  The hunger blockade proved so effective because it pitted primarily 
landlocked countries in Central Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria) 
against the world’s strongest naval power and empire (Britain) with committed allies in 
France, Italy, and the United States.251  Hunger and deprivation were daily impediments 
that wore away Germany’s resolve and, as will be explored in the next chapter, aided in 
the defeat of the Central Powers with timely hunger-themed propaganda.252    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
251 Although an ally of the British, the Russian Empire did not figure prominently in the 
management and administration of the naval blockade.   
252 Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, v.  
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
 
 
Infant and Adolescent Death Rates in Germany / 1,000, 1913-1921 
 
[Table 2]  Source: E. Roesle, “The Mortality in Germany, 1913-1921: The Effects of War Casualties and 
Famine on Mortality,” Journal of American Statistical Association 20, no. 150 (June 1925): 168. 
 
 
Female Death Rates in Germany / 1,000, 1913-1921 
 
[Table 3]  Source: E. Roesle, “The Mortality in Germany, 1913-1921: The Effects of War Casualties and 
Famine on Mortality,” Journal of American Statistical Association 20, no. 150 (June 1925): 171. 
 
 
 
 
 
     Year    Under 1 
  year old 
    1-5 
  years old 
    5-10 
  years old 
   10-15  
 years old 
   15-20  
 years old 
     1913     151     13.2      5.9      3.9        6.5 
     1914     164     13.1      6.1      4.2      10.1 
     1915     148     16.8      8.4      4.8      15.1 
     1916     140     15.0      7.7      5.2      15.1 
     1917     149     22.0      8.7      6.1      23.1 
     1918     158     17.7    11.6      8.9      33.1 
     1919     145     13.4      7.7      5.6      11.5 
     1920     131     11.1      6.4      4.6        9.4 
     1921     134     10.7      5.0      3.7        7.2 
         
     Year       20-25 
  years old 
     25-30 
  years old 
     30-35 
  years old 
    35-40  
 years old 
    40-45  
 years old 
     1913       4.0        4.7        5.3       6.1        6.9 
     1914       4.1        4.9        5.4       6.2        7.1 
     1915       4.1        4.7        5.4       6.3        7.2 
     1916       4.4        5.0        5.7       6.6        7.5 
     1917       5.4        5.9        6.6       7.7        8.9 
     1918     11.6      12.7      12.4     11.7      11.5 
     1919       6.2        6.7        7.2       7.6        8.3 
     1920       5.8        6.8        7.0       7.2        7.6 
     1921       4.4        5.1        5.5       6.1        6.7 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PRINT WARS AND THE ART OF PERSUASION: 
LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND ANGLO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA 
 
British Newspapers and the Press c. 1914 
 
In an age where radio broadcasts and telephones were in their infancy, the printed word 
was king.  Newspapers were the predominant medium by which most Britons and 
Europeans received their current political and socio-economic news at the start of the 
First World War.  The growth of the British press was due primarily to the sweeping 
Elementary Education Act of 1870, which sought to spread literacy and ensure a basic 
level of education for British schoolchildren between the ages of five and twelve.253  
Subsequent amendments to the Act in 1888, 1891, and 1902, in addition to mandatory 
attendance for children under thirteen, did much to lay the groundwork for universal 
education in the decades thereafter.  By 1914, children raised in this era of Gladstonian 
Liberalism254 were now literate adults accustomed to reading or, at the very least, 
encountering newspapers on a daily basis.  Technological advances in late nineteenth 
century industrialization and mass production equally made possible Fleet Street’s 
meteoric rise.     
Mass literacy afforded middle and lower working class Britons a window into 
contemporary politics and entertainment, as newspapers could be purchased on most 
urban street corners for as little as one penny.  These “penny populars” reported on the 
                                                        
253 M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-
1918 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 2-3.  
254 This term refers to the Liberal idealism espoused by William Gladstone upon his return to 
Downing Street in 1880.  During his second premiership Gladstone embarked on a series of reforms to 
extend the franchise and ensure equal representation in Parliament for both urban and rural constituencies.  
Part of this process entailed properly educating the newly enfranchised electorate under the Reform Act of 
1867.  Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 146-149, 158.  See also, H. C. G. 
Matthew, Gladstone, 1875-1898 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. 162-183.  
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latest political scandals in the country, offering salacious and up-to-date details to an 
eager readership.  The period from 1890 to 1910 saw a dramatic rise in newspaper 
circulation throughout Europe and North America.255  This growth in circulation, coupled 
with the abolition of tax on paper and advertising, meant that the Press held an enviable 
position in early twentieth century Britain.  Whitehall traditionally enacted legislation 
with little regard for public opinion because politics were seen as “the special business of 
kings, nobles, aristocratic persons[,]” and Members of Parliament (MPs).256  Yet the 
popular press of Fleet Street, backed by advertising revenue and a surge in readership, did 
not think twice about publishing a scathing opinion piece on the Government.   
Indeed, the public’s clamour for information ensured that political parties paid 
greater attention to the editorials of late Victorian and Edwardian newspapers.  The 
Liberal, Conservative, and Labour parties openly courted the favour of newspaper editors 
and proprietors in the hopes of influencing public opinion to support their respective 
agendas.257  “It was a comparatively easy task in prewar days to deal with the press,” 
noted the Foreign Office’s head of Political Intelligence, Sir William Tyrrell, “[because] 
the issues which presented themselves in the popular mind were mainly confined to 
Anglo-German relations, and on this subject there was practical unanimity in our 
Press....”258  The Kaiserreich, after all, provided a common enemy for both the Press and 
Asquith’s government to focus their mutual distrust and condemnation.     
                                                        
255 Alice Goldfarb Marquis, “Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the 
First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 3 (July 1978): 468. 
256 Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), 13.  
257 These political agendas included: welfare reforms to the long-standing Poor Law (Liberal 
party), protectionist tariffs and anti-Home Rule measures in Ireland (Conservative party), and expanding 
the role of trade unions (Labour party).  Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, 
vol. I (1984), 369.   
258 Memorandum by Sir William Tyrrell, 10 December 1921, TNA, FO 600/329. 
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Patriotism and Propaganda: Two Sides of the Same Coin 
 
The eighteenth century Anglo-Irish philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke argued 
that along with the clergy, nobility, and the bourgeoisie, there existed another political 
class or force independent of the established ranks of power – the Press or the “Fourth 
Estate.”259  Much like the newly empowered Third Estate in France c. 1789-1792, the 
Fourth Estate demanded a voice in political affairs.  The press that Burke referred to were 
conservative papers like The Times and Morning Post, which hired journalists to cover 
debates in the House of Commons.260    
At the outbreak of the First World War, The Times and Morning Post still 
remained the reliable authority on domestic politics and foreign affairs, but now the 
market was also saturated with countless other newspapers of varying journalistic quality.  
While the British press was not homogeneous in its political outlook, there very much 
existed a civic tradition of journalism whose goal was to report the news as it was 
happening.  The war then provided the Fourth Estate with an opportunity to prove itself 
indispensible to the state.  As historian and propaganda expert Gary Messinger aptly 
notes, “the most conspicuous feature of British official propaganda… appears to have 
been the extreme care taken by the British, even more than was the case in other 
countries, to let nongovernmental sources do the work of opinion manipulation which the 
Cabinet wanted done.”261  Patriotic journalism and official propaganda were ultimately 
treated as two sides of the same coin in wartime Britain.  
                                                        
259 The Scottish historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle attributes Burke with coining the phrase 
“the Fourth Estate.” Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (London: 
James Fraser, 1908), 392.  See also, Sanders and Taylor, 4.  
260 Wilfred Hindle, The Morning Post, 1772-1937: Portrait of a Newspaper (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1974), 69.  
261 Messinger, 22-23.  
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In contrast to Imperial Germany where propaganda was highly regulated by the 
state, the Liberal governments of H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George actively 
recruited successful authors and press barons to influence public opinion at home and in 
neutral countries.262  In late 1914, the British Foreign Office established an official 
propaganda department located at Wellington House in Buckingham Gate, London.  Over 
the course of four years the bureau published nearly 1,200 propaganda pamphlets aimed 
at persuading Britons, the populations of the dominions and colonies, Americans, 
Scandinavians, and allies like Russia and France to stand firm in their resolve against 
German militarism.  This was a war of words intended to reassure allies and neutrals that 
Britain’s cause was just.  Early war propaganda apportioned sole blame to Germany for 
starting the war thereby justifying the need for British intervention.   
A bold speech made by Asquith at Guildhall on 9 November 1914 best articulated 
Britain’s war aims.  Here, the Prime Minister called for the restoration of Belgium and an 
end to the fighting in France.  He also highlighted a respect for the rights of neutral and 
smaller states and asserted that the Allies must wrest the Kaiserreich from the grips of 
Prussian domination.  Thus British propaganda sought to impart Asquith’s sentiments 
through the release of patriotic posters and pamphlets.263  References to the German 
“Hun” – a hulking and reprehensible character who had no regard for humanity – firmly 
placed the enemy on the dark side of Manichean imagery of good versus evil.  This type 
                                                        
262 In early 1915 the German Imperial Ministry of War forbade the press from publishing anything 
“injurious to the Fatherland.”  This censorship prohibited newspapers from releasing statistics on mortality 
rates or discussing any political disagreements between Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.  See, Ralph Haswell Lutz, ed. The Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, vol. I (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1932), 177-183.    
263 Sanders and Taylor, 137-138.  See also, J. Gooch, “Soldiers, Strategy, and War Aims in 
Britain, 1914-1918,” in Barry Hunt and Adrian Preston (eds.), War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great 
War (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 25-26.   
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of literature was known as “atrocity propaganda”264 and was the specialty of Wellington 
House and its famed authors like H. G Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, and 
Arnold Toynbee during the early war years. 
However, vilification of the enemy was soon replaced by a greater need to 
counteract German propaganda that charged the naval blockade was unlawful and 
inhumane.  The German War Press Office (Kriegspresseamt) targeted the Allies’ flagrant 
disregard for international law as a means to gain support in the United States and neutral 
Scandinavian countries.  “The only useful slogan we have is ‘Freedom of the Seas,’” 
remarked a Kriegspresseamt official in mid-1917.  The Allied blockade was at the centre 
of Germany’s propaganda campaign to discredit the enemy, but it ultimately proved 
disastrous to their international credibility because of the inherent violence of the 
submarine warfare with which Germany responded to the blockade.  Wellington House 
easily dispelled the German allegations by reminding Britons and neutrals that although 
search and seizures were inconvenient, its intrusion on neutral rights paled in comparison 
to lethal German aggression.265   
The use of chemical warfare at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, for 
instance, or the sinking of the Lusitania the following month, and reintroduction of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917: these were all tactics employed by the 
German High Command to achieve victory at whatever cost.  It also was difficult for the 
                                                        
264 Wellington House identified eight categories of anti-German propaganda for dissemination to  
the masses.  These involved exploiting (1) German stereotypes (i.e. embodied in the hard-nosed Prussian 
officer), followed by (2) pejorative references to “Huns” or the French equivalent “Boches,” (3) atrocity 
stories particularly involving women and children, and (4) continually labeling the enemy as “militaristic” 
and “aggressive.”  Other trends involved (5) deflecting military setbacks and, likewise, (6) exaggerating the 
importance of limited victories on the battlefield.  (7) Key slogans like “Britons: Lord Kitchener wants 
you” and (8) equating honour and patriotism with support for the war effort allowed the Foreign Office to 
target as many people and political groups as possible.  See, J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: 
From Propaganda to Brainwashing (Harmondsworth: Middlesex, 1963), 94. 
265 Marquis, 491.   
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Kriegpresseamt to decry the human cost of the naval blockade for fear of admitting its 
effectiveness against the German civilian population.  That would have been “tantamount 
to an admission of Prussian vulnerability” and difficulty in managing domestic 
resources.266  The Reich obdurately chose instead to downplay food and material 
shortages for the duration of the war.  By 1917, Wellington House had sufficiently 
silenced German attempts to turn global opinion against the Allied naval blockade, and 
by the following year the Allies were using the threat of a post-bellum blockade to hasten 
the war’s end.   
This chapter on wartime propaganda is part of a broader narrative on the growth 
of civil-military relations in Britain during the First World War.  It explores the 
relationship between the tightening of the naval blockade and the intensification of anti-
German propaganda released by the British government in the later war years (i.e. 1917-
1918).  It argues that in harnessing the power of Fleet Street Lloyd George’s government 
recognized the importance of the Press in controlling the flow of sensitive information.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the influential career of press baron Lord 
Northcliffe.  First, in his role as chairman of the British War Mission to the United States 
and, later, head of Allied Propaganda in Enemy Countries, Northcliffe functioned as a 
bridge between the civil and military elements in wartime Britain.  His ruthless business 
acumen earned him the moniker “the Napoleon of Fleet Street,” but it was his deft control 
of First World War propaganda that had Adolf Hitler admitting in the interwar years: 
“What we failed to do [in 1914-1918], the enemy did, with amazing skill and really 
brilliant calculation… I, myself, learned enormously from this enemy war  
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propaganda.”267     
The Role of Censorship 
Censorship was a tool that went hand in hand with Allied propaganda.  Following  
Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August 1914 the Foreign Office ordered the British 
cable ship Teleconia to cut the underwater cables between the United States and 
Germany, in effect, severing the fastest method of communication between the two 
countries.  This gave Britain an immeasurable advantage in the war of words to come.  It 
made Germany dependent on slower wireless telegraphy, where newspaper reports from 
Berlin to Washington arrived considerably later than headlines from London.  Secondly, 
it isolated the Central Powers by forcing them to rely on often week-old press reports 
from the Northern Neutrals, which made the practice of German espionage and 
intelligence gathering much harder.268  It lastly provided Britain an opportunity to shape 
public perception of the war at home and abroad with the help of Fleet Street and the 
ever-expanding powers of DORA (Defence of the Realm Act) and Britain’s naval 
blockade.     
 British newspaper editors were naturally loath to support any form of censorship 
of the press.  A January 1915 opinion piece in the left-leaning Daily Chronicle clearly 
shows the influences against the success of the Asquith government’s initial calls for 
voluntary cooperation: “To send an article to the Press Bureau is to invite a severity of 
treatment which can easily be escaped by the simple process of not sending [it].  Some of 
our contemporaries escape it in this way every day… A policy of this sort simply puts a 
                                                        
267 Harry J. Greenwall, Northcliffe: Napoleon of Fleet Street (London: Wingate, 1957); Adolf 
Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), 176. 
268 Messinger, 100-101.  
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premium on a newspaper not ‘playing the game.’”269  The tightening of measures under 
the Defence of the Realm Act, however, made evasion of the censors much harder.  The 
act, amended on more than five occasions during the war, gave His Majesty’s 
Government wide-ranging powers of state control unseen in peacetime.  Under this 
emergency legislation individuals, institutions, and companies were subject to 
prosecution by civil courts if their actions – even indirectly – aided the enemy’s war 
effort.  To that end, posters or leaflets deemed unpatriotic were torn down and 
confiscated, while those responsible faced potential jail time pending further 
investigation by the British Home Office.270   
Postal censorship was another mechanism used by the state to control the flow of 
seditious and sensitive information.  Letters to and from the front were routinely 
scrutinized for their content – references to troop movements, war aims, and low morale 
were blacked out altogether.  Yet mail censorship in wartime was nothing new.  Indeed, 
King George III’s government tampered with mail in the American colonies in the 
months leading up to the American Revolution and the practice became commonplace in 
the Northern and Southern states during the American Civil War.  Such measures after all 
were “… necessary to check espionage, prevent merchandise entering or leaving 
Germany and forestall efforts to promote uprisings by the circulation of seditious and 
inflammatory literature,” argued Lord Robert Cecil.271  In an official address to the 
American people in mid-1916 the Minister of the Blockade acknowledged the 
inconvenience posed by mail censorship, but stated that all efforts were being made to 
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return individuals’ mail within 48 hours.  The implication was that innocent parties had 
nothing to fear.  Conversely, swift actions would be taken to shut down the business 
operations of Britons and Americans who continued to trade with the enemy.272  How 
were these restrictive measures met with in the U.S. and how did support for the Allied 
war effort trump widespread dissent in Britain and America?  To answer these questions 
one must trace the storied career of press baron Lord Northcliffe. 
Alfred Harmsworth: The Making of a Propagandist 
Born Alfred Harmsworth in Dublin, Ireland in 1865, Northcliffe rose to prominence as a 
newspaper magnate in the 1890s and first decade of the twentieth century.  Known by 
several biographers as the “founder of modern journalism,” he was able to reach an 
unprecedented audience through his ownership of The Times, Evening News, and ever-
populist Daily Mail.273  Northcliffe controlled 40 percent of the morning newspapers, 45 
percent of the evening, and 15 percent of all Sunday newspapers circulating in Britain in 
the opening days of the war.274  Newspaper headlines kept Britons informed about major 
developments on the fighting in France and Belgium, and chances were high that those 
headlines belonged to a Northcliffe-owned paper. 
The press baron was a vocal proponent of British intervention in the Great War 
and frequently criticized politicians and institutions that were seen as “soft” on Prussian 
militarism.  His censure extended to H. H. Asquith’s war leadership during the Shell 
Crisis over the shortage of munitions in the spring of 1915, which helped, in part, to 
topple the Prime Minister’s Liberal government and force him to take ministers from the 
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Conservative opposition.275  Northcliffe’s continued criticism was then central to 
Asquith’s replacement as prime minister by the minister of munitions, David Lloyd 
George, on 5 December 1916, Lloyd George having shown in Northcliffe’s estimation a 
greater determination to wage all-out war.  Nevertheless, Northcliffe’s criticism with 
British war policy did not stop, and his newspapers were unrelenting in their calls for 
victory on the Western Front and an ever-tightening blockade of Germany in the North 
Sea and Atlantic.276  While Northcliffe touted Lloyd George, to be “the man to win the 
war,” he envisioned himself alongside the new Prime Minister formulating policy, 
offering advice, and, ultimately shaping the peace settlement in Britain’s favour.277  
Lloyd George’s War Cabinet colleagues regarded Northcliffe as the proverbial 
“thorn” in their Prime Minister’s side.  “Unscrupulous,” “dangerous,” and “he will not 
rest until he is made [a] Dictator” was how one high-ranking advisor described him.278  
The prime minister, however, saw another use for the loquacious and wily press baron – 
wartime propagandist for His Majesty’s Government.  From 7 June to 3 November 1917, 
Northcliffe toured the United States as Chairman of the British War Mission in the hope  
                                                        
275 The Shell Crisis occurred after the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (10-13 March 1915) when 
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of solidifying Anglo-American relations and harmonizing Allied war aims.279  Historian  
J. Lee Thompson is right to argue “[that] by sending him [Northcliffe] across the 
Atlantic, Lloyd George also schemed to muzzle the criticism of his newspapers and 
particularly their support of the army against government ‘interference’ with strategy.”280  
Thus, by appealing to Northcliffe’s patriotism and vanity, Lloyd George effectively 
undercut the former’s public opposition while utilizing his vast influence and connections 
abroad. 
Although the U.S. had joined the Allied war effort in April 1917, Northcliffe’s 
publicity campaign was a shrewd move to allay American fears of the war’s futility and 
perceived ulterior motives of British policymakers.  As early as January 1916, British 
diplomats in Washington informed the Minister of the Blockade Robert Cecil “that there 
was a growing feeling [in America] we were using the blockade for our commercial 
advantage and to the injury of American trade.”  This Foreign Office cable plainly 
revealed the inadequacy of Britain’s pre-1917 diplomacy with the world’s largest neutral 
power.  When asked how to rectify the situation, Washington replied: “Get a good 
publicity agent and put your case before the American people… who can understand the 
legal technicalities of [the] blockade?  Who is impressed by the nicely balanced phrases 
of the official mind?”281  Northcliffe aimed to solve the transatlantic gap by eschewing 
what he deemed the “elitist” diplomacy of Whitehall for a more transparent and open 
dialogue with the United States. 
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Compared to the frocked coat foreign secretary Arthur Balfour, Northcliffe was 
seen as a new kind of Briton altogether.  Dressed humbly in an old suit and rumpled hat, 
his public addresses were impassioned speeches on the necessity of Anglo-American 
cooperation.  This war, he stated, “is a matter of whole nations in arms… Let every man 
give to this War that concentration of thought and purpose of mind that have made his 
business a success… Let everything else stand aside.”282  His speeches were also laden 
with the message that Britain’s commitment to the Allied war effort was genuine and 
unwavering.  This last point went a long way to alleviate U.S. reticence concerning the 
blockade’s wartime imposition and the notion that American Doughboys would be vainly  
sacrificed for the political and commercial interests of Great Britain.283  Throughout the  
First World War Northcliffe was commonly referred to on both sides of the Atlantic as  
‘the Most Powerful Man in the Country.’284  He had travelled to America on more than 
twenty occasions prior to his official visit in mid-1917 and was regarded by many in the 
press as more American than British.  While this did not endear Northcliffe to the old 
guard of the War Cabinet, it firmly established his position as the British authority on 
wartime public relations with the United States.   
The Propaganda of Crewe House 
Upon his return to England Northcliffe was appointed the Director of Propaganda in 
Enemy Countries by Lloyd George in February 1918.  This post, located at Crewe House 
in Mayfair, suited the press baron’s talents remarkably well.  He possessed an almost 
uncanny ability to understand what type of propaganda would best foster dissent in the 
enemy ranks and aid in shortening the war.  For example, in a 10 June 1918 letter  
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to foreign secretary Balfour, Northcliffe was adamant that: 
Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the settled  
war aims of the Allies… We may be inclined to believe that every German is  
something of a Junker, we have to remember that he is also a potentially 
reasonable man.  There is much evidence that the German people as a whole 
desire above all else the cessation of the war.  They are suffering more than their  
opponents… [Yet] it must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a  
ruthless policy of commercial blockade.285               
This letter is significant for several reasons.  Firstly, his rationale that Germans differed 
little from their Allied combatants was in marked contrast to the propaganda released by 
Crewe House’s predecessor, Wellington House.  The latter agency chose to vilify the 
enemy through the release of posters depicting the atrocities of the barbarous “Hun.”  
Much of this imagery was based on familiar prewar stereotypes, which seemed dreadfully 
outmoded to the War Cabinet by 1918.  It lacked, for instance, the visceral impact of the 
war’s grim reality – casualties were mounting daily while territorial gains were sporadic 
and, even then, short-lived.  Therefore, the principal aim of Northcliffe’s department was 
to refashion propaganda in a way that would convince the enemy to lay down their arms 
because the alternative seemed futile.286  Skilled in the art of marketing and mass 
persuasion Lord Northcliffe was the ideal man to head this new agency.           
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(a) The Balloon Post 
Crewe House released its propaganda to the enemy via the Balloon Post or Luftballon.   
Leaflets written in German were attached to an 8 x 20 foot air balloon and sent over the 
frontlines into enemy territory.  Once in mid-air the leaflets were released by a timed 
spring-loaded mechanism, a process that was repeated more than a thousand times each 
day and with great effect.  By August 1918, Britain’s Balloon Post dropped 100,000 
pamphlets per day and released a staggering 6.7 million leaflets in the last five and a half 
weeks of the war.  Moreover, Northcliffe ingeniously contrasted German prewar 
stereotypes with its “war weary” 1918 counterpart.287  A few examples will suffice.  One 
highly effective leaflet entitled, “What are you fighting for, Michael?” asked German 
soldiers “have you ever really thought for what you are fighting?... Your Kaiser has 
decorated Hindenburg with the Iron Cross.  What has he given you?  Privation, sorrow, 
poverty, hunger, for your wives and children, misery, sickness and tomorrow a grave.”288   
This talk of Germany’s plight was followed by a cartoon leaflet in which the mythic 
Germania is seen riding a chariot with a general, presumably Helmuth von Moltke the 
Younger, and an admiral.  The chariot is pulled by the German Volk and tempted by the 
“carrot” of a quick victory in August 1914.  The image is sharply contrasted with the 
same figure after four years of protracted war.  Now, in 1918, Germania has lost her 
lustre and the German people have withered in size and are no longer content with the 
ersatz or substitute victory promised by the German High Command.289  Prewar illusion  
versus bleak wartime reality – that was the real genius of Northcliffe’s propaganda in  
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[Figure 3] “Germania,” Hoover Institution Archives.  An example of the type of propaganda released by 
the Balloon Post.  Note the difference between the hearty volk and High Command in 1914 and their 1918 
war profiteering counterpart.  Despite the withered appearance of Germania in 1918, the civil-military 
leadership still managed to stockpile money in the rear of its chariot (i.e. on the backs of the German 
people.) 
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[Figure 4] “Seeherrschaft,” Hoover Institution Archives.  Another pamphlet released by the Balloon Post 
depicting Britain’s naval supremacy.  The aim here was to demonstrate the impending Allied victory.  It 
acknowledges, for example, the German U-boat menace in the early years of the war.  But using the simple 
motif of compare and contrast, it effectively illustrates Germany’s reversal of fortune as the war 
progressed. 
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comparison to the staid, familiar images of Wellington House. 
This was the first major instance where British policymakers used the blockade 
for propaganda purposes by threatening its prolongation after the war.  The Foreign Trade 
Department had tried the previous year to “advocate exploiting the alarm already 
manifested in Germany at the idea of a post-bellum trade war.”290  Yet the War Cabinet 
dismissed the proposal as “a dangerous policy from which it might be difficult to draw 
back [international] credit.”  However, Northcliffe’s blockade related propaganda 
succeeded because the threat was introduced at a time when rampant hunger and 
malnutrition swept Germany and the United States was firmly aligned with Britain and 
France against the Central Powers.291  Commenting on the success of Britain’s late 
propaganda efforts, Northcliffe contended that “Had the German army been well fed and 
provisioned, the effect might not have been [as] striking, but gradually weakened by the 
merciless blockade of the Allies, German soldiers proved receptive to the insidious ideas 
disseminated by the Balloon Post.”292          
 (b) Inter-Departmental and Allied Cooperation 
Another achievement of Crewe House was its ability to coordinate and work seamlessly 
with various Cabinet departments and Allied propaganda agencies in France, Italy, and 
the United States.  Although Northcliffe’s department was answerable only to the prime 
minister, it was merely one important cog in Britain’s wartime machinery.  By 1918, six 
separate offices reported directly to David Lloyd George on all issues relating to 
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propaganda.293  The Ministry of Information headed by Lord Beaverbrook (Canada’s 
Max Aitken) was responsible for the distribution of British propaganda in Allied and 
neutral countries, in effect, taking over the work of Wellington House in 1918.  
Additionally, the Foreign Office maintained an interest in the propaganda released by 
Beaverbrook and Northcliffe’s respective agencies, while the War Office’s MI7 
department and the National War Aims Committee created in August 1917 focused on 
domestic issues such as censorship and “counter-act[ing] war weariness and pacifism.”294   
Finally, the longstanding Press Bureau continued its work under the umbrella of 
the War Office to liaise with General Headquarters and soldiers at the front.  Dispatches 
from accredited war correspondents John Buchan and Henry Nevinson were then printed 
in widely read newspapers like The Times, Daily Telegraph, and Morning Post, to name 
only a few.295  “In the early days of propaganda,” bemoaned Robert Cecil when asked to 
characterize the government’s relationship with the Press, “even Westminster was found 
to be too far from Fleet Street.”296  One can see that this was clearly not the case by the 
war’s end.  Civilian involvement in the official propaganda effort was one of the 
hallmarks of British civil-military relations c. 1917-1918.  
All too often the web of government bureaucracy can become overly tangled.   
Wellington House, for example, had very little day-to-day contact with either the War  
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Office or Admiralty, yet worked closely with the Foreign Office.  This division of labour 
led to disorganization and inter-departmental rivalry as various departments competed for 
creative control.297   No one agency held a monopoly on wartime propaganda; however, 
the frequent interaction between Crewe House, the Foreign and War Office, as well as the 
Ministry of Information and the Press Bureau was a significant improvement on earlier 
attempts to coordinate propaganda.  
Northcliffe was also keen on cooperating with the Allied and Associated Powers 
to ensure that propaganda was utilized to its full advantage.  On 14 August 1918 he held a 
four-day long conference with foreign representatives in London to encourage a united 
effort to tip the balance in the Allies’ favour.298  Various strategies were discussed to 
exploit what Ludendorff termed “the black day of the German Army” – the highly 
successful Allied attack at the Battle of Amiens (8-12 August).  Not only did the battle 
mark the end of trench warfare, it ushered in the last hundred days of the First World War 
with a remarkable Allied advance of 19 km that broke up six German divisions and left 
thousands of soldiers surrendering en masse.299  More than 50,000 German troops 
became Allied POWs in the battle’s aftermath.  Amiens was undoubtedly a turning point 
for the Allies.  It also provided Crewe House with some insight into the overall impact of 
their campaign at a very pivotal stage in the war.  Despite the German High Command’s 
insistence that soldiers simply disregard the “lies” of the Balloon Post, “the large number 
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of German prisoners taken with leaflets in their pockets [at Amiens] proved that these 
[propaganda pamphlets] were doing their work.”300   
The Success of British Propaganda and the Collapse of Germany’s Allies 
 
What exact role did propaganda play in the enemy’s defeat?  One cannot say for certain.  
What is clear, however, is that the propaganda of Crewe House did one thing 
exceptionally well.  It ultimately reinforced the suspicions and fears of many soldiers in 
the ranks of the Central Powers, where dissent and war weariness were palpable 
throughout most of 1917-1918.301  By early 1918, “the Turkish resistance that had halted 
[the Allies] at Gallipoli; the Bulgarians in the hills above Salonika, the Austro-
Hungarian[s] on the Isonzo; and above all the German resistance on the Western Front 
had ceased to be so formidable.”302  What follows is a detailed look at how enemy 
propaganda affected each of the powers.  
(a) Austria-Hungary 
The political and ethnic composition of the Habsburg Empire was fragmented and fragile.  
After 1867 one monarch ruled both the Austrian empire with its capital in Vienna and the 
Kingdom of Hungary with its seat of government in Budapest.  At its core a 
constitutional monarchy, the Habsburg Empire had two distinct parliaments, each run by 
its own prime minister (Karl von Stürgkh in Austria and István Tisza in Hungary).  To 
complicate matters further eleven major ethnic groups comprised this polyglot empire.  
Nearly 53 million Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Italians, Slovenes, Romanians, 
Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs lived together under Habsburg rule.   
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The Dual Monarchy was the name given to this multinational empire in the wake 
of Austria’s defeat by Bismarckian Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.  Indeed, 
a political union or compromise (Ausgleich) with Hungary in 1867 was seen as the only 
way to maintain Austria’s status as a Great Power in late nineteenth century Europe.303  
By late 1916, the empire was entering its twilight phase.  The much beloved and long 
reigning monarch Franz Josef died on 21 November.  His successor and great-nephew, 
Karl, found himself head of an empire that was decaying from within.  The young 
emperor was sympathetic to the plight of Hungarian nationals who wanted autonomy 
from Austria, but was ultimately in over his head.304   
The structure of the Habsburg army was also flawed.  “Designed not to fight a 
major war but rather to maintain a delicate political balance in the empire,” is how Holger 
Herwig described the cumbersome organization of their military.  It consisted of three 
wings – a combined Austro-Hungarian army and two national reserve forces; the 
Austrian contingent or Landwehr and a Hungarian section, the Honved.  Initially, German 
was spoken in both the joint army and the Landwehr, while Hungarian predominated in 
the Honved.  Yet ethnic grievances in Bosnia and Herzegovina later forced the military to 
include instruction in all eleven national languages.305  Communication between the 
various wings was extremely challenging because the number of soldiers fluent in more 
than three or four languages dwindled as casualties mounted and troops were reassigned 
to new units.  
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(b) Bulgaria 
Bulgaria was a latecomer to the Central Power alliance, entering the war on 14 October 
1915.  Yet they were by no means new to the dynastic power struggle occurring in the 
Balkans.  The country’s prewar foreign policy helps to explain Bulgaria’s decision to take 
up arms with an Austro-Hungarian-German-Turkish coalition against the Entente.  
Tsarist Russia was all too eager to promote anti-Ottoman discord in the Balkans 
following their defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), which brought an increased 
Turkish presence to the Caucasus and led Russia to again declare war on Turkey in April 
1877.  Emboldened by promises of Russian assistance and independence from Ottoman 
rule, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania joined forces with the Romanovs to 
beat back Turkish influence in the region.  Their resultant victory spurred nationalist 
desires and facilitated the creation of a Balkan League in 1912.306  The peace, however, 
was short-lived as newly independent Bulgaria balked at the strictures imposed by the 
pro-Russian League and declared war on Serbia, Romania, and Greece, sparking the 
Second Balkan War (29 June – 10 August 1913).  Ultimately, tensions between Greece, 
Romania, and Serbia left the latter power alone in an alliance with Russia at the start of 
the First World War. 
Bulgaria’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers was nothing 
if not pragmatic.  Although Bulgaria’s King Ferdinand and Prime Minister Vasil 
Radoslavov were pro-Austrian, they were in no hurry to side with one alliance over the 
other.  Instead, they waited until military intervention might prove fruitful.  With the 
Allies’ failure to capture Constantinople and secure a direct trade route to Russia, the 
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Dardanelles campaign was the turning point for Bulgaria in mid-1915.  Joining an 
alliance with its erstwhile enemy (Turkey) was preferable to aligning with a more recent 
foe in Tsarist Russia.307 
The Bulgarian army made great strides in rolling back Serbian troops stationed 
along its northwestern border.  By December 1915, the combined forces of the German 
11th Army, Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army, and Bulgarian 1st and 2nd Armies occupied 
Serbia completely.308  With Serbia subdued the Central Powers turned to separate 
geographical areas of interests – the Austro-Hungarians focused on the Italian and 
Russian fronts, as Germany divided its attention between the Western and Eastern Fronts, 
fighting for territorial control in East Africa, all the while waging a losing naval 
campaign in the North Sea and the Atlantic.  Bulgaria, in contrast, focused its efforts 
exclusively on the Macedonian front for the remainder of the war.   
On 28 September 1918, Bulgaria was the first Central Power to sue for peace and 
be granted an Armistice by the Allies.  The Bulgarian army simply lost its will to fight; 
the country’s war aims had largely been met with the occupation of Serbia in 1915 and 
important gains made by the Bulgarian 3rd Army in Romania in 1916-1917.  The 
German army had already transferred most of its Eastern and Southern divisions to the 
Western Front in the build up to the Spring Offensive in 1918 (Kaiserschlacht), which 
left only a small German presence in the region and signaled waning support for its 
Balkan ally.309 A lack of support and communication from Berlin was one thing, but after 
exporting the majority of its foodstuffs to Germany and Austria-Hungary for the past two  
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years, Bulgaria was on the brink of starvation.310 
(c) Turkey 
A secret member of the Central Powers prior to the outbreak of war, Ottoman Turkey 
formally entered the conflict on 29 October 1914.311  Turkey’s contributions to the war 
effort were substantial, particularly against Russian and British (colonial) troops in the 
Caucasus region and the remote mountains of Persia (Iran) and fighting the British 
Expeditionary Force in the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq), in addition to the 
Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916.  Turkey’s military collapse was due more to internal 
pressures stemming from the Arab Revolt beginning in the summer of 1916.312  British 
and French officers stationed in Arabia, most famously T. E. Lawrence, promoted Arab 
nationalism as a counterpoint to despotic Ottoman rule, a story that is outside the scope of 
the present study.  Indeed, Crewe House did not bother to circulate enemy propaganda 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, leaving that task to Lord Beaverbrook’s Ministry of 
Information.313 
______ 
 With the Central Powers overstretched both militarily and financially after three 
and a half years of war, it was apparent to Crewe House that progress could be made in 
attacking the enemy powers where they were most vulnerable.  It is not surprising that 
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Northcliffe and his chief propaganda experts H. Wickham Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson 
selected Austria-Hungary, with its fragmented population and politics, as the first 
destination for the pamphlets of the Balloon Post.314  The director of propaganda posed 
two different options to the British War Cabinet on 24 February 1918.  In the first 
scenario or option “A,” Britain could work to secure a separate peace treaty with Austria-
Hungary.  This would deprive Germany of their closest ally and show Bulgaria and 
Turkey what would be gained by an early settlement, instead of waiting for a complete 
military collapse at a later date.  In the second scenario or option “B,” Britain would press 
for the total disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.315    
After careful deliberation the War Cabinet deemed that the two proposals were 
not mutually exclusive.  Anti-German propaganda could be used to plant the seeds of 
discontent by encouraging non-German subjects to support the Allied cause, thereby 
exacerbating ethnic tensions without promising the Southern Slavs their own state 
following the war.  This last point was vital for politicians like Arthur Balfour, who 
stressed to Northcliffe the fine line between seeing an enemy vanquished and dealing 
with the unwanted chaos of a fallen empire.316  Between May and October 1918 Crewe 
House distributed 60 million propaganda leaflets of various languages behind Austro-
Hungarian lines.  The method of delivery varied; either the Balloon Post distributed them 
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or in a combined Franco-British-Italian effort leaflet-filled rifle grenades were shot into 
the enemy’s camp.  The campaign worked much the same way against the Bulgarians.  
British intelligence agents stationed in neutral Switzerland, for example, reported that 
Bulgarian troops were pushing for the expulsion of their king and a disassociation from 
German war policy.317        
Apathetic and tired from fighting the Allies on multiple fronts, “food was the 
most emotive aspect of the problem” for Germany’s allies as a result of the intensification 
of the hunger blockade under the Lloyd George government.318  Unlike Wilhelmine 
Germany, which was dependent on foreign imports for its economic survival, Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria were more agriculturally self-sufficient.  Initially, they were able 
to weather the effects of the naval blockade by implementing a system of rationing, on 
the one hand, and through the power of the black market, on the other.  Furthermore, as a 
result of Russian setbacks on the Eastern Front, Austria was able to regain access to its 
most significant agriculture province (Galicia) in June 1915.    
The problem came, however, when plentiful Hungary found it difficult to supply 
the Dual Monarchy with sufficient grain, meat, and produce.  This became apparent as 
early as April 1915 when, at a political protest in Vienna, the general sentiment was that 
“Hungary treats us like a foreign country – like a state of the triple entente!”  The 
situation was compounded by the fact that while Hungary was Austria’s largest prewar 
supplier of food, the Magyars were not legally bound to export goods to its imperial 
counterpart.319  Shared political institutions, in short, did not necessarily make for an  
equal distribution of wartime resources.  
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By 1917, the same predicament was occurring throughout the Central Powers –
with a loss of manpower (i.e. labour), horses, and fertilizer to the war effort the home 
front directly felt the impact of food shortages.  The situation was dire in Austria, where  
Viennese rations were slashed to a barely sustainable 830 calories per day in 1917.320   
Similarly, the daily meat ration for Austrian troops in Italy was reduced over the course 
of the war from 400g in late 1914 to 100g in early 1918.  It has also been estimated that 
75 percent of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia were starving throughout the winter months, 
“[as] the sea blockade by the entente and the land blockade due to lack of railroad 
facilities brought this about.”321   
“We Were Hypnotized… as a Rabbit by a Snake”:  
The Legacy of Britain’s Propaganda Campaign 
 
Even before propaganda leaflets were found on German soldiers in the aftermath of 
Amiens (August 1918) Northcliffe received intelligence reports in May and early June, 
which indicated that German and Austrian POWs were regularly expressing surprise and 
appreciation for how well they were fed in Allied hands.  Crewe House ultimately used 
this information to wear down the enemy’s resistance once and for all.  The decision was 
made to distribute leaflets with the price of common foodstuffs like bread, milk, potatoes, 
butter, and meat in both the Pound Sterling and Reichsmark.  Knowing full well the 
scarcity of these items on the German home front and battlefield, this strategy capitalized 
on soldiers’ malnourishment and exhaustion.  It highlighted, for instance, the much 
higher cost of goods in Germany than in Britain due to the Allied blockade and rampant 
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German inflation, and served to remind them that unrestricted submarine warfare had 
failed to starve England.  
Letters accompanied these pamphlets from actual British and German soldiers to  
their loved ones on the home front.322  Homesickness and a genuine desire for peace were 
common elements to both letters, so as to break down enemy stereotypes and emphasize 
the similarities between “Tommy” and “Jerry.”  But their real purpose was to show the 
great disparity between Britain’s and the enemy’s food supply.  References to hunger and 
appalling conditions populated German letters home, while they were noticeably absent 
in British letters.  The most effective leaflets though came in pictorial format.  A single 
image of POWs eating food or, as in the case of “Germania” and “Seeherrschaft,” two 
contrasting images conveyed Crewe House’s message far better than any elaborate 
text.323       
 Northcliffe sent a formal letter of resignation to Lloyd George on 12 November 
1918 following the signing of the Armistice the previous day.  Lacking his characteristic 
flourish the short letter contained only two paragraphs in which he thanked the prime 
minister for his continued “confidence” in the work of Crewe House.  He made it clear, 
however, that the department no longer served a purpose in peacetime.324  For a man who 
attained great wealth and power on Fleet Street and reported directly to the prime 
minister for the last two years of the war, was this resignation not in some way 
premature?  Did it not run contrary to everything the patriotic press baron had hoped for?  
The answer, like so many aspects of Northcliffe’s career, is a complicated one.   
                                                        
322 Sanders and Taylor, 218.  
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There is no doubt that Northcliffe sought a formal role in the peace process.  Both 
he and chief propagandist Wickham Steed stated as much in separate correspondence to  
the War Cabinet.  Steed argued that Crewe House could easily be transformed from a 
propaganda department into “an agency for enlightenment” in order to procure a 
favourable settlement for the Allies and the German people.  Northcliffe, meanwhile, 
brazenly requested that he “… be given, with the least possible delay, authority as 
Chairman of the British War Mission to undertake this peace... in the closest 
collaboration with the various departments of state until the final peace settlement has 
been concluded.”325  This cable was sent to Lloyd George only a week prior to 
Northcliffe’s resignation on 12 November.  Highly suspicious of the propaganda 
director’s motives the prime minister recalled in his memoirs that, “I curtly told him to go 
to Hades.”326  Thus ended Northcliffe’s career in public service and, with it, his 
unflagging loyalty to His Majesty’s Government.  Edged out from the postwar settlement 
Northcliffe remained disillusioned with Lloyd George’s Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government up until his death in 1922.327 
The impact of Crewe House, however, was more enduring.  Newspapermen 
influencing and even leading government policy was a novel concept in Britain even at 
the end of the nineteenth century.  It took the stalemate of the First World War for 
politicians to truly harness the power of the British press.  Their search for 
unconventional solutions to the problem of an ill-equipped and understaffed state 
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In fact, he worked to undermine Lloyd George’s reelection campaign with his influence on Fleet Street.  
The Times and the Daily Mail were both highly critical of the Prime Minister’s election platform. 
 119 
 
 
 
bureaucracy led to the creation of Wellington House following the outbreak of war, 
followed by the Ministry of Information and Crewe House in 1917 and 1918, 
respectively.  In the postwar period a debate sparked around the question whether 
propaganda actually helped or hindered the Allied war effort.  Some Britons argued that 
it prolonged the war by playing up stereotypes of the Hun and his barbarous ways.  But 
these sentiments were in the minority.  Most contemporary British politicians and 
historians have since agreed with Ludendorff’s assertion that his beleaguered troops 
“were hypnotized by enemy propaganda as a rabbit by a snake.”328  Indeed, the novelty of 
Crewe House was that it differed in both the tone and substance from the propaganda 
released by its predecessors.  Its sole purpose was to communicate directly with German, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian soldiers in order to create doubt and dissension in the 
enemy’s ranks.  British propaganda stressing territorial setbacks, inadequate food supply, 
and mounting ethnic tensions undoubtedly contributed to the widespread malaise of the 
Central Powers.  
In a 1921 open letter to Lord Northcliffe the German-American journalist 
Ferdinand Hansen summed up the power of the Balloon Post:    
When you wished to influence the Germans you found it expedient to  
resort to the truth, or to some semblance of the truth…You reported the  
hardships borne by the German civilian population at home… 
With the air black with aeroplanes and white with millions of leaflets,  
he was not one to shut his eyes to the desperate situation in which he  
found himself.  When he went home on furlough he could see the woe and  
                                                        
328 General Ludendorff quoted in David Welch, Germany, Propaganda, and Total War, 1914-
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misery about him all too well.  When he captured prisoners… how could  
he not help contrasting their strong and well-fed appearance with his  
own gauntness and that of his companions.”329 
The propaganda of Crewe House did not cause Germany’s defeat in 1918, but rather 
expertly exploited pre-existing grievances – the hunger blockade chief among them – to 
the point that peace was seen as the only alternative to the carnage of total war.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
329 Ferdinand Hansen, The Unrepentant Northcliffe: Reply to the London Times of 19 October 
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Chapter 4 Appendix  
“The Organization of Official British Propaganda, 1918” 
 
 
 
[Figure 6] Source: Sanders and Taylor, 271.  The diagram is the author’s own. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix  
“The Department of Enemy Propaganda at Crewe House” 
 
 
 
[Figure 7] Source: Sanders and Taylor, 270.  The diagram is the author’s own. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“AN END BY BULLETS IS PREFERABLE TO DEATH BY 
STARVATION”: PEACE TALKS AND DISSENTING DIPLOMATS, 
NOVEMBER 1918 - MARCH 1919 
 
An Act of Hubris 
General Erich Ludendorff realized that Germany had effectively lost the war on 28 
September 1918.  Unaccustomed to failure the quartermaster general suffered a mental 
breakdown prior to admitting defeat.330  What troubled him most was the speed at which 
the Allies were gaining strategic ground along the Somme and Meuse-Argonne rivers in 
late September and the simultaneous collapse of the Bulgarian Army on the Balkan 
Front.331  In addition to these critical military setbacks, the German Empire faced the 
threat of widespread revolution on the home front, where calls for an immediate 
Armistice came from both soldiers and citizens alike. 
Rather than negotiate with France and Britain directly, the German government 
contacted U.S. President Woodrow Wilson on 4 October 1918 with the aim to strike a 
more lenient peace settlement based on the democratic principles of his recent Fourteen 
Points address to Congress.332  The Germans hoped to capitalize on the perceived 
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benevolence of Wilsonian idealism, which preached freedom of the seas and the removal 
of many international trade barriers – possibilities for the postwar world that would 
benefit Germany by curbing Britain’s naval predominance and foster a less Anglo-centric 
world order.333  A peace settlement spearheaded by the American president was 
ultimately the best-case scenario for German politicians looking to find their new “place 
in the sun” post-1918.    
  German Foreign Secretary Paul von Hintze argued, for example, that 
democratization was the key to winning over the American peace delegation and “the 
best way to muffle the political aftershock that followed defeat” on the home front.  What 
he proposed to the German High Command (OHL) and the emperor was nothing short of 
a revolution from above.  This entailed liberalizing the government by extending the 
franchise and amending the constitution to allow the populist Social Democrats (SPD) 
greater political representation in the Reichstag.334  These reforms extended to the highest 
ranks of government with the immediate resignation of Chancellor Georg von Hertling 
and even von Hintze, himself.335  In von Hintze’s place, liberal-minded diplomat 
Wilhelm Solf was appointed foreign minister, while known moderate Prince Maximilian 
of Baden became chancellor just in time to sign the ceasefire request to the Americans.  
The prince had grave reservations, however, about signing away Germany’s bargaining 
power.  Instead of blindly accepting Wilson’s Fourteen Points could not the German 
army continue fighting until the government was in a stronger position to negotiate?  By 
labeling Germany the “vanquished power” on paper, did it not ensure that the Allies 
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would demand further concessions in order to halt Germany’s economic progress after 
the war?  If recent history proved anything, as Prince Max reminded the German General 
Staff in regard to Germany’s punitive treaty with Bolshevik Russia on 18 March 1918, it 
was naïve to think that a victor would ever agree to a peace treaty that did not unduly 
punish the losing side.  Indeed, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk effectively marked Russia’s 
withdrawal from the First World War and forced the country to renounce all claims to 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland, as well as arable land in the Ukraine, Russian 
Poland, Belarus, and territory adjacent to the Black Sea in northeastern Georgia.336       
The chancellor’s doubts were valid but the reality was that Germany had waited 
too long to negotiate a better Armistice deal with the Allies.  An emergency meeting on 2 
October 1918 between the OHL and leaders of the interim government, including SPD 
head Philipp Scheidemann and Matthias Erzberger of the Catholic Centre Party, 
confirmed that Germany must immediately sue for peace: “[as] we can no longer win… 
and [need to] put an end to the struggle in order to save the German people and their 
allies from making further sacrifices.”337  Thus from 4 to 27 October 1918, multiple 
communiqués were passed between Washington and Berlin to the exclusion of London, 
Paris, and Rome.  British and French politicians looked askance at this newfound rapport 
between President Wilson and Prince Max.  If Germany were to capitulate it ought to be 
France and Britain who dictated terms rather than an American-led peace initiative.  This 
was the official attitude of Britain as its military and economic stranglehold of Germany  
                                                        
336 Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities (London: 
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continued in the final weeks of the war.  Ultimately, certain events at sea helped 
safeguard the Allies’ bargaining power at the peace table.   
In a desperate bid that served no purpose other than to justify the anger of Allied 
policymakers and citizens, a German U-boat torpedoed a British passenger liner off the 
coast of Ireland on 12 October.  More than 450 civilians were killed onboard the Leinster 
as the ship sank less than fifteen miles from Dublin.  Any sense of optimism that Wilson 
might have had for the impending negotiations with Imperial Germany vanished that day.  
He was decidedly harsher in his next communication with Germany, condemning the act 
as both “illegal and inhumane.”338  Moreover, in counsel with trusted adviser, Colonel 
Edward M. House, Wilson sought to distance himself from the Germans, believing that 
the only hope for an equitable peace necessitated greater Allied involvement. 
 The sinking of RMS Leinster had a diplomatic impact similar to the Lusitania 
disaster of May 1915.  Both instances involved German submarines targeting civilians on 
the high seas.  The tragedies sparked international outrage and invariably strengthened 
Wilson’s conviction to side with the Allies. Armistice talks stalled between Washington 
and Berlin in late October as a direct consequence of the U-boat attack.339  Although the 
president was still willing to work with Prince Max, he wanted assurances that Germany 
was not simply paying lip service to American beneficence in order to launch an 
offensive at a later date.  He now demanded complete German acceptance of the Fourteen 
Points, an admission of the military superiority of the Allies, and the promise of real 
constitutional change within the Reich.  A nominal cabinet shake-up was not enough  
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proof that Germany was willing to capitulate once and for all. 
 Perhaps the killing of British noncombatants was justified by the OHL as the best 
way to illustrate the unavoidable loss of civilian life during wartime.  It is more likely, 
though, that the attack was a reprisal in response to the continued presence of the Allied 
naval blockade.  Either way, it was an unnecessary act of violence that undermined their 
initial peace overture and ensured that future German promises were met with 
considerable Anglo-American skepticism.340  Foreign Secretary von Hintze was correct 
to assume that a ceasefire was contingent on German adherence to the rule of law.  
Subsequent Armistice talks with the Allies made this stipulation a definite requirement 
for peace.    
Article XXVI of the Armistice Agreement 
Less than five weeks after Germany’s 4 October communiqué to President Wilson, Max 
von Baden appointed Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger to negotiate a ceasefire with 
the Allies.  Erzberger was a liberal-minded politician and a longstanding critic of the war 
among the Great Powers.  He was, in short, the ideal German diplomat to negotiate with 
the Allies and Associated Powers amid the chaos of war and revolution.341  A ceasefire 
agreement was needed more than ever as Germany’s allies capitulated one by one in the 
autumn of 1918.  Ottoman Turkey, for instance, followed Bulgaria’s lead and concluded 
an Armistice on 30 October, while Austria-Hungary signed a separate agreement on 3 
November.342  With Germany isolated and facing imminent defeat Erzberger travelled to  
Allied Headquarters to end the fighting that had ravaged much of Europe and the world  
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for the last fifty-two months.    
Convened around a small table in Ferdinand Foch’s railway carriage Allied and  
German representatives signed the Armistice agreement outside the northern French town  
of Compiègne at 5:00 a.m. on 11 November 1918.343  Present at the negotiations was  
Supreme Allied Commander Marshal Foch, French Major General Maxime Weygand, 
and British Admirals Rosslyn Wemyss and George Hope.  Representatives from the 
German army, navy, and foreign ministry accompanied the secretary of state, including 
Major General Detlev von Winterfeldt, Captain Ernst Vanselow, and Count Alfred von 
Oberndorff.  When General Weygand read aloud the terms to the German delegation 
there was a collective reluctance to agree to Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement.344          
This controversial Article stipulated that the naval blockade would remain in 
place after the Compiègne agreement, but that the Allies “would contemplate the 
provisioning of Germany… to such an extent, as shall be found necessary.”345  Such 
vague wording troubled Erzberger, who pleaded to Foch on the night of the Armistice: 
“Article XXVI signifies the continuation, by the Allies, of an essential part of the War 
during the Armistice,” and concluded by asserting, “This starvation policy of England… 
The Allies will not derive any military success from that, yet the German people will 
again most gravely be hurt.”346  Why did the Allies and Americans think it necessary to 
include Article XXVI in the ceasefire agreement?  What impact did the blockade’s 
continuation have on the wider peace proceedings and the German home front?  Did the 
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Allied delegation have any moral or ethical reservations about allowing civilians to 
starve?  This chapter addresses these questions from the signing of the Armistice in 
November 1918 to early March 1919 when the Allies finally began to comprehend the 
dangers associated with maintaining the blockade.347  
The Continuation of the Blockade after the Armistice 
The prolongation of the naval blockade of Germany after 11 November has led one 
historian to conclude that its retention “symbolize[s] the great lost opportunity for 
postwar Europe… [where] the new reality was founded not upon Wilson’s high principle 
but upon unnecessary starvation.”348  These are harsh words levelled against the Allies.  
They eloquently characterize the injustice of targeting civilians in war, but the statement 
lacks some historical context to accurately judge the Allies’ motives throughout the post-
Armistice period.   
It is prudent then to reconsider Admiral John Fisher’s prewar assertion that “all is 
fair in war.”  This 1904 quote, which opened the dissertation, suggested that it would not 
be immoral to implement a food blockade in the event of war with Imperial Germany.349  
He maintained, for example, that it was necessary for the Royal Navy to quickly establish 
command of the sea to prevent foodstuffs from being denied to a geographically isolated 
Britain.  This is understandable given that Britain on the eve of war was forced to import 
more than 60 percent of its foodstuffs from overseas.350  Fisher’s argument does not take 
into account the morality of targeting Germans on the home front, but neither does it 
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promote the blockade’s continuance for strictly political ends.  This was something of 
uncharted territory for Allied policymakers and their respective armed forces.  The Allied 
naval blockade was considered a valuable instrument of war, yet how was it to be used 
after the guns stopped firing on the Western Front?  
(a) The French Argument 
The need for retribution was a significant element in French decision-making.  For 
instance, centrist Premier Georges Clemenceau pushed for the economic sanctions to be 
kept in place after the Armistice as a way to settle longstanding grievances over the 
Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).351  In 1871, Prussian forces annexed the provinces of 
Alsace and Lorraine following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).  
The Treaty of Frankfurt, which formally ended the conflict on 10 May, stipulated that 
Prussia would take control of this strategic land.  Before the treaty there was some 
discussion among German policymakers about the benefits of appropriating Alsace-
Lorraine.  In favour of the decision was General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who 
commanded Prussian forces in the wars of German unification,352 and considered Alsace-
Lorraine to be more than just the requisite spoils of war.   
This vast French territory, which bordered Germany and stretched from the base  
of Luxembourg in the north to Switzerland in the south, represented an ideal opportunity  
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for the newly unified empire to consolidate power in Western Europe.  The area 
encompassed the Vosges Mountains and a series of elaborate fortifications at Metz, and 
was rich in iron and coal.  These geographical advantages might deter France from 
undertaking a war of attrition, or facilitate future military action against France.  
There was also the delicate issue of nationalism to consider, as many residents in 
Alsace-Lorraine spoke some form of German (either an Upper Rhenish or Alsatian 
dialect).353  Thus the case could be made that territorial possession was simply following 
linguistic and ethnic traditions, much like Adolf Hitler’s opaque justification for annexing 
the Sudetenland in September 1938.354  Moltke and the German General Staff ultimately 
wagered that the Kaiserreich only stood to gain from annexing the two provinces. 
Alsace-Lorraine officially became a German imperial territory or Reichsland with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Frankfurt on 10 May 1871.  French census records reveal, in 
total, that nearly 500,000 inhabitants emigrated from the two provinces between 1871 and 
1910.355  The negative impact of Frankfurt cannot be underestimated, as deep-seated 
revanchism underscored much of French foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  The need to regain the “lost provinces” not only contributed to the 
deterioration of Franco-German relations prior to the First World War, it undoubtedly 
conditioned France’s terse response to German pleas for a lenient peace settlement in  
November 1918.356    
                                                        
353 C. C. Eckhardt, “The Alsace-Lorraine Question,” Scientific Monthly 6, no. 5 (May 1918): 436.  
See also, Michael Heffernan, “History, Geography, and the French National Space: The Question of 
Alsace-Lorraine, 1914-1918,” Space & Polity 5, no. 1 (February 2001): 28-29. 
354 Alan E. Steinweis, “German Cultural Imperialism in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 1938-1945,” 
International History Review 13, no. 3 (August 1991): 469. 
355 Eckhardt, 434.  
356 See, Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-1871 in French Memory 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), esp. 175-202; Rachel Chrastil, Organizing for War: France, 1870-
1914 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); D. R. Watson, “The Makings of French 
 132 
 
 
 
The Franco-Prussian War cast a long shadow over French diplomacy, particularly 
in regard to the punitive measures enforced by the German treaty (residents were forced 
to legally declare their allegiance to either France or Germany; those who identified 
themselves as “French” were forced to emigrate westward) and the escalation of violence 
against civilians throughout the Siege of Paris.  Indeed, Prussia sought to win a war by 
attacking and investing the French capital in the autumn and winter of 1870-1871.357  
Although Bismarck wryly predicted that, “eight days without a café au lait would suffice 
to break the Parisian bourgeoisie,” it took more than five months of dwindling provisions, 
the outbreak of tuberculosis, and bombardment of the city for Paris to surrender.358  
Starvation was not the goal of Prussia’s attack on Paris.  The siege was merely intended 
to hasten victory by forcing the Government of National Defense to admit defeat.  Food 
queues were a daily inconvenience, with the young, elderly, and infirm suffering the most 
from malnutrition.  But widespread famine did not occur, as Bismarck ensured that 
trainloads of food were brought in to relieve the city’s inhabitants once the peace treaty 
was concluded.359      
But this is not to suggest that the French Third Republic was only motivated by 
long-standing revenge.  Nowhere in the preliminary Armistice or peace negotiations did 
Clemenceau argue it was France’s “right” to starve Germany in retaliation for 1871 or, 
even the horrors of the last four years.  The French premier maintained, however, that he 
would be “betray[ing]” his country if the Allies relaxed their economic stranglehold of 
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Germany: “Towns had been destroyed; over two million [French] men had lost their 
lives; mines had been rendered unworkable; and yet what guarantees had France that 
anything would be received in payment for all this destruction?”360  The latent power of 
German militarism could not be trusted.  To show mercy at this late stage could 
jeopardize the victory won by the Allies on the battlefield and possibly the entire peace 
settlement.  The French, therefore, implored the British and American delegations to 
maintain the Allied blockade of Germany throughout the negotiation process. 
(b) The British Perspective 
The idea of using the naval blockade as a political weapon was not just relegated to the 
French delegation or the cunning propaganda of Northcliffe’s Balloon Post.  It was also a 
strategy increasingly favoured by the British Foreign Office, Admiralty, and War Office 
in order to secure an early peace settlement with Germany.361  In fact, the latter 
department argued throughout the negotiations:  
We should retain our whip hand over Germany and obtain our peace  
conditions; we should save her from Bolshevism and thus enable her to  
be in a position to reorganize after peace… With the abolition of the  
Blockade, and especially its machinery, we lose our power of coercion  
over Germany; we run the risk of seeing Germany crumble and become  
unable to pay any indemnity; we lose our trade [monopoly] to the neutrals.362   
                                                        
360 Georges Clemenceau to the Supreme War Council, 13 January 1919, quoted in Bane and Lutz, 
218-219.  
361 In contrast, the Treasury, Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, and War Trade 
Department were strongly against continuing the blockade into the post-Armistice period.  ‘Memorandum 
Respecting the Continuance of the Blockade,’ 22 January 1919, TNA, T 1/12275, 158-160.   
362 ‘Memorandum Embodying the Views of the General Staff Respecting the Continuance of the 
Blockade [Appendices B and C],’ 20 January 1919, National Archives, T 1/12275, 166-169.  See also, 
Edward F. Willis, ‘Herbert Hoover and the Blockade of Germany, 1918-1919,’ p. 5, in the Edward 
Frederick Willis Papers, Box 1, HIA.    
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This memorandum from the General Staff is telling in that it points to the myriad socio-
political issues facing a vanquished Germany and briefly outlines Britain’s post-
Armistice blockade strategy to combat them.   
Above all, the War Office wanted to ensure that there would still be a functioning 
German government with which to negotiate a peace and settle on a sum of reparations.  
The perceived threat of Bolshevism was a motivating factor for the Allies to insist on 
“retain[ing] our whip hand over Germany…” until the ink had fully dried on the peace 
settlement.363  The political collapse of the Imperial Germany in November 1918 
effectively created a power vacuum where leftists (i.e. the Social Democrats) and extreme 
leftists (i.e. the Independent Social Democrats) openly jockeyed for position.  The impact 
of the German Revolution is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but suffice it 
to say that the fear of anarchy in post-Wilhelmine Germany was very much at the 
forefront of the British General Staff’s thinking in regard to the political benefits of a 
post-Armistice blockade.364 
Britain desired an end to the fighting and suffering of the Great War, but it was 
unwilling to see Germany as the aggrieved party for several reasons.  Chief among them 
was the need to create a lasting peace in the spirit of the Congress of Vienna.365  The 
1815 peace conference, which ended Napoleon’s reign as Emperor of the French, 
established a balance of power on the Continent that lasted nearly a century.  Like 
Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany was viewed as the illiberal aggressor who 
needed its power corralled and political destiny shaped by a coalition of liberal-minded 
                                                        
363 ‘Memorandum Embodying the Views of the General Staff Respecting the Continuance of the 
Blockade.’ 
364 Osborne, 187.  
365 Charles G. Fenwick, “Notes on International Affairs: The Peace Treaty with Germany,” 
American Political Science Review 13 no. 3 (August 1919): 468. 
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victors.  The Allies and Associated Powers, like the nineteenth century anti-Bonapartist 
coalition of Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Britain, had only one chance to establish a 
workable peace settlement.  It was a burdensome task for all involved. 
At the same time, the Treaty of Versailles was intended to be a “peace of 
justice”366 – the ultimate legal proof that German provocation started the First World War 
and, consequently, ought to bear sole responsibility for the war’s cost.  Restitution rather 
than retribution was the primary objective of the peace conference for the British 
delegation.367  The retention of the Allied naval blockade was one of the surest ways for 
Britain to realize this goal.  In a report prepared by the Political Intelligence Department 
of the Foreign Office and circulated to the War Cabinet in August 1918, Robert Cecil 
noted:  
Any announcement to Germany must convey a threat as well as an offer,  
and it is an elementary principle that a threat should consist in facts rather  
than words.  What is the average German most afraid of?  There can be no  
question as to the answer.  It is the economic predominance of the Allies…  
on the other hand, what does the average thinking German hope for?  The  
answer follows from what we have already said and can be given in two  
words – peace and plenty –  and he is more and more beginning to realise  
that the restoration of that domestic comfort after which his soul still hankers  
depends upon the use made by the Allies of their economic control.368    
                                                        
366 George A. Finch, “The Peace Negotiations with Germany,” American Journal of International 
Law 13, no. 3 (July 1919): 537.  See also, Catherine Lu, “Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons for the 
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367 “‘The Great Reckoning’: Victors Impose Terms on Defeated Germany: Treaty Principles 
Revealed on ‘Lusitania’ Day,” Advocate of Peace 81, no. 5 (May 1919): 148-149. 
368 Lord Robert Cecil, ‘Economic Defence and Development Committee Memorandum re: 
Northcliffe’s 10 June Letter to Balfour,’ 1 August 1918, TNA, MUN 4/6615.  
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Although Cecil’s words left little room for doubt, a subsequent memorandum on 
22 January 1919 listed the key advantages of continuing the blockade:  
(1) The Blockade is the most effective weapon left to the Associated Powers  
for speedily obtaining our peace terms; (2) The continuance of the Blockade is 
calculated to secure an early peace; (3) If the Blockade is discontinued, even for  
a short period, it will be impossible again to bring its machinery into operation; 
(4) The Blockade means co-operation; its abolition means the most fierce trade 
competition among the Associated Powers.369   
It was ultimately the official opinion of the Foreign Office, in consultation with the 
Admiralty, War Office, and Lord Northcliffe’s Crewe House, that the Allies should leave 
the blockade in place for fear of jeopardizing their leverage at the peace table. 
Lloyd George and the General Election of 1918 
Political considerations similarly accounted for David Lloyd George’s decision to 
announce an election in Britain twenty-four hours after signing the Armistice with 
Germany.  Lloyd George came to office in December 1916 when the Liberal party was 
deeply divided over the war leadership of H. H. Asquith.370  Endorsed by the Fleet Street 
press, including Northcliffe’s numerous publications, as “the man to win the war,”371 
Lloyd George more or less managed the interests of Liberals, Labour, and Conservatives 
while the war was ongoing and hoped to capitalize on the Allied victory with another 
term in office.372  This election, however, was radically different than the last general  
                                                        
369 ‘Memorandum Respecting the Continuance of the Blockade,’ No. 11214/x/1150, 22 January 
1919, TNA, T 1/12275.   
370 Edward David, “The Liberal Party Divided, 1916-1918,” Historical Journal 13, no. 3 
(September 1970): 510-512.  
371 J. M. McEwen, “Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War,” 655. 
372 This is not to suggest that the pacifism of the Labour party went totally unheard, however, the 
party never posed a serious threat to Lloyd George’s coalition (Liberal-Conservative) government. In fact, 
 137 
 
 
 
election held in Britain in 1910.   
Political allegiances had shifted during the war years to create a dynamic coalition 
between the Liberals, led by Lloyd George, and Andrew Bonar Law’s Conservative 
(Unionist) party.  Liberal-Tory partisanship, in contrast, had not been an option for 
Asquith in 1910.  Locked in a fiery election battle with the Conservatives, Asquith had 
been forced to rely instead on the fleeting support of the Irish Nationals and Labour in 
order to win the vote.  Conversely, the divisive issue of Irish Home Rule – compounded 
by the violence of the 1916 Easter Rising and recent conscription crisis – precluded any 
chance of Irish Republican support for Lloyd George’s 1918 election bid.373  The prime 
minister, then, had two options open to him – align further with the Conservative party or 
attempt to solidify his Liberal base by wooing back the disgruntled Asquithians.374  The 
latter strategy was more uncertain because it involved appealing to estranged former 
allies or, in some cases, enemies for their support.  Thus, Lloyd George courted the 
favour of Bonar Law and the Conservatives, albeit cautiously and with some hesitation.  
But one question remained regardless of his political alliances: would the momentum of 
the Armistice be enough to clinch the P. M. a victory at the polls? 
  Indeed, the social and political composition of the British electorate had changed.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
Labour’s perennial anti-war stance was used by the coalition Liberals and Conservatives to discredit the 
likes of prominent Labour members such as Arthur Henderson, Ramsay Macdonald, and Philip Snowden as 
either “Bolsheviks” on the one hand, or “pro-German” sympathizers on the other.  See, Bernadotte E. 
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(February 1960): 101; J. A. Turner, “The British Commonwealth Union and the General Election of 1918,” 
English Historical Review 93, no. 368 (July 1978): 528; Erik Goldstein, “Great Britain: The Home Front,” 
in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, eds. Manfred Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, 
and Elisabeth Glasner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 154-156.  
373 McGill, 110-111.  See also, Keith Jeffrey, “The First World War and the Rising: Mode, 
Moment, and Memory,” in 1916: The Long Revolution, eds. Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (Cork: 
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Houndsditch,” Review of Politics 40, no. 3 (July 1978): 370-371. 
374 Trevor Wilson, “The Coupon and the British General Election of 1918,” Journal of Modern 
History 36, no. 1 (March 1964): 28.  
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No longer was it possible to deny women the vote when many proved themselves capable 
of labour-intensive factory work, courageous nursing efforts, and volunteer work with the 
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and various other agencies.  “My good lady, 
go home and sit still,” was the advice of the War Office to women in late 1914.375  That 
paternalistic mindset did not hold during the war and would not suffice when it came to 
the postwar vote either.  To reflect these changing social mores Parliament granted 
women over the age of 30 the right to vote with the Representation of the People Act on 6 
February 1918.  The Act also enfranchised all men over the age of 21 and even allowed 
19 and 20-year-old men to vote if they were servicemen.  Overnight the franchise in 
Britain nearly tripled in size from 8 million eligible voters to 21 million.376   
Permitting women and young men to vote in the general election ensured that 
voters’ concerns needed to be addressed more than ever.  Labeled the “Khaki Election” 
because of the government’s preoccupation with securing the veteran vote, the issues that 
dominated the campaign logically focused on British postwar stability and security.  
What assurances did voters have that the war would not resume at some point, and what 
actions were being taken to combat the forces of German militarism and Bolshevism?  
These questions were of paramount concern to Britons in the nine months following the 
signing of the Armistice.  The majority of Britons ultimately did not want a “soft” peace.  
When voters headed to the polls on 14 December 1918 an overwhelming 47.14 percent 
were willing to let Lloyd George and the Conservative wartime coalition represent their  
                                                        
375 Beckett, 324. 
376 McGill, 111.  See also, “The Coming General Election,” British Medical Journal 2, no. 3008 
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interests at Versailles.377   
 Marxist historian Arno J. Mayer has been quick to point out the groundswell of 
nationalism that bookended the war years in Europe.  Strident Balkan nationalism and 
German autocracy sparked the initial outbreak of war.  But Mayer is equally convinced 
that the Allies contributed to a postwar atmosphere of self-interest and distrust by 
cloaking their conservative rhetoric in the patriotism of the flag: “The British government 
became the prisoner of this far from unorganized and undirected super-nationalist 
impulse which packed Parliament with a majority of ‘hard-faced men.’  At the Peace 
Conference Lloyd George never really dared relent on indemnities….”378  This depiction 
of the prime minister’s campaign is somewhat unfair; calls to “hang the Kaiser!” did not 
come exclusively from Whitehall.  The coalition government merely vowed to prosecute 
the peace with the same diligence and vigour that allowed the Allies to win the war.  
Continuity and moral certainty was what the Lloyd George ballot represented to many 
voters who saw Britain as the natural arbiter between “the punitive attitude[s] of the  
French… [and] the more conciliatory approach of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.”379  
Initial Relief Efforts 
The Allies refused to lift the blockade of Germany for political reasons.  That much is 
plain.  But the decision was not unanimously reached.  Politicians and military personnel 
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on both sides of the Atlantic questioned the morality of denying food to a country that 
had already admitted defeat.380  Herbert Hoover, more than any other Allied official, 
recognized the need to revictual Europe in a timely manner.  As head of the American 
Relief Administration and member of the Supreme Economic Council at the peace 
conference, Hoover outlined the gravity of the “new world situation in food” in a widely 
publicized address to the United States Food Administration on 12 November 1918:  
“The war has been brought to an end in no small measure by starvation itself and it 
cannot be our business to maintain starvation after peace.”381   
He knew all too well the difficulty of provisioning war-ravaged countries as he 
was Chairman of Relief Operations in Northern France and Belgium from 1914 to 
1917.382  But the task of provisioning an entire continent was an enormous administrative 
feat that seemed almost insurmountable to him.  The population of Europe was 420 
million in 1918.  Denmark, Hungary, and Southern Russia had sufficient supplies to last 
the winter without the help of Allied aid.  That, nevertheless, still left him with 380 
million mouths to feed.  The population of Britain, France, and Italy stood at 125 million; 
however, steps had been taken to ensure that the Allies would not go hungry.  Thus, when 
Hoover and his capable team of administrators set sail for Europe on 16 November 1918,  
they were faced with the immediate prospect of feeding 255 million people.383    
(a) The Hoover Plan 
How does one begin to combat hunger on such a grand scale?  Hoover’s answer was to  
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prioritize aid based on political, rather than physiological necessity.  In his opinion, the 
Allies’ first concern must be to provision the 75 million inhabitants languishing under the 
“German yoke” – Belgians, Greeks, Serbians, Yugoslavs, Czechs, and Romanians.  
These people were sympathetic to the Allied cause and, as a result, ought to be helped 
first in order to prevent starvation and further political dislocation.  Next on the list of 
those to feed were the 40 million people living in neutral countries – Sweden, Norway, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, to a lesser extent.384  Neutrals had 
traded informally with both the Central Powers and the Entente; however, overwhelming 
pressure from the Allies and America’s entry into the war eventually compelled neutral 
governments to deny foodstuffs to Germany as well.  Hoover ensured that these countries 
would be rewarded for their loyalty with food and essential matérial at the earliest 
possible date.   
His next priority involved significant aid to 50 million people in Northern Russia, 
including an Allied contingent of British marines and U.S. soldiers sent to take North 
Russia from the Bolsheviks in mid-1918.385  Transportation links were virtually 
nonexistent in Russia due to heavy fighting on the Eastern Front.386  The rapid approach  
of winter also meant “these groups are the ones that must enlist the sympathy of the  
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American people and for whom we are prepared to make any necessary sacrifice.”387   
Where did the Central Powers factor into Hoover’s relief plan?  In his first official 
statement after arriving in Europe on 1 December 1918, he detailed the plight of Germans 
suffering from hunger and malnutrition under “a watertight blockade” and urged Allied 
delegates to remember that although “justice requires [Germany] to make amends for 
wrongs done, it cannot be accomplished through the spread of anarchy.”388  The German 
civilian death rate had long overtaken the birth rate by l918 and the looming threat of a 
socialist revolution did little to inspire confidence and stability in the new provisional 
government.  The installation of prominent socialists in Max von Baden’s government, 
for example, along with the growing threat of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg’s 
radical left-wing Spartacus movement, was proof enough for many Anglo-American 
politicians that postwar Germany was rife with Bolshevism.389  Hoover, in short, believed 
that this was neither the time nor place to use food as a weapon.  The key to feeding these 
people was quite obvious to him – the Allies needed to lift the blockade of the Central 
Powers in order to free up more American supplies for the rest of Europe.390  He worked 
throughout January 1919 to convince the Allies that the German merchant marine could 
be used to transport American foodstuffs and, thereby, speed up postwar reconstruction 
and the peace negotiations.   
(b) Allied Obstructionism  
But France and Britain were not as amenable to the Hoover plan.  The French delegation  
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refused to even consider Hoover’s proposal to lift the blockade, choosing, instead, to cite 
the vague and debatable wording of Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement on the 
need to provision the enemy.391  A certain amount of French recalcitrance was expected 
after fifty-two months of fighting that resulted in 1.4 million French combat deaths.  Yet 
France’s apprehension had less to do with feeding Germany than how the enemy would 
pay for these provisions.392  Would a line of credit be extended to Germany?  If so, who 
would provide the loan?  Why should war-torn France offer any concessions when it was 
Germany who ought to pay reparations?  These were valid questions, to be sure.  But they 
effectively stalled Hoover’s reconstruction efforts in Central Europe until mid-March 
1919.  
“First one excuse after another has been found by one government after another 
amongst the Allies… The uses to which the blockade on foodstuffs is being placed are 
absolutely immoral,” wrote an irate Hoover to President Woodrow Wilson on 19 
February 1919.393  These frustrations with the Allies are noted time and again throughout 
his correspondence with Washington and professional dealings with the Supreme 
Economic Council and Allied Blockade Committee.394  The American Relief 
Administration particularly objected to the stalling tactics of Sir John Beale, head of the 
British Food Ministry, who warned Hoover to not speak to the British press about the 
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blockade’s relaxation “until the Germans [have] learned a few things.”395  Ultimately, 
Hoover balked at Beale’s suggestion, which was followed up with a dubious offer to lift 
the blockade if, and only if, the U.S. agreed to lower the prices of its food exports to 
Britain.396  
There is little doubt that Allied obstructionism made the revictualling of Europe 
much harder for Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration.  Undercutting 
their relief efforts in the hope of negotiating cheaper food for domestic consumption was 
just one example.  Perhaps the most unscrupulous incident involved the sale of 45,000 
tons of rotten fish to Germany in return for $40 million in gold.  The Allies initially 
bought the fish from the Northern Neutrals as part of their preclusive purchase strategy in 
1917.  By mid-February 1919, though, the stockpiled shipment lay rotting in a 
Scandinavian warehouse.  It was the Allies’ intention to trick the German delegation into 
making this tainted purchase.  Fortunately, as Hoover recounts in his memoir, the  
Germans notified him of the impending sale and he put an end to the “rotten” deal.397   
Conditions in Germany 
After representing Britain at the Armistice agreement Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss  
informed Lloyd George “that the term that causes the greatest consternation among the 
German delegates is the blockade, as they fear famine and sickness… Conditions in 
Germany are far worse than we thought.”398   Most Britons, the War Cabinet included, 
gave little thought to the daily struggle of the average German woman and her family on 
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the home front.  The prime minister was nevertheless compelled to send teams of British 
army officers to Germany in order to assess the real health and wellbeing of its citizens.  
Was Germany truly starving or were these cries for aid just clever propaganda?  The War 
Office’s fact finding mission began in mid-December 1918 and concluded in late 
February/early March 1919 with some startling revelations that forced the Allies to 
rethink the political necessity of their post-Armistice blockade.399             
 The first reports on the socio-economic conditions in Germany came from  
Brigadier General H. C. Rees and Lieutenant A. Campbell.  Stationed in Berlin between  
12 and 15 December 1918, the officers declared that: “Germany appears to be completely 
beaten and disorganized… The nation as a whole is on the verge of starvation… They are 
hungry, very hungry… The one question in Berlin is: ‘when are the American or English 
troops coming, and will they give us food?’”400  Each subsequent report from British 
army officers confirmed Rees and Campbell’s initial assessment of the harsh living 
conditions in Germany.  For instance, the food situation was just as appalling in Saxony, 
particularly in Leipzig in early January 1919, where officers were shocked by the gaunt 
and sallow appearance of people walking the streets.  Two weeks later, in Munich, 
Captains J. E. Broad and J. R. Sommerville and Lieutenant D. Pease made three 
observations to the War Office: (1) the region of Bavaria was dreadfully undernourished 
(2) existing food supplies would not last more than two months and, as such, (3) 
Germany needed to be provisioned by April in order to prevent the onset of famine.  
Speaking broadly, “from conversation with all classes of Bavarians,” the officers reported  
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that public opinion believed “the present situation would be greatly minimized by the 
raising of the blockade.”401       
On 2 February 1919, Captains E. Christie-Miller and E. B. Trafford spoke from 
firsthand experience on the deteriorating conditions in Hanover.  Both men had spent 
nearly a year in the German city as prisoners of war.  Thus, neither soldier was inclined 
to exaggerate the plight of their former captor, which makes their analysis of the German 
food situation all the more sobering.  Their report focused specifically on the lack of milk 
in Hanover; no one over the age of six was permitted a milk ration and dairy cows were 
being systematically slaughtered for food.  Desperation reached new levels when even 
cows suffering from tuberculosis were eaten.  The officers implored the War Office to 
revictual Hanover immediately.  It was their heart-felt opinion that humanitarian 
considerations ought to trump short-term political gains.  The blockade of Germany 
needed to be lifted at once.402      
 General Foch, however, held the opposite view.  In correspondence with the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pichon, Foch argued that “the strict 
maintenance of the rules of the blockade is imperative from a military point of view… 
The blockade, the severity of which can be increased or diminished according to 
circumstances, will remain the best and most rapid means of obtaining respect for the 
Armistice agreement….”403  Foch’s letter is significant for two reasons.  First, it is dated 
February 3rd – the day after the latest report from the British Expeditionary Force 
officers detailing the widespread hunger and sickness of the German civilian population.  
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This gives some insight into the difficulty of Allied decision-making c. 1914-1919.  The 
French firmly believed that the post-Armistice blockade would expedite the peace 
process and lay the groundwork for a postwar economic alliance or, in the words of the 
French Minister of Commerce, Etienne Clémentel, “an economic union of free peoples” 
that did not include the Germans.404 As French historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown, 
French economic policy c. 1918-1919 focused on promoting the political and monetary 
benefits of inter-Allied cooperation after the war.  Call it safety in numbers or a precursor 
to the “corporatism” of the 1920s in the U.S. and Europe, Clémentel argued that France 
would greatly benefit from price fixing and sharing resources with the other Allies by 
reconstructing the French economy more quickly.405   
 Secondly, it reiterates the fact that most Allied diplomats viewed the naval 
blockade as a control mechanism – akin to a light switch – that could be turned on and off 
at the Allies’ will.  But the problem with this line of thinking was that it did not take into 
account the long and short-term implications of denying food to a country that had 
already surrendered.  After all, the terms of Article XXVI promised that the Allies would 
“contemplate the provisioning of Germany…” after 11 November 1918.406  Four months 
had already elapsed since the signing of the Armistice and the Allies were no closer to 
contemplating any serious relief efforts in Germany.  “I wish to preface my report on my 
visit to Leipzig,” wrote Captain W. S. Roddie on 14 February 1919, “to those who have 
had the opportunity of studying Germany from the inside, the policy of continuing the 
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starvation of that country must appear not only senseless but utterly harmful to 
ourselves.”407  At this crucial stage in the negotiations the post-Armistice blockade 
proved more a hindrance to peace than anything else.   
The Turn of the Tide 
The flood of health reports from British officers stationed in Germany coincided with the 
third and final renewal of the Armistice.  German and Allied diplomats reconvened to 
discuss the terms of the ceasefire at Trier in the Rhineland from 14 to 16 February.  Just 
as he had negotiated the initial agreement on 11 November 1918, Matthias Erzberger 
headed the German delegation once more.  This time, however, the Allies were met with 
hostility from an embittered Erzberger who condemned their obstructionist tactics in 
delaying the arrival of food to Germany: 
Gentlemen… in wide circles of the German people I am asked quite  
rightly: what is it the Allies want of us?  We are making sacrifice after  
sacrifice, and in the surrender of our resources we are going even to the  
length of impoverishment.  We do not want you to give us the foodstuffs  
we need [for free], as we are ready to pay for them.  Despite this[,] deliveries  
have been postponed again and again, and we are going hungry.  If the  
Entente wishes to destroy us, it should at least not expect us to dig our own  
graves.408  
Erzberger’s words convey the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that was clearly 
mutual on the part of the Allies toward Germany and Germany toward the Allies.   
Delegates on both sides left the Trier conference wondering what it would take to end  
                                                        
407 Reports from British Officers, 82-83. 
408 Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, 17 February 1919, Appendix A, 40, 
quoted in Willis, 42. 
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this political stalemate.  But two developments occurred in late February and early March 
1919 that helped to turn the tide.     
 After pleading with the Allies to let them get on with the business of feeding  
Europe, Hoover and the American delegation decided to approach the problem of food 
relief in an entirely different manner.  In a 20 February meeting of the Superior Blockade 
Council,409 U.S. Chairman Vance McCormick chose to appear indifferent to Allied 
requests for aid.  He reminded the American Relief Administration beforehand that it 
held the upper hand in any dealings with the Allies regarding food and finance, as the 
Entente was heavily dependent on American aid.   He wagered that it would only be a 
matter of weeks before their feigned apathy compelled the Allies to relent.  “[It] worked 
like a charm,” revealed McCormick in his diary five days later, “… our policy of 
indifference on the relaxation of the blockade is having the desired effect and the Allies 
are now coming to us.”410  This was an important lesson for the United States to 
demonstrate and an even more valuable lesson for the Allies to remember – U.S. aid to 
European allies must not be taken for granted.  France and Britain would ultimately need  
to abandon their fixed notions of justice if they wanted to create a lasting peace.  
The British delegation came to a similar conclusion based on the myriad reports 
from army officers witnessing the level of deprivation on the German home front.   
The officers wrote their findings independently of one another and were repeatedly left 
with the same conclusion: “hunger is at the bottom of a good deal of the unrest.”411    
                                                        
409 The Superior Blockade Council was an Allied sub-committee of the Supreme Economic 
Council.  The council was created in early February 1919 to “… compel Germany to observe the terms of 
the existing armistice and to accept the new terms of the armistice which is to be signed on February 
17th….“  Minutes of the Superior Blockade Council, 11 February 1919,” Bane and Lutz, 109-110.      
410 Vincent, 107.  See also, McCormick, 18 February 1919.  
411 Reports from British Officers, 85-86.  
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The tipping point came when the British Second Army, sent to occupy the left bank of 
the Rhine in March 1919, was staggered at the level of chaos around them.  These 
soldiers fought at Ypres and contributed to the success of the Italian campaign.  Indeed, 
they were by no means inexperienced of the horrors of war.  Their commander was 
Herbert Plumer, a no-nonsense yet paternalistic general who distinguished himself as a 
gifted administrator and patriotic soldier during the First World War.  He commanded 
equally the respect of his troops and Lloyd George’s War Cabinet.  Therefore, Plumer’s 
criticism of the appalling conditions in Germany could not be dismissed as simply 
German alarmism or American interference in European politics.   
Plumer submitted a damning report to Lloyd George by the end of his first week 
in Germany: “In my opinion food must be sent into this area [Cologne] by the Allies 
without delay… The mortality amongst women, children, and [the] sick is most grave 
and sickness due to hunger is spreading.  The attitude of the population is becoming one 
of despair and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by 
starvation.”412  The general went on to say that his soldiers were parting with their rations 
in order to provide food to the severely malnourished civilian population.  Revolutionary 
turmoil was spreading throughout Germany and a deciding factor was the elusive food 
promised under Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement.  Furthermore, Plumer 
expressed his opinion that British soldiers would either revolt or their resolve crumble, “if 
children were allowed to wander the streets, half starving.”413 
David Lloyd George had been reelected on a conservative pro-Versailles/German  
                                                        
412 Minutes of the Supreme War Council, 8 March 1919. See, Bane and Lutz, 214.  
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Papers, Boxes 1-2, f. 11, HIA.  
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war guilt platform in the Khaki Election of December 1918.414  Yet he was now faced 
with irrefutable proof that the post-Armistice blockade was morally questionable and 
contrary to the Allies’ proposed reconstruction of Germany.  After all, the aim of a 
postwar peace settlement was to define new international laws and boundaries and 
acclimate the vanquished power to their new, albeit checked, role in global politics.  This, 
as German historian Avner Offer explains, “helps to reconcile the loser to his defeat, to 
accept its legitimacy and to acquiesce in his own punishment… [But] the blockade policy 
after the Armistice deprived the Allies of such legitimacy.”415   
For all the talk of “Allied” policy, the naval blockade of Germany was first and 
foremost a British venture, and it ultimately took British intervention to lift the economic 
sanctions.416  Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill wrote that these reports of 
starvation in Germany were a “sudden punch”417 in the gut to Allied integrity.  So much 
of Allied strategy in the post-Armistice period involved the corralling of German industry 
and its armed services.  Yet, in doing so, the Allies were unnecessarily hindering the 
postwar reconstruction of Europe.  General Plumer’s report, corroborated by the findings 
of other army officers, forced the British to confront the inhumanity of the blockade’s 
prolongation.  Subsequent meetings with delegates proved more fruitful once discussions 
turned from sanctions and political leverage to talk of relaxing the blockade.  One thing 
became clear to all parties involved – death by starvation could not continue.  
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Chapter 5 Appendix 
“Hunger Map of Europe, U.S. Food Administration, 1 December 1918” 
 
[Figure 8] Source: New York Times Current History: A Monthly Magazine, The European War, Vol. 10 
(April-June 1919): 52. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“FAMINE IS THE MOTHER OF ANARCHY”:  
PEACEMAKING, HERBERT HOOVER, AND THE END OF 
ECONOMIC WARFARE, MARCH - JULY 1919 
 
A Troubling Realization 
At the start of the Armistice negotiations in November 1918 Herbert Hoover, member of 
the Supreme Economic Council and head of the American Relief Administration, 
estimated the cost of provisioning the “liberated populations” of the Central Powers at 
$200 million.418  Aid was to be divided evenly per capita between Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, and Serbia.  Germany, however, was left to fend for itself.  Never mind 
that Kaiser Wilhelm II had abdicated the throne on 9 November, seeking refuge in the 
Netherlands as his empire collapsed.  The abdication of the Kaiser merely confirmed to 
the Allies that a major power shift had occurred in Germany.  Key members of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) moved to replace the old authoritarian guard.  Socialist 
politicians such as Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, for instance, headed the 
provisional government that negotiated the Armistice with the Allies at Compiègne on 11 
November 1918.419  
Although the majority of the SPD members were essentially left-leaning 
moderates,420 who were content to work within the bounds of a parliamentary system, the  
                                                        
418 Letter from Herbert Hoover to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson re: Feeding Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia, 9 November 1918, in the Herbert Hoover Papers, 1918-1919, HIA.  
419 Standard works on the German Revolution include: A. J. Ryder, German Revolution of 1918: A 
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M. Watt, The Kings Depart: The Tragedy of Germany; Versailles, and the German Revolution (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1968); Scott Stephenson, The Final Battle: Soldiers of the Western Front and the 
German Revolution of 1918 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).    
420 This was primarily because the old SPD had splintered into various factions by late 1918; some 
members identified with the pacifism of the USPD (Independent Social Democrats), while others joined the 
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Allies could not easily classify them as traditional “liberals” or “democrats.”  This 
distinction caused Allied politicians to pejoratively lump the Socialists together with the 
German Communist Party (KPD) and even the radical socialist splinter group – the 
Independent Social Democratic Party or USPD.  Together, these political parties 
epitomized the dangers of “Bolshevism” in Allied eyes.  Like a virus, one could try to 
inoculate against its spread, but there was no cure for Bolshevism once the host became 
infected.421  The virus could appear benign at first, yet it could easily mutate into a more 
virulent strain as time progressed.  In the words of British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George, revolutionary Germany was a “cholera area” to be avoided at all costs.422   
In place of troops on the ground the Allied naval blockade was continued after the 
Armistice in order to force the German delegation to sign the Treaty of Versailles.423  
This chapter traces the fallout from the prolongation of the blockade once the Allies 
became aware of the level of malnutrition and starvation on the German home front.  
Official reports from British and American intelligence officers in December 1918 
explicitly revealed the precariousness of the German situation.  News of revolutionary 
fervour and poor living conditions reached London and Washington in late February - 
early March 1919, causing the Big Four Powers at Versailles – Britain, France, Italy, and  
                                                                                                                                                                     
KPD (Communist Party) or the Spartacus League in an effort to violently overthrow Germany’s “staid” 
political system.  
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the United States – to reevaluate their surefire strategy to win the peace.   
If the Allies could not maintain this economic stranglehold due to mounting 
public health concerns and issues of morality, how could they be sure that Germany 
would not resume military action once the blockade was lifted?  This question confronted 
the peacemakers as they sought to achieve justice for the 22 million Allied casualties of 
the First World War.424  Indeed, faced with the prospect that the blockade’s retention 
might be jeopardizing the viability of a stable European peace settlement, the Allies were 
forced to admit that their great weapon of war proved too harsh for the intricacies of 
diplomacy.  
The opening paragraph of a U.S. Army report concerning the political situation in 
Germany in March 1919 reads: “Germany appears to be marking time.  The people are 
waiting for peace, waiting for food and waiting for a constitution.” 425  But how long 
could Germany realistically wait for the reconstruction process to begin?  After years of 
protracted warfare, where many Germans lost family members on the battlefield and 
suffered chronic deprivation and illness on the home front, there was not much left for 
civilians to give in terms of collective strength and fortitude.   
“The Government that could to-day promise the people food could impose almost 
any form of Government upon [the German] Empire which it desired.”426  That was the 
assessment of Stephen Miles Bouton, an American journalist and foreign correspondent 
stationed in Berlin throughout the post-Armistice period.  His analysis on the necessity of  
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filling the power vacuum in revolutionary Germany supports the findings of British and  
American intelligence officers sent to assess the German food situation in the wake of the  
Armistice.  Both studies, for example, recount the daily struggle of civilians to feed 
themselves and their families.  Political rallies, devalued currency, long food queues, and 
meager rations of little nutritional value – that was the reality of everyday life in 
Germany c. 1917-1919.427  In fact, in the final year of the war and throughout the post-
Armistice period, it was not uncommon for residents in urban centres to slaughter a horse 
in the streets or, worse still, eat meat from a cow infected with bacterial diseases like 
tuberculosis or typhoid.428   
 
            [Figure 9] A photograph of Berliners standing over the carcass of a horse.  By 1918-1919,  
            desperate and hungry Germans would eat virtually any protein they could find, including horses  
            and other sick or dead animals.  Source: Imperial War Museum.  Catalogue number: Q110883 
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It is little wonder then that mortality rates in Germany skyrocketed even prior to the  
global influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, which claimed an estimated 50 million lives 
worldwide.429   
Bouton and the Allied officers innately understood that the fragility of the nation 
was determined by both its physical and political health.  “I talked with very many 
Germans of all classes,” stated Lieutenant A. Campbell, a British soldier in his mid-
December 1918 report to the War Office.  “They are hungry, very hungry; that is, all 
except the superrich… They fear that food will not be given to them until all danger of a 
Bolshevik movement is past.”430  Campbell was shocked by the physical deterioration of 
civilians on the German home front and became convinced that the only way to contain 
Bolshevism was to lift the naval blockade and allow Germany to re-enter the global 
marketplace.431  It is significant to note that this recommendation was virtually identical 
to the plan proposed by Herbert Hoover to the U.S. Food Administration on 12 
November 1918.  Yet, whereas Hoover’s initial attitude towards the German government 
was reproachful in nature, even calling them “[a] group of gamblers in human life,”432 
those on the ground were focused more on the immediate welfare of the civilian 
population.   
Despite his harsh words for the political and military leadership in Germany,  
Hoover still advocated feeding the masses in order to bring stability to an ailing nation in  
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the heart of Europe:   
Unless anarchy can be put down and stability of government can be  
obtained in these enemy states, there will be nobody to make peace  
with and nobody to pay the bill to France and Belgium for the fearful  
destruction that has been done.  I would certainly approach this matter 
with mixed feelings, having been witness to the long robbery of food from 
women and children and the destruction of millions of tons of food at sea 
and to the misery under which the millions amongst the big and little  
Allies have suffered under the German yoke… [But] if we value the  
preservation of civilization itself, we cannot sit idly by and see the growth 
of this cancer in the world’s vitals.  Famine is the mother of anarchy.433 
Here was an extraordinary opportunity for the victorious democratic powers to shape 
authoritarian Germany into a fledging democracy.  The Allies had already committed 
themselves on paper with Article XXVI of the Armistice, which agreed to “contemplate” 
provisioning Germany throughout the peace process.434  Surely, a genuine offer from the 
Allies to relax trade restrictions would be preferable to watching the most dominant 
power in Western Europe “turn” Bolshevik.435     
It was the opinion of those whose job it was to study the European food crisis that  
the time had come to shelve political differences for the sake of global stability.  After  
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several weeks in Germany it was abundantly obvious to Hoover that, “there is no longer  
any military or naval value attached to the maintenance of the blockade of enemy 
territory.  Its retention has political value… but these latter features require immediate 
consideration because the political values may be entirely destroyed by its present harsh 
condition.”436  This was a troubling realization for the leading authority on food relief to 
admit.  Hoover was, after all, the driving force behind the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium (CRB), which supplied foodstuffs and matérial to nearly 10 million people 
living in German-occupied territories in Belgium and northern France throughout 1914-
1918.437  The CRB’s mandate was to offset the brutality and social and political 
upheavals attendant with life under the “German yoke.”  Therefore, it was not his first 
instinct to supply the enemy with precious Allied resources.  Moreover, although Hoover 
realized that Germany was in desperate need of provisions, the peacemakers at Versailles 
still needed some convincing.  
Crafting the Peace: A Case of History Repeating Itself? 
When the Allied delegates met at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris to craft the peace 
settlement on 12 January 1919, they did so with the understanding that it would be a long 
and divisive process.  Their first order of business was to assemble the Supreme War 
Council that would decide the fate of the former Central Powers.  This led to the creation 
of the Council of Ten, which consisted of David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, 
Woodrow Wilson, Vittorio Orlando, Japanese Prime Minister Hara Takashi, and their 
respective foreign ministers: Arthur Balfour, Stéphen Pichon, Robert Lansing, Sidney 
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Sonnino, and Uchida Kosai.  The council meetings occurred daily throughout January 
and February and were conducted primarily in English due to Clemenceau’s command of 
the language and the Italian foreign secretary’s ability to speak it relatively well.  Orlando 
and Takashi, however, had to rely almost exclusively on the English-French translations 
of the council interpreter Dr. Paul Mantoux.438   
The peace negotiations officially commenced six days later in order to coincide 
with the forty-eighth anniversary of the unification of Germany in the wake of the 
Franco-Prussian War.  In a symbolic act of power Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, was 
crowned German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at the French Palace of Versailles on 18 
January 1871.439  The Council of Ten, therefore, began the process to see Germany 
stripped of its imperial glory on the historic date of the Reich’s creation.  Clemenceau 
and the French delegation thought it only fitting to pay back in kind the stinging 
humiliation of defeat.  The timing of the peace conference also reveals some significant 
facts about the state of Great Power relations in 1919.   
The European state system established by Napoleon’s conquerors at the Congress 
of Vienna (1815) created a balance of power on the Continent that limited conflicts 
between the Great Powers of Russia, Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria.  Each power 
acted as a counterweight to the expansionist designs of a rival power in the hopes of 
mitigating territorial disputes or more general confrontation.  Throughout the nineteenth 
century this “Concert of Europe” aimed at preserving the status quo, that is, the existing  
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power structure with Great Britain firmly at the top.440  Although Pax Britannica spanned 
the century from the end of Napoleon’s reign in 1815 to the outbreak of the First World 
War, British hegemony was increasingly challenged by the early 1880s.   
Competition was fierce among the Great Powers over the “Scramble for 
Africa”441 – the renewed push for colonial possessions that reignited imperial rivalries in 
the last two decades of the century.  “[In order] to remain a great nation, or to become 
one, you must colonize,” argued French Prime Minister Léon Gambetta in a rousing 1881 
speech.442  Gambetta’s nationalist outlook was indicative of the colonial aspirations of 
many contemporary European politicians.  The period was overwhelmingly characterized 
by Germany’s bid for a greater imperial presence, as evidenced by Wilhelm II’s 
aggressive program of Weltpolitik or “world policy.”443  There is little doubt that this 
constant jockeying worsened Great Power relations prior to 1914.  Indeed, the war’s 
outbreak merely crystallized the previous half-century of unbridled nationalism. 
Five years later the peacemakers at Versailles not only had to restore order in  
Europe, they also had to create a new balance of power.  The nineteenth century Great 
Power system simply could not be re-imposed on the post-1918 world. Russia, for 
example, was plunged into civil war with the October Revolution of 1917.  Caught 
between the moderate yet ineffectual leadership of Alexander Kerensky’s Provisional 
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Government, on the one hand, and the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet councils, on the 
other, the war on the Eastern Front took a backseat to the country’s bitter internal 
struggles.  The Bolsheviks wrested control of the government in Petrograd on 7 
November (or 25 October according to the Julian calendar) with an assault on the Winter 
Palace led by Vladimir Lenin and his Red Guards.444   
Lenin finally broke with the Allies in early December 1917 by suing for a 
separate peace treaty with Germany.  Yet the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Leon Trotsky, was reluctant to accept Germany’s “annexationist” demands without 
attempting to negotiate a more favourable peace.  In a bold move that surprised even 
others in the Bolshevik delegation, Trotsky abruptly broke off communication with the 
Germans on 10 February 1918, declaring that the two countries were in a state of limbo 
with “no war, no peace.”445  The Germans did not take kindly to Trotsky’s diplomatic 
antics.  In order to convince the Bolsheviks to submit to their more stringent demands, 
Kaiser Wilhelm ordered his troops to march eastward on 18 February.  Germany’s 
hardline approach ultimately worked.  As First World War historian and international 
relations scholar David Stevenson notes:  
When it appeared that the Central Powers were no longer willing to make  
peace the Bolshevik leaders were prepared in extremis to seek assistance  
from the Allies, and the latter, for all their ideological distaste, would probably 
have given it; but as soon as the Germans communicated their terms the  
Russians accepted them, not bothering to negotiate in detail but preferring to  
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swallow the medicine whole.446 
Russian territorial losses notwithstanding, including Finland and the Baltic lands of 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russian Poland, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks to consolidate domestic power, culminating in the creation of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in December 1922.447    
 The transformation of Tsarist Russia into an upstart Socialist republic was just 
one of the major issues facing the Council of Ten.  The disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire also challenged Allied diplomats to juggle the needs of various ethnic 
groups without inadvertently pitting them against one another.  The Balkan region was a 
veritable powder keg of competing national interests even prior to the Russian Revolution 
and the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in the final stages of the war.  Thus, how were the 
peacemakers to reconcile the democratic Wilsonian principal of national self-
determination without sparking revolutionary fervour across Central and Eastern 
Europe?448 
The rise of the United States was another development that signaled the dawn of a 
new era in international relations.  It would have been inconceivable for a British 
delegate at the Congress of Vienna to heed the advice of a U.S. president on European 
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affairs.  But the spectacular growth of the American economy over the next four to five 
decades could not be denied.  Average household wages in 1800 were one-third higher in 
the United States than Western Europe.  Furthermore, American industrial output in 1861 
exceeded Russia and Prussia and was poised to out produce France on the eve of the 
American Civil War.  The United States, in short, was an undisputed economic 
juggernaut by the end of the nineteenth century.449   
The country had secured an enviable position in international affairs through a 
shrewd combination of industrial might, strong financial markets, and a bit of 
geographical luck.  America’s distance from Europe meant that Woodrow Wilson could 
even entertain the possibility of neutrality in August 1914 and, unlike the British 
dominions, political and economic independence allowed the U.S. to remain neutral for 
the majority of the war.  Moreover, as the world’s preeminent financial power, American 
credit largely funded the conflict, and thus American input at the peace conference would 
be on par with the Great Powers.450   
Yet President Wilson found it incredibly difficult to mount an effective peace 
campaign once in Europe.  The initial meetings of the Supreme War Council struck him 
as overly formal and, at times, even frivolous.  As historian Margaret MacMillan writes, 
“every afternoon the doors opened and footmen carried in tea and macaroons.  Wilson 
was surprised and somewhat shocked that they should interrupt discussing the future of 
the world for such a trivial event.”451  Beyond the obvious cultural differences, the U.S.  
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president also had to overcome his own unpreparedness.  
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, like many in the American delegation, was 
particularly critical of Wilson’s performance at Versailles.  Lansing depicts the president 
in his memoirs as a high-minded, fish-out-of-water politician who failed to take charge of 
the negotiations and was simply outmanoeuvred by his peers.  Ultimately, despite 
Wilson’s best intentions, what transpired was a series of peace talks that lacked focus and 
an overall American influence:   
He [Wilson] was inclined to let matters drift, relying apparently on his  
own quickness of perception and his own sagacity to defeat or amend  
terms proposed by members of other delegations.  From first to last there  
was no teamwork, no common counsel, and no concerted action.  It was  
discouraging to witness this utter lack of system, when system was so essential.  
The reason was manifest.  There was no directing head to the American 
Commission to formulate a plan, to organize the work and to issue definite 
instructions.452 
The conference might have proceeded very differently had Wilson arrived in Paris with a 
clearly defined peace agenda.  But the president chose instead to tout the League of 
Nations as a panacea to global strife.  
The League was Wilson’s attempt to craft a sweeping solution to the major 
diplomatic issues facing the Allies in a postwar world; its mandate was to resolve inter-
state conflicts peacefully in order to promote collective security and stability.  The 
organization was intended to reestablish a balance of power within a post-1918 
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framework.  This last point was essential to the League’s survival, as four years of world 
war had clearly supplanted the nineteenth century Great Power system.453  If a new 
political order was to emerge from the devastation of war, however, it needed to move 
beyond generalities and good intentions.  Lansing’s critique was harsh but it spoke to the 
difficulty of conducting talks on a scale that would have confounded even the 
peacemakers at the Congress of Vienna.  Vienna was the historical model by which the 
Allied and Associated Powers crafted the framework for the Paris Peace Conference.454   
Peacemaking, unfortunately, is not an exact science and the study of the past could only 
reveal so much to the Supreme War Council in their early meetings.  The sheer scope of 
Versailles – what its outcome meant for Germany’s role in postwar Europe – dictated that 
the Allies look beyond a century old blueprint in order to achieve something of a lasting 
peace.  
The Humanitarian Argument To Feed Germany 
 
One of the ways in which the peacemakers dealt with the broad scope of the conference 
was to consolidate power in the hands of a select few.  This concentration of power 
occurred most sharply with the drastic restructuring of the Supreme Council when the 
Council of Ten became the Council of Four in March 1919.  First, the Japanese 
delegation was dropped from the day-to-day proceedings.  Then, the Big Four dispensed 
with their foreign ministers to create a power dynamic that firmly centred on Lloyd 
George, Wilson, Clemenceau, and Orlando. Dissatisfaction and resentments are naturally 
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part of any negotiation process that involves the victor determining the fate of the 
vanquished.455  But one issue that brought many German and Allied delegates together 
was the controversy over the maintenance of the post-Armistice blockade.   
The Council of Four was at a total impasse when Allied representatives met with 
German delegates in the picturesque Belgian town of Spa on 4 March 1919.  The 
emergency meeting was called following the publication on 28 February of British army 
reports in the London Times Weekly.  It is still unknown who leaked the War Office files 
to the press, but the article included this sobering observation made by Captain W. S. 
Roddie in mid-February: “I believe that Germany at the present moment is on the brink 
of a volcano[,] which may burst forth at any moment.  It would be folly to suppose that 
the ensuing disaster would be confined to Germany.”456  The “ensuing disaster” was, of 
course, the spread of Bolshevism on the Continent in the wake of the Russian and 
German Revolutions.   
Roddie also highlighted the direct link between dwindling food supply and 
political unrest in Germany since 11 November 1918.  Although the Allies had promised 
to modestly provision Germany throughout the peace process, he saw firsthand that “… 
there has been no increase in the milk or fat rations since the Armistice.”  The scarcity of 
these everyday items placed the local authorities in a precarious situation.  It could either 
dole out these already meager rations on a “starvation basis” to avoid running out or, 
“overapportion the supplies” in order to boost civic morale and thus avoid violence on the 
streets.  Both scenarios, however, presupposed that the Allies intended to fulfill their 
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obligation to the Germans.457  The London Times Weekly article made it plain to British 
civilians that it was in Britain’s best interest to furnish the enemy.  
The British delegation finally took notice.  After reading these documents it was 
the opinion of Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.), that the 
post-Armistice blockade “seems to me barbarous [because] we have no right to go on 
starving the great mass of German women and children.”  As Lloyd George’s top military 
advisor at Versailles, he understood the desire to see Germany brought to justice, but was 
not willing to achieve peace at the cost of human decency.  “I am not prepared personally 
to make myself responsible for defending the continuance of this system indefinitely,” he 
persuasively argued in a memorandum to King George V and the British War Cabinet 
after reading the full and, at the time, unpublished version of Roddie’s report.  “Things 
must be brought to a head, and either the war must be resumed, or conditions of peace 
must be reached which are satisfactory for us and give the German people some chance 
of life and work.”458   
The fear of Germany plunging into a civil war like Bolshevik Russia was reason 
enough for Hoover and Vance McCormick, Chairman of the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace, to advocate relaxing trade restrictions on Germany as early as 
December 1918.459  Yet they would have to wait for the British to come to this realization 
on their own.  Ultimately, it took four months and the release of multiple army 
intelligence reports to reveal that the post-Armistice blockade was an impediment to 
peace.  General Wilson’s memorandum was more than just an acknowledgement of this 
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fact; it also put forth a compelling argument to lift the naval blockade based on 
humanitarian considerations.  
Within two days of the public release of the War Office files, Lord Robert Cecil, 
in consultation with Hoover and McCormick, organized the Spa Conference for 4 March 
1919.  The conference began with an opening statement from Admiral George Hope, 
whom the Germans regarded as a formidable negotiator at the initial Armistice talks at 
Compiègne and, later, at the renewal of the Armistice terms at Trèves in January and 
February 1919.460  He took the opportunity to warn the German delegation that no food 
would enter German ports without the government first handing over all cargo and 
passenger ships to the Allies.   
Admiral Hope, in effect, demanded the use of the entire German merchant fleet 
for the purpose of transporting American foodstuffs to German ports.  The Allies were 
prepared to give 270,000 tons of foodstuffs to the Germans.  The country could also 
import an additional 100,000 tons of grain from Argentina.  The German delegation 
expressed a willingness to relinquish the merchant fleet, but with the proviso that the 
Allies agree to provision Germany until the next harvest.  The Germans, after all, could 
not surrender the only leverage they had at the peace table.  Therefore, unless the Allies 
signed an agreement to provision Germany monthly, the delegates would simply have to 
agree to disagree.461   
If the Germans were not ready to “bargain ships for food,” why did busy Allied  
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representatives continue to meet with them?462  The diary of Samuel Shartle, a member of 
the American delegation at Spa, provides a compelling answer.  On the evening of 4 
March, for example, he wrote: “Perhaps the League of Nations can cure Bolshevism, 
perhaps not.  While the League has been formulating, anarchy has spread – due to lack of 
food and lack of peace.  It is not an answer to say, let Germany suffer.  Not only 
Germany is involved… food won the war and food may win the peace – if the hungry 
had more food and less promises.”463  Shartle’s assessment of the German food situation 
closely mirrored that of Herbert Hoover.  Both men believed that a stable, prosperous, 
and well-fed Germany was a necessary bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism in 
Europe.   
Hoover and the American peace delegation took a practical approach to feeding 
Germany by arguing that the Allies needed to rethink their strategy to win the peace.  It 
was in the Allies’ best interest to break with the recommendation of press baron Lord 
Northcliffe and discontinue “… a ruthless policy of commercial blockade.”464  
Northcliffe, of course, advocated continuing the blockade after the Armistice as a way to 
highlight the “economic predominance of the Allies… [by] accentuating German fears 
and hopes.”  This strategy was seen as an extension of Allied propaganda released by 
Crewe House in the final year of the war, when British intelligence revealed that the  
                                                        
462 British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour first used the phrase “bargaining ships for food” in a 
12 January 1919 meeting of the Supreme War Council.  See, Edward Frederick Willis, ‘Herbert Hoover 
and the Blockade of Germany, 1918-1919,’ in the Edward Frederick Willis Papers, Box 1, HIA, 22. 
463 Samuel G. Shartle, Spa, Versailles, and Munich: An Account of the Armistice Commission 
(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1941), 74. 
464 ‘Letter from Lord Northcliffe to Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, dated 10 June 1918,’ 
presented at the Economic Defence and Development Committee Meeting, 18 September 1918, TNA, 
MUN 4/6615.  
 171 
 
 
 
average German yearned for two things above all else: “peace and plenty.”465   
The Northcliffe plan was predicated on the assumption that the Allies could exert 
more control over Germany at the peace table by exploiting the fragility of its domestic 
situation.  Perhaps greater concessions could be extracted from the German delegation – 
higher reparations, German disarmament, and more territory – if they truly believed that 
“Germany might be excluded from a future economic bloc… [because] she is excluded 
from an existing bloc at the present moment… Having our club in our hands we should 
be absolved from the necessity of flourishing it in print.”466  Northcliffe regarded the 
post-Armistice blockade as a powerful weapon that could be used for great political and 
propagandistic effect at the peace table.   
This bold strategy first appealed to the Foreign Office and War Cabinet when it 
received Northcliffe’s memorandum in mid-1918, and was still touted by Allied 
Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch in February 1919 as, “… the best and quickest 
means of securing respect for the Armistice convention.”467  Yet serious problems arose 
because the plan blithely treated the provisioning of Germany as a carrot that could be 
dangled in front of the enemy.  Although the conference failed to ratify an agreement that 
satisfied both the Allies and the Germans, British and American representatives left Spa 
more determined than ever to break the stalemate and lift the food blockade.    
The Supreme War Council’s Response 
British peace delegate and polemicist, John Maynard Keynes, viewed the deadlock at Spa  
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as an opportunity to “bring matters to a head and attract the attention of the Great Ones  
[at Versailles].”  He suggested to Admiral Hope that the British representatives 
immediately break off food talks with the Germans “and order our trains to return to Paris 
that night [5 March]… so that when the Germans woke in the morning it would be to find 
us flitted.”  This highly “public rupture” was intended to send a message to the Big Four 
politicians – and, of course, the Germans – that global access to food was a necessary 
precondition of peace.468  Germany needed to relinquish its fleet and the Allies, in turn, 
needed to facilitate the provisioning of Germany before any more time elapsed.  
 Having read in the press of Britain’s “dramatic adjournment” at Spa, Lloyd 
George summoned Hoover, Cecil, and British Second Army Commander Herbert Plumer 
to his office in Paris on 7 March 1919.469  The Supreme War Council was set to meet the 
following day at the French Foreign Ministry and the British prime minister wanted 
answers.  He talked first with Plumer to see if the food conditions in Germany were as 
dire as the army intelligence reports suggested.  The general was not one to mince words.  
Hoover vividly recounts the exchange between Plumer and Lloyd George in his 
multivolume work on famine relief published in the last years of his life.  As the Allied 
Food Administrator tells it, the general impressed upon the prime minister that food 
supplies were so scarce that “[everywhere] hordes of skinny and bloated children were 
pawing over the offal of British cantonments.”470   
Plumer feared for the wellbeing of the occupied civilian population, as lack of  
food and Bolshevik uprisings tested the Germans’ resolve on a daily basis.  He feared  
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also for the wellbeing of his troops, who were torn between serving their King and 
country and saving innocent people from suffering and starvation.  Plumer’s main 
argument to Lloyd George was that his soldiers should not have to decide which path to 
follow; feeding the Germans and patrolling the Rhineland were not mutually exclusive 
because the reconstruction of Germany depended on both developments occurring 
simultaneously.471 
Hoover was in complete agreement with Plumer that the post-Armistice blockade 
was now “a constant plague to relief and reconstruction [efforts].”472  The clock was 
ticking to transport American foodstuffs to European shores and any delay in the process 
only risked more illness, unnecessary death, and political turmoil for Europeans.  The 
reality was that there were more mouths to feed than shipments of food available, which 
explains why Hoover encouraged the Allies to relax the naval blockade on Germany as 
soon as possible.473  Permitting the Germans access to food was not just a humanitarian 
decision; it was the most prudent course of action because it would have allowed the 
Allies to focus solely on crafting the Versailles settlement.   
The role of food – both Germany’s access to it and the Allies’ control of it – took 
on more importance than it otherwise should have during the negotiation process.  The 
Germans were desperate for supplies and thus highly motivated to cast off the burden of 
economic sanctions, but the delegation was reluctant to give up the nation’s merchant 
fleet in the event the negotiations continued into 1920.  The German delegates stubbornly 
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believed that possession of Germany’s merchant fleet was an insurance policy if the 
peace talks stalled and the country needed to venture into blockaded waters in order to 
feed the beleaguered masses.  As the German Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger 
noted, “… deliveries [of food] have been postponed again and again, and we are going 
hungry.  If the Entente wishes to destroy us, it should not at least expect us to dig our 
own graves.”474  The Allies, meanwhile, regarded the naval blockade as an insurance 
policy in the event that hawkish elements in the German government decided to resume 
the war or refuse to sign the peace treaty.475  Either way, both decisions were motivated 
by a desire to control the flow of foodstuffs into Germany as a way of leveraging the 
peace.  But recklessly gambling on the power of the blockade only hindered the peace 
talks and bred unnecessary distrust between Germany and the Allies and even among the 
Allies themselves.   
Hoover informed Lloyd George “that, with the exception of Lord Cecil’s 
assistance, [he] had received little cooperation since his arrival in Europe.”476  He was 
stymied at every turn by the obstructionist tactics of the French, who brokered a side deal 
to sell rotten fish to the Germans in February 1919 and repeatedly stalled American relief 
efforts by clinging to the vague wording of Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement.477  
He was equally dismayed at Britain’s extraordinary lack of foresight in continuing to 
blockade Germany after the Armistice.  Hoover reminded the prime minister that the 
Allies blockaded Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria throughout the war, yet the bulk 
of trade restrictions were lifted once each country signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
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Allies in the autumn of 1918.478  What made the German case so radically different?  
Should the country not be regarded in the same way as its wartime allies?  Combat had 
ended five months earlier and Allied politicians were still debating the merits of feeding 
Germany.  At this rate, if the French had their way, another five months would elapse and 
there would still be no consensus on how to proceed.   
Hoover illustrated the point by highlighting the issue of German fishing rights.   
This was an issue of bitter contention for the Germans throughout 1919.479  The British 
Admiralty unilaterally extended the naval blockade into the Baltic Sea on 28 December 
1918.  This move severed Germany’s remaining supply chain with the Northern Neutrals 
and prohibited the country from even fishing for small amounts of food for domestic 
consumption.  The extension of the Allied blockade into the Baltic marked a line that 
Hoover was uncomfortable crossing in light of Germany’s well-publicized plight.  Both 
he and U.S. Admiral William S. Benson thought it was an entirely “stupid strategy made 
by admirals ignorant of food supply.”480  At this point in the discussion Lloyd George 
asked Hoover to deliver a similar speech to the Council the next day.  Hoover was taken 
aback at Lloyd George’s suggestion, as he was inclined to think that the prime minister, 
like Clemenceau and Foch before him, still regarded the post-Armistice blockade as an 
effective weapon to ensure peace.481  Startled and “delighted” by Lloyd George’s 
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reaction, Hoover ultimately agreed to attend the meeting but thought it “would carry 
much more weight if it came [directly] from him.”482   
 Shortly after 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, 8 March David Lloyd George addressed the 
Supreme War Council in the crowded office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
Fifty-nine council members attended the meeting, including the Japanese delegation, as 
well as the foreign ministers of the Big Four.  In addition to Hoover, Marshal Foch, John 
Maynard Keynes, Étienne Clémentel, the French Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
and Louis Klotz, the French Minister of Finance, were in attendance.483  The issue on 
everyone’s mind was the outcome of the food talks at Spa.  The abruptness of Britain’s 
departure hinted at yet another breakdown in the negotiations with Germany.  Lloyd 
George confirmed that the trip failed to yield better results for the Allies.  But what the 
Supreme War Council did not know was that Britain’s hasty exit was not conducted 
merely in a fit of pique.  It was designed to elicit a strong reaction from the Council – be 
it good or bad – to news of Germany’s plight.484   
The Council members listened attentively as the prime minister described the 
turmoil and despair witnessed by many Allied soldiers in Germany since the signing of 
the Armistice.  These publicized reports of widespread malnutrition and political 
instability clearly indicated that the problems associated with blockading the Germans far 
outweighed any short-term political gains.  The reason for this was very simple: 
  The honour of the Allies was involved… the Germans had accepted our  
armistice conditions, which were sufficiently severe, and they had complied  
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with the majority of those conditions.  But so far, not a single ton of food had 
been sent into Germany.  The fishing fleet had even been prevented from  
going out to catch a few herrings.  The Allies were on top now, but the  
memories of starvation might one day turn against them… These incidents 
constituted far more formidable weapons for use against the Allies than any  
of the armaments it was sought to limit.  The Allies were sowing hatred for  
the future: they were piling up agony, not for the Germans but for themselves.   
As long as the people were starving they would listen to the arguments of the 
Spartacists [Bolsheviks], and the Allies by their action were simply  
encouraging elements of disruption and anarchism.  It was like stirring up an  
influenza puddle, just next door to one’s self.485 
Lloyd George invoked the imagery of Bolshevism as a contagious disease that had  
infected Germany, as he had previously done in the War Cabinet.486   The aim was to 
appeal to the overwhelming sense of fear among Council members that political turmoil 
in key pockets of Eastern and Central Europe would spread to the rest of the Continent.   
Conditions in Germany mattered a great deal to neighbouring war-torn states like 
France and Italy.  Their proximity to the “disease” dictated as much.  But, as the British 
prime minister learned, not all Allied delegates believed that the German situation was so 
desperate as to warrant the removal of the naval blockade.  Clemenceau, for example, 
wondered why, “if the Germans were starving, as General Plumer and others said they 
were, did they continue to refuse to surrender their fleet?”  Could it be that “the Germans 
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were simply trying to blackmail the Allies[?]”487  His first reaction was that Germany’s 
refusal to hand over its merchant fleet indicated that their food supply was more than 
adequate.  Beggars, after all, cannot afford to be choosers under any circumstance.   
Besides, as the French Minister of Finance reminded him, there was the all-
important issue of money to consider.  It was one thing for the Allies to talk of 
provisioning Germany in broad terms, but it was quite another to agree to supply the 
enemy indefinitely with food transported and paid for by the Allies themselves.  
Clemenceau instead recommended that:  
the Germans should be made thoroughly to understand that the Allies allow  
no nonsense in regard to the minute observance of the terms of the Armistice. 
As soon as the Germans recognized this fact, [he] felt sure his colleagues,  
M. Loucheur [the French Minister of Industrial Reconstruction], M. Klotz,  
and M. Clémentel, who were ready to be guided by the feelings of humanity,  
would easily arrive at an agreement in regard to the supply of food to  
Germany, and the payment therefor.488        
From the French perspective there was a compelling case to be made that the Allies ought 
to move forward with the peace terms and worry about the reconstruction of Germany at 
a later date.   
Lloyd George, however, vehemently opposed the cavalier “wait and see” attitude 
of the French and took the opportunity to thoroughly dismiss Clemenceau’s reservations.  
Taking the floor once again, he noted: “General Plumer’s [report] disclosed a very 
serious state of affairs… [which] the [Peace] Conference did not wish to create sympathy 
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with Germany by a continuance of a system of starvation.” 489  Finally, he called on the 
French prime minister to “stop these obstructive tactics, otherwise M. Klotz would rank 
with Lenin and Trotzky [sic] among those who spread Bolshevism in Europe.”490  The 
room fell silent.  Clemenceau was rarely at a loss for words, but this was one of those 
occasions.  The meeting ended after two and a half hours with the French delegation 
utterly chastened and the British having gained the upper hand in the food talks with 
Germany.491  
Brussels Food Agreement and the Relaxation of the Blockade 
On 13 March 1919, representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and  
Belgium (including Hoover, Admiral Wemyss, and European unionist Jean Monnet) met 
with German diplomats in Brussels to discuss the ongoing food crisis.492  Lord Robert 
Cecil, as Minister of the Blockade, used the intervening six days between the dramatic 
events at the French Foreign Ministry and the opening session of the conference to devise 
a payment plan in order for the Germans to receive food.  Working closely with the 
Supreme Economic Council, he presented a solution to the delegates right as they 
departed for the Belgian capital.   
Gold, Cecil believed, would break the deadlock.  He informed the Allies that 
Germany had not converted its gold supply into currency since before the outbreak of the 
                                                        
489 ‘Supplies for Germany, Presented to the Supreme Economic Council at its Meeting of March 7 
March, 1919,’ in Bane and Lutz, 196.  See also, Minutes of the Meeting of the Superior Blockade Council, 
1 March 1919, TNA, BT 13/74; Hoover, An American Epic, 318, 338. 
490 Willis, 55.   
491 John Maynard Keynes even asserts that the British prime minister viciously lashed out at Klotz 
over his perceived love of money: “He [Lloyd George] leant forward and with a gesture of his hands 
indicated to everyone the image of a hideous Jew clutching his money bag… The anti-Semitism, not far 
below the surface in such an assemblage as that one, was up in the heart of everyone.”  See, Keynes, 61.   
492 ‘Memorandum of the Conference held at Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919,’ in Bane and 
Lutz, 246-248.  The Brussels agreement only pertained to the importation of foodstuffs; it did nothing to 
alleviate the ban on raw materials or clothing etc.  
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war.  Therefore, while the value of the paper mark was steadily declining, the country’s 
gold reserves were still intact.  The Germans had begged the Allies at Spa to provision 
the country until the next harvest.  What they were essentially asking for was a six-month 
guaranteed food supply.  The Allies had been prepared to give a single shipment of 
270,000 tons of food and permit access to 100,000 tons of grain from Argentina.  Yet a 
thirty-day food supply was not nearly enough to eradicate hunger in Germany.  There 
was no way around it.  The Allies would need to provision the enemy at least until 1 
September 1919.  A loan of £200 million would adequately cover the cost and shipment 
of foodstuffs and, in turn, German gold would act as collateral for the loan.493       
 Admiral Wemyss presented this new financial arrangement to the Germans on 14  
March.  Reading the terms aloud, Wemyss informed the German representatives that the  
Allies would allow Germany to import up to 370,000 tons of food per month from any 
country.  Germany, of course, still had to pay for the food.  But now it could do so in the 
following ways: 
  (a) by exporting commodities to neutral countries  
  (b) via credit in neutral countries 
  (c) through the sale of foreign securities or properties  
  (d) using foreign securities or properties as collateral  
  (e) by the hire of ships  
  (f) through the sale of gold if all other methods failed and providing that  
     the Allies agreed to the terms of sale 494 
 
The signing of the Brussels accord marked a vital signpost in the overall relaxation of the 
naval blockade.  American delegate Samuel Shartle even went so far as to conclude, 
“…the wings of the French seem to be clipped.  They were when the English took charge 
at Brussels in the negotiations about food.  The results will have a good effect on order in 
                                                        
493 Willis, 56-57.  
494 ‘The Brussels Convention,’ Peace Conference British Delegation Archives, Supreme Economic 
Council, Private Papers of Sir P. Waterlow, 1919-1920, TNA, FO 608/281.  
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Germany.”495  Within two days the German government handed over its merchant fleet 
and the first of two instalments of £100 million in gold marks to the bank of a British 
consul in Rotterdam as per the agreement.  The Allies, in return, reinstated Germany’s 
fishing privileges in the Baltic and formally began to revictual the country on 19 March  
1919.496   
Realizing that some critics would still object to feeding the Germans before the 
Allies had even ratified the peace, Hoover released a pre-emptive bulletin worldwide on 1 
April 1919.  Entitled “Why We Are Feeding Germany,” the Allied Food Director wanted 
to categorically dispel any doubts in the minds of naysayers.  The future of Europe 
mattered more to Hoover than a show of force or small victory at the peace table.  He 
believed that access to food was a basic human necessity, not a political promise to be 
taken away or leveraged with the stroke of a pen:  
From the point of view of my Western up-bringing, I would say at once, 
because we do not kick a man in the stomach after we have licked him. 
From the point of view of an economist, I would say that it is because there  
are seventy millions of people who must either produce or die, [and] that their  
production is essential to the world’s future and that they cannot produce  
unless they are fed… no matter how deeply we feel at the present, our vision  
must stretch over the next hundred years and we must write now into history  
such acts as will stand creditably in the minds of our grandchildren.497              
                                                        
495 Shartle, 61-62. 
496 ‘Minutes of a Conference held at Brussels on March 13-14, 1919, between the Financial 
Representatives of the American, British, French and Italian Governments and the Delegates of the German 
Government, Appendix III,’ in Bane and Lutz, 249-254; ‘Letter from James A. Logan to Commander A. P. 
Carter, Aide to Admiral Benson re: Fishing Restrictions in the Baltic Removed,’ 19 March 1919, 265.  
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The efforts of the American Relief Administration aimed to breath new life into stagnant 
economies and facilitate the postwar reconstruction of Europe.  But the peacemakers 
needed first to step aside and allow the process to occur.  Hoover feared that the Allies 
were bypassing this crucial stage in the reconstruction of Germany in order to see justice 
served.    
 His suspicions were ultimately warranted.  The Brussels food agreement was the 
culmination of five months of constant prodding and warnings from Hoover and various 
intelligence officers detailing the famine conditions in Germany.  Five months of 
discussion as to whether to remove the blockade entirely or relax certain restrictions 
piecemeal could have been five months better spent revictualling the country in the first 
place.  By early April, the British were fully aware of this miscalculation.  Foreign 
Secretary Balfour even sent a telegram to Second Army Headquarters asking General 
Plumer to “preserve censorship” in the region over news of the partial relaxation of the 
blockade.  This was a last minute attempt to court the favour of the German people by 
reminding them that it was Britain – not just the United States – who provided them with 
food and an out-stretched hand when they were hungry: “Americans will claim that they 
have been responsible for this raising of the blockade and are likely to take full advantage 
of it in the Press. [But it is] desirable that H.M.G. should get equal benefit and that the 
German Press should be given [the] idea that concessions are mainly due to [the] policy 
of the British Government.”498   
                                                                                                                                                                     
497 American Relief Administration Bulletin, no. 3, 1 April 1919, 2-3.  See also, “The Guilt of the 
Famine,” 22 March 1919, The Nation; “Huns Seek to Bargain: Haggling over Food Delivers Results Only 
in Extending German Hunger,” 23 March 1919, The Washington Post.  
498 ‘Telegram from Arthur Balfour to Second Army Headquarters re: Trading with Firms in 
Germany,’ 25 March 1919, TNA, FO 608/221/29; idem, ‘Partial Raising of German Blockade,’ 29 March 
1919. 
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The task of convincing the Germans was left to the British Chief of the Armistice  
Commission, Richard Haking.  An often-maligned figure in the historiography of the 
First World War,499 General Haking agreed with Balfour that it was crucial for Britain to 
take credit as a “prime mover” in the relaxation of the food blockade.  He gained valuable 
insight after discussing the matter further with German delegates General Kurt von 
Hammerstein and Kurt von Lersner at the German Headquarters in Spa.  Hammerstein 
was especially quick to point out the extraordinary level of praise heaped on the 
Americans by the German press; they were continually portrayed as “saviours” of the 
German people.  Yet the attitude of the German press towards the British government 
was less clearly defined.  Britain was not seen as outwardly conniving, but it certainly 
was not viewed alongside Hoover and the American delegation as stalwartly 
internationalist and humanitarian.  But all of that could change, remarked the German 
delegates, if Britain were to remove the remaining trade restrictions and honour the 
Brussels agreement to provision the country until the autumn of 1919.500  It would have 
undoubtedly benefitted the Allies to foster goodwill and amity with a new German 
government that was both figuratively and literally indebted to it.  In the end, however, 
the peacemakers deemed it too risky to remove the blockade at this late stage in the peace 
negotiations.   
Both the diary of Vance McCormick (Chairman of the Superior Blockade  
Council) and the minutes of the Supreme Economic Council reveal that the Allies, in fact, 
formulated plans for the re-imposition of the blockade even after concluding the Brussels 
                                                        
499 Particularly for the high casualty rates sustained by the BEF’s XI Corp at Loos in September 
1915, the Battle of Fromelles in July 1916, and on the Italian Front at the Battle of Caporetto from 
November 1917 to March 1918. 
500 ‘Attitude of German Press towards Great Britain,’ 29 March 1919, TNA, FO 608/221/29. 
 184 
 
 
 
agreement.  Spearheaded by the French economist Jacques Seydoux, the Big Four agreed 
in mid-May to revoke the Brussels accord and reintroduce all trade restrictions in the 
event that Germany refused to sign the preliminary peace terms.501  President Wilson 
later described these council meetings as a series of “struggles with Clemenceau and  
Lloyd George [in order] to hold them down to justice and reason.”502   
Indeed, Wilson’s first preference was for a military occupation of Germany, as he 
believed that the threat alone was enough to convince the Germans to sign the peace 
treaty.  What real harm would it have done to exert pressure that did not involve 
leveraging the promise of food?  When presented with this other option, Lloyd George 
dismissed the idea as a costly and time-consuming gamble, while Clemenceau argued 
that a military occupation was an insult to the Allied forces who legitimately won the 
war.503  Clemenceau, unlike Lloyd George, was less concerned with the overall financial 
cost in bringing Germany to justice.  The Big Four could not put a price tag on achieving 
the peace when honour and principle were at stake.  Convinced of his moral certitude, 
Clemenceau viewed the post-Armistice period as a Clauswitzian continuation of war by 
other means.  Why the Allies would ever consider dispensing with the blockade until the 
war was truly over was beyond him.  Speaking candidly to his Allied counterparts, he 
thought “it may be useful to remind the Germans of the fact that the blockade shall cease 
at the same moment as the state of war, and that what legally brings a state of war to an  
                                                        
501 ‘Memorandum from Jacques Seydoux to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of 
Blockade re: Plans for the Blockade of Germany,’17 April 1919, TNA, BT 13/74. See also, “All Steps 
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end is the exchange of ratifications.”504   
Wilson, in his private correspondence with McCormick and Hoover, denounced 
this “survival of the fittest” mentality that motivated the French delegation.  He “felt 
great pity for them,”505 but was resigned to the fact that there was little use in 
discouraging their methods when the Allies were so close to ratifying the Treaty of 
Versailles.  Lloyd George felt much the same as Wilson.  The most pressing issue facing 
the peacemakers was to ensure that the hostilities did not resume.  Their next priority was 
to contain the spread of Bolshevism within Germany’s borders – steps were also being 
taken to combat the Bolsheviks in Russia – before it threatened the very fabric of  
European democracy.  It was essential to postwar stability that these issues were resolved 
as soon as possible.  Then, and only then, was it time to settle the score.   
The Allied and Associated Powers spent six months taking into consideration the 
new role of Germany in postwar Europe.  The peacemakers agreed that the country 
should be stripped of its overseas possessions in Africa and the Pacific (Article 119) and 
undergo a drastic reduction in its military and naval power (Article 160 and 181).506   
Article 231, the so-called “War Guilt clause,” blamed Germany and her allies for starting 
the war, while the reparations clause (Article 235) set the first sum of payments at 20 
billion gold marks to be paid in full by April 1921.507  As short-sighted and implacable as 
the treaty may seem, the peacemakers wanted to craft a system of checks and balances 
                                                        
504 Vincent, 115. See also, ‘Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Superior Blockade 
Council, 11 June 1919’ in Bane and Lutz, 519; ‘Minutes of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Supreme 
Economic Council re: Re-imposition of the Blockade on Germany, 16 June 1919,’ 528-529.  
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Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), 13, 20-21.    
507 Ibid., 34. 
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whereby Germany was held accountable for its reckless and continued aggression.  But 
did the peacemakers do the exact opposite in their haste to formalize a treaty?  According 
to many Allied participants in the peace negotiations, they certainly did.   
John Maynard Keynes’ indictment of the Treaty of Versailles as a “Carthaginian  
Peace” is the most obvious example.  Less quoted, but equally evocative of the interwar 
air of disillusionment with the peace settlement is South African general and Imperial 
War Cabinet member, Jan Smuts, and his remark to Lloyd George that “such a chance 
comes but once in a whole era of history – and we missed it.”508  British diplomat and 
Middle Eastern expert, Harold Nicolson shared Smuts’ misgivings.  In his memoir 
entitled Peacemaking, 1919 (1933), Nicolson lamented the disorganization and lack of 
serious political foresight by the Allied diplomats at Versailles.509   
These negative perceptions of the peacemakers persisted after the Second World 
War and continued until the late 1960s.510  It was only when historians gained access to 
private French archives in the early 1970s (i.e. records concealed from the Nazis during 
the Second World War) that a cogent revisionist argument emerged.  Historians such as 
Stephen A. Schuker, Sally Marks, and Marc Trachtenberg have used French documents  
                                                        
508 Smuts, like Keynes, was in favour of a more lenient peace.  He argued throughout the 
negotiations that the Allies needed to work towards reconciliation with Germany.  Alan Sharp, 
Consequences of the Peace: The Versailles Settlement; aftermath and legacy, 1919-2010 (London: Haus, 
2010), 1.   
509 Published in 1933 on the heels of Adolf Hitler’s rise, Nicolson’s work aligned with the period’s 
emphasis on Versailles as flawed settlement, as well as the futility of constructing a lasting peace.  William 
R. Keylor, The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 
4.  
510 Principally, John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Settlement (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966) and Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking.  These works 
viewed the Treaty of Versailles through the lens of the Cold War.  Both books argued that that American 
democracy was offset by the leftist authoritarianism of the Russians even then, but Mayer suggested that 
the structure of the peace (i.e. the preponderance of the Big Four) was outdated and inherently antagonistic 
towards the rest of Europe. 
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to construct a more balanced narrative of the peace process.511  They argue that it was a 
remarkably hard task to redraw national borders and create a new balance of power in 
Europe following the war.  The Big Four fared relatively well in their historical 
assessment given these high stakes.  There is a great deal of merit to this revisionist trend, 
but one of the more significant mistakes the Allies made throughout the peace process 
was in assuming that the retention of the naval blockade would hasten the peace 
settlement and combat revolutionary upheaval.   
In the short-term, the post-Armistice blockade made it difficult for the Germans to 
refuse the Allies’ demands at the peace table, but at what cost to postwar credibility?  
Herbert Hoover pondered as much in a letter to President Wilson: “I seriously doubt 
whether when the world has recovered its moral equilibrium that it would consider a 
[peace] obtained upon such a device as the starving of women and children as being 
binding upon the German people.”512  After all, how could it be?  Accepting the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles was the only means by which the Germans could guarantee 
unrestricted access to food.  It took five months after the signing of the Armistice for the 
peacemakers to even begin to revictual the country.   
The Brussels food agreement (14 March 1919) promised Germany the ability to 
import up to 370,000 tons of food per month, but not a single shipment reached German 
ports until the second week of July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was eventually 
ratified.  By then, hunger and disease had exacted a further toll on the civilian 
                                                        
511 See, Stephen A. Schuker, American Reparations to Germany, 1919-1933 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988); Sally Marks, “Reparations Reconsidered: A Rejoinder,” Central European History 
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512 Memorandum from Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, 14 May 1919, in the Herbert Hoover 
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population.513  Approximately 800 civilians died from hunger each day the post-
Armistice blockade was maintained,514 which prompted German delegates to allege at the 
peace table: “the hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since 
November 11, because of the blockade, were destroyed coolly and deliberately after our 
opponents had won a certain and assured victory.  Remember that when you speak of 
guilt and atonement.”515  This speech from Germany’s principal negotiator at Versailles, 
Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, clearly illustrates the counter-intuitiveness of bargaining 
food for peace.   
On several occasions David Lloyd George aptly likened the spread of Bolshevism 
in Germany to a festering disease – the problem needed containing before it subverted the 
Allies’ genuine attempt to heal war-torn Europe.  Yet how could Germany withstand the 
threat of revolution when its people were waging a daily battle for survival on the home 
front?  The Allies ultimately realized too late in the peace process that Germany’s fragile 
political state was closely tied to the overall health of the nation.  The relaxation of the 
naval blockade following the signing of the Armistice would not only have ameliorated 
the plight of many Germans, it might also have improved Allied-German relations in the 
interwar period.  The ramifications associated with prolonging the hunger and suffering 
of Germany would take years, even decades, to manifest.  When they did, however, their 
social and political impact was wide-ranging.     
 
 
 
                                                        
513 “Blockade of Germany to be Raised To-day,” 12 July 1919, The Times; Parmalee, 186-187. 
514 Willis, 49.  See also, ‘Inter-Allied Scientific Food Commission,’ in the Graham Lusk Papers, 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE POSTWAR LEGACY OF THE HUNGER BLOCKADE 
 
The Long Shadow of War 
 
When asked after returning from the Paris Peace Conference if he was satisfied with its 
overall outcome, David Lloyd George replied that, “I did as well as might be expected… 
considering I was seated between Jesus Christ [Woodrow Wilson] and Napoleon 
Bonaparte [Georges Clemenceau].”516  Beyond his usual withering critique of others at 
the peace table, Lloyd George’s remark highlights the challenge of creating a lasting 
settlement when strong personalities representing competing national interests were 
forced to work together to build a new international order that could scarcely be imagined 
amid the destruction of four years of war.  Wilson, of course, was no New World messiah 
and Clemenceau, although fiercely patriotic, was certainly not militaristic or tyrannical in 
nature.  Both statesmen wanted nothing less than to ratify a treaty that would guarantee 
peace in Europe for the next one hundred years.   
Lloyd George and the British peace delegation had a similar hope for postwar 
Europe when they arrived in Paris in January 1919.  But the reality of the Versailles 
settlement was that no one left the peace table entirely satisfied.  Alfred Zimmern, the 
German-born classicist who represented Britain at the Paris Peace Conference, aptly 
summed up the difficulty of constructing such a lasting and comprehensive settlement.  
“Paris disgusted and depressed me more than I can say,” he revealed in a conversation 
with fellow delegates Arnold Toynbee and James Headlam-Morley.  “The Majestic and 
                                                        
516 Sean Dennis Cashman, America in the Age of the Titans: The Progressive Era and World War I  
(New York: New York University Press, 1988), 526.  See also, Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars, 
Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 33. 
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Crillion [the two hotels that housed the British and American representatives] were full of 
unease and heartbroken men.”517  Headlam-Morley, who was the assistant director of the 
Political Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office and author of the wartime 
pamphlet, The Starvation of Germany (1917), expressed similar reservations about the 
entire process: “I have not found one single person here who approves of it as a whole… 
the total effect is, I am sure, quite indefensible and in fact is, totally unworkable.”518   
The fact that the Allies were finally at peace with Germany – and, later, Austria, 
Hungary, and Turkey upon signing separate treaties – meant that the naval blockade of 
the Central Powers could be raised once and for all.519  The lifting of the economic 
sanctions, however, offered no assurances that international trade and diplomatic 
relations would resume along prewar lines for either the Allies or the Central Powers.  
Indeed, the total cost of the war stood at $180 billion US.  That staggering figure, in 
conjunction with the 8.5 million soldiers killed in action, 21 million wounded, and more 
than 8 million civilian casualties, clearly shows how the First World War cast a long 
shadow over the twentieth century.520   
France unquestionably fared the worst over the course of the war in terms of 
economic strife, number of war dead, and the physical destruction of its territory.521   
Although it is difficult to compile a definitive balance sheet of the war’s physical and 
financial toll, the chart below, Table 4, illustrates the comparative “destruction of human  
                                                        
517 Sharp, 3-4.  See also, Agnes Headlam-Morley and Russell Bryant eds., Sir James Headlam-
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520 Stevenson, Cataclysm, 410, 442; Herwig, The First World War, 446.  
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and financial capital”522 based on prewar figures.  In total, France’s war dead (1.3 million 
soldiers and 350,000 civilians) accounted for just over 7 percent of the country’s 
population between the ages of 15 and 49.  Britain, meanwhile, lost over 3 percent of its 
population ages 15 to 49 (723,000 troops and approximately 17,000 civilians),523 while 
the United States suffered far fewer casualties (100,000 soldiers and 750 civilians) due to 
its late entry into the war in April 1917.       
Loss of Human and Financial Capital (% Prewar Assets) 
 
[Table 4] Source: Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War I: A 
Comparative Analysis, “Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, Toronto, Canada (August 
2005), 17, 31.   
 
* This figure includes the German reparation bill and, in the case of human capital, does not include 
civilian deaths attributable to the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.   
 
In comparison to the Allies, however, the Central Powers lost a greater percentage 
of their population to the war.  When these military and civilian casualties are compared 
with prewar figures, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria experienced a 
combined loss of nearly 6 percent of their population ages 15 to 49, while Britain, France, 
Italy, Russia, and the U.S. lost roughly 3 percent.  As for the total financial burden, the 
                                                        
522 Broadberry and Harrison, “The Economics of World War I,” 31.  
523 Stevenson, Cataclysm, 442; Kramer, 40; British War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of 
the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920 (London: H.M.S.O., 1922), 339, 674-676. 
                  Countries  Human Capital   Financial 
Capital 
                  Allies:    
                  Britain          3.6          14.9 
                  France          7.2          54.7 
                  Russia          2.3          ----- 
                  Italy          3.8          ----- 
                  United States          0.3          ----- 
    
                  Central Powers:    
                  Germany         6.3          54.7* 
                  Austria-Hungary         4.5          ----- 
                  Turkey and Bulgaria         6.8          ----- 
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First World War cost France more than 50 percent of its prewar assets, which persuaded 
the peacemakers to offset some of the expense through German reparation payments in 
the sum of 132 billion marks.524  Equalizing the monetary burden of the war was entirely 
understandable.  Most historians of the peace treaty have judged that John Maynard 
Keynes reacted too harshly when he accused the Allies of “[not] making the future of 
Europe their concern.”525   
On the contrary, the Allies were concerned with the future of Europe; the 
possibility that Germany would resume fighting on the Western Front and Bolshevism 
would spread westward throughout Europe.  But there were instances where fear trumped 
other political and moral considerations.  The decision to continue blockading Germany 
after signing the Armistice was a prime example.  In their attempt to stave off further 
bloodshed and revolution, the peacemakers ultimately gave little thought to the long-term 
implications of using food as a weapon against Germany.   
The blockade’s retention allowed the Allies to craft a treaty that Germany had to 
accept regardless of its objection to certain clauses.  Hunger was, of course, a powerful 
motivator that compelled the German delegation to sign the Treaty of Versailles on 28  
June 1919.526  The British Admiralty, Foreign and War Office gambled that the  
blockade’s continuance after 11 November 1918 would have “a hastening effect upon the  
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[peace] negotiations” by forcing the Germans to summarily agree to the Allies’ peace 
terms.527  Yet they clearly misjudged how the blockade’s strategic use throughout the war 
and post-Armistice period would affect the peace in the years to come.   
This chapter traces the postwar legacy of the Allied naval blockade and argues 
that its destructive effects spurred two significant developments in international relations 
over the course of the next thirty years.  One major consequence of the Allies’ decision to 
use food as a weapon during the First World War was a new prominence for international 
relief organizations and their role in providing assistance to fragile, war-torn nations.  
Several charitable organizations in Britain and America, for example, were either created 
to combat hunger in Germany once the naval blockade was raised or lent their support to 
the relief effort.  Their initial attempts to send aid, however, were somewhat 
controversial.  With the economic sanctions lifted, many argued that the Central Powers 
ought to take care of themselves.  Although raising money for enemy children was not 
regarded as an especially patriotic activity, the thought of “watching children starve to 
death without making an attempt to save them”528 proved powerful enough for 
organizations such as Save the Children and the Quakers to override the bitterness of the 
war years.  
 Malnutrition was rampant throughout Europe in 1919, but Germany and Austria 
were particularly affected because of the continuation of the Allied naval blockade.  In 
fact, more German civilians died of hunger during the eight months after the Armistice 
was signed until the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles than in any single year of the 
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war.  A brief look at German casualty statistics over the course of the conflict shows that 
nearly 350,000 civilians died from the effects of malnutrition from January 1918 to June 
1919.  It is remarkable to note that 40 percent of those deaths (or 140,000 civilian 
casualties) occurred in the month of November 1918.529  
Civilian Deaths in Germany Per Annum Since 1914-1919 
 
* Total civilian deaths in Germany in 1913 = 945,835 
 
       Year       Military Deaths  Civilian Deaths      Excess Deaths 
       1914              241,343       988,204             42,369 
       1915              434,034       954,706               8,871 
       1916              320,468       957,586             11,571 
       1917              281,905    1,000,433             68,598 
       1918              379,777    1,216,882           271,047 
       1919                14,314    1,017,284             71,449 
     Totals:            1,671,841    6,135,095           473,905 
[Table 5] Source: N. P. Howard, “The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of 
Germany, 1918-1919,” German History 11, no. 2 (1993): 166. 
 
The second major legacy or consequence of the Allied naval blockade was the 
political and psychological impact it had on German military and economic thought in 
the interwar period.  Access to food – either through domestic production and/or the 
forcible requisitioning of goods – became an obsession with Nazi economists and 
military planners in the years leading up to the Second World War.  Their aim was to 
ensure that Germany would never again endure the starvation, agony, and defeat of 1914-
1919.  Food experts such as the agronomist Herbert Backe, for instance, advocated that 
the Third Reich should pursue living space (Lebensraum) in the East by starving millions  
                                                        
 529 N. P. Howard, 166.  
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of ethnic Slavs and appropriating their lands.530  Backe’s ruthless “Hunger Plan” 
ultimately provided a powerful economic and racial justification for Germany to invade 
the Soviet Union in June 1941.  
Food and war invariably went hand-in-hand for many Nazis who had experienced 
the effects of the Allied blockade as either hungry, demoralized soldiers or malnourished 
children on the home front.  As Adolf Hitler privately told a Swiss diplomat in early 
1939, “I need the Ukraine, in order that no one is able to starve us again, as in the last 
war.”531  Avoiding a repeat of the First World War, however, meant that other “less 
desirable” races would have to starve in the next war.  Although the Allies continued to 
blockade Germany after the Armistice as a way to safeguard against renewed fighting 
and the spread of Bolshevism by speeding the conclusion of peace, the political impact of 
the prolonged sanctions was quite different and much longer-lived than intended. 
Fight the Famine 
 
Social activists in Britain and the United States regarded famine relief in postwar 
Germany as a moral obligation.  Many of them came from privileged backgrounds, were 
well educated, and had a history of commitment to social reform in their own country.  In 
Britain, these activists had either worked or volunteered in army hospitals during the war 
or were privy to the famine conditions in Europe as Members of Parliament, while ethnic 
background (i.e. German heritage) and religious affiliation (the Quakers) were more 
influential factors for anti-blockade activists in America.  Other defining features of  
the movement include the prominent role of women in famine relief work and the  
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emphasis on helping children to overcome the hardships of war.   
No civilian exemplified the relentless desire to feed the starving children of 
Europe quite like Eglantyne Jebb.  Born in Shropshire, England to a well-off Anglican 
family in 1876, Jebb studied History at the first all-female college at Oxford and trained 
as a primary school teacher in the late 1890s.532  Her first exposure to international relief 
work came on the eve of the Second Balkan War (the spring of 1913) after learning of the 
plight of Christians living in war-torn Macedonia from her brother-in-law Charles 
Buxton.  “Charlie” Buxton, a lawyer and former Liberal MP, had established the Balkan 
Committee in 1902 with the help of Irish playwright and social activist George Bernard 
Shaw, political theorist Leonard Hobhouse, and journalist and, later, government 
propagandist Charles Masterman.  The Committee’s objective was to draw attention to 
the political instability in the Balkan region, an area that Buxton continually referred to as 
“the danger point of Europe.”533   
In 1903, the Committee expanded to include a charitable organization, the 
Macedonian Relief Fund.534  As tensions rose again in the Balkans in 1912, Buxton 
approached Jebb to personally supervise the distribution of Balkan aid.  She eagerly 
obliged and took up the cause, raising additional funds until her departure in February  
1913.535  Her travels to Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia brought her face-to-face  
with strident nationalists whose religious and political zeal she found deeply troubling.   
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She could not understand, for instance, why Catholic Albanians (a religious minority in 
the region) were being massacred by Serbians simply on account of their religion.   
At first, she thought the reports from British officials exaggerated the tensions 
between the various ethnic groups, yet she later discovered that the Serbian military went 
to great lengths to conceal the murders.  Jebb’s time in the Balkans confirmed for her that 
the prewar “distinctions of nationality and race had permanently lost their importance.”  
What mattered more to her was an “insistence upon the unity of mankind.”536  She 
approached famine relief in postwar Europe with a similar desire to rebuild the trust 
between erstwhile enemies – this time, the Allies and the Central Powers.537  Jebb knew 
firsthand from volunteering in the Balkans that children (and the elderly) were often the 
first to suffer from the effects of war.538  The protracted and truly global nature of the 
First World War meant that many more civilians fell victim to hunger, sickness, and 
disease.   
Both Jebb and her younger sister Dorothy, Charlie Buxton’s wife, were acutely 
aware of the famine conditions in postwar Europe.  In August 1915, Dorothy Buxton 
began translating and publishing excerpts from French and German newspapers in order 
to provide the British public with a more balanced view of the war.  Readership of the 
pamphlets skyrocketed and she hired additional linguists in Italian, Russian, Hungarian, 
and Romanian to keep up with the public demand.  Buxton’s excerpts were later 
serialized in the Cambridge Magazine – a prominent intellectual publication with anti- 
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war leanings.  
It was obvious to the Jebbs that Britain’s blockade of the Central Powers posed a 
great health risk to the people of Europe, as even countries allied with Britain 
experienced serious hunger and deprivation.  By early 1917, for example, reports from 
the Romanian press told of the harsh home front conditions in which many froze to death 
in their homes due to a shortage of coal.  Meanwhile, it was not uncommon to see 
children in the streets of Belgium and Luxembourg “searching dustbins [for food] like 
starved dogs.”539  News that the Allies had signed a ceasefire agreement with Germany 
therefore gave Jebb, Dorothy Buxton, and Buxton’s husband a sense of hope that the 
worst of the famine was over.  They believed that the conclusion of the Armistice was the 
first step to restore peace and thereby save one more family from hunger and misery.  In 
the days that followed, however, Charlie Buxton’s secretary noted, “I shall never forget 
the sense of crisis which pervaded the household,” when the family learned that the 
Allies were continuing the blockade of Germany after the Armistice.540  
The Jebb sisters were irate that the Allies would knowingly prolong the suffering 
of millions for the sake of a signature on a peace treaty.  Jebb, in particular, struggled to 
reconcile her love of King and country with the continuance of a policy that she found 
extraordinarily cruel.  She further explored these themes of guilt and morality in a poem  
on the post-Armistice blockade:  
Now over our afternoon tea, dear friend, 
Let’s consult together why 
We’re starving sixty million people, between us, 
You and I… 
                                                        
539 Ibid., 214.  
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Is it to make them accept terms of peace, which they otherwise wouldn’t? 
Or is it to get hold of markets we otherwise couldn’t? 
Do we want the food – though it’s more than  
We could eat – for our own poor nations? 
Or do we simply want to reduce the enemy population? 
…The fact is I want to know what to say 
When asked what my motives exactly were, by God, at the Judgment Day. 
For I’ve an increasing suspicion, 
Although hitherto I have hid it. 
God will not let us off scot[-]free 
When we say that the Government did it.541 
 
Jebb wrote the piece in late November 1918 amidst the groundswell of British patriotism 
that accompanied the defeat of the Central Powers and Lloyd George’s call for a general 
election.542  Although the poem was never published, it clearly articulated her disgust for 
the continued suffering of millions and explored the idea of personal guilt for the “sins” 
or actions of a government.   
 Typical of both their social status and political outlook, Jebb and Buxton were 
active members of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) – 
a vibrant non-profit organization created in 1915 to promote a peaceful end to the war.  
At a December 1918 meeting of the London chapter, the sisters decided to form a 
political pressure group to raise awareness of the famine conditions in Central Europe.  
Soon Marian Ellis, a founding member of WILPF and the wife of Liberal MP Lord 
Parmoor, joined the cause and enlisted the help of her husband and his influential 
friends.543  Parmoor’s political connections included Labour party leader Ramsay 
MacDonald, G. B. Shaw, and author H. G. Wells.  It was their vocal support and financial 
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backing that led to the creation of the Fight the Famine Council on 1 January 1919.  The 
immediate goal of the Council was to convince Lloyd George’s government to raise the 
post-Armistice blockade.  The second and longer-term aim was to secure international 
loans in order to purchase and transport food to famine stricken areas in Germany, 
Austria, and Russia.544   
Parallels can certainly be drawn between the monumental relief efforts of Herbert 
Hoover’s American Relief Administration (ARA) and the aims of the Fight the Famine 
Council in Britain.  Both organizations recognized the doubly destructive nature of the 
continued blockade; it possessed no military value after 11 November and forced Hoover 
to divert precious foodstuffs intended for Allied, neutral, and liberated countries in order 
to prevent further starvation in Germany.545  Hoover particularly resented how the Allies 
– blinded by the power of the hunger blockade – repeatedly interfered with the ARA’s 
ability to revictual Europe.  He warned them against the long-term implications of 
starving the Germans, arguing that famine-stricken areas were far more prone to political 
extremism and violence than an adequately fed and well-cared-for population.546  Both 
the ARA and the Fight the Famine Council knew that the only real cure for hunger and 
disaffection was a massive dose of humanitarian aid administered closely by the Allies.   
Save the Children 
As the founder and general secretary of the Fight the Famine Council, Jebb wanted to 
alert the British public to the fact that their government was starving the enemy after the 
Armistice.  She believed that the most compelling way to illustrate the devastating impact 
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of the blockade was to graphically show the damage caused by chronic malnutrition.  
Using photographs of German and Austrian children obtained by Allied medical doctors, 
and given to Buxton in late 1918, Jebb distributed leaflets with a picture of a starving 
baby to passersby in Trafalgar Square on 15 April 1919.  The leaflets showed a small 
female child in Vienna with a disproportionately large head supported by tiny limbs and a 
shrunken torso (Figure 10).  At first glance, the child’s body resembled that of a three to 
five month old infant weighing just over 12 lbs.  The leaflet stated, however, that the 
child was actually two and a half years old, at least 16 lbs. underweight for her age, and 
had failed to reach proper growth milestones because of severe malnutrition.547    
There were millions of innocent children who were directly impacted by the 
Allies’ decision to continue blockading the Central Powers.  Conservative estimates, like 
those listed in Table 5, suggest that Germany suffered nearly 500,000 “excess” civilian 
casualties from August 1914 to June 1919.  Meanwhile, Britons went about their usual 
business – they shopped, went to work, raised their children, worried about their loved 
ones at the front, and, of course, were grateful that the Allies finally defeated the 
Germans.548  
Jebb knew that she faced an uphill battle in convincing her country to look 
beyond its grief and sadness in order to “save the children.”  Public support would go a 
long way into pressuring the government to raise the blockade, but she realized that 
others either did not care what happened to the children of the enemy or simply would 
                                                        
547 Francesca Mary Wilson, 174.  See also, Jones, 79-82.  
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[Figure 10] A leaflet distributed by the Fight the Famine Council in Trafalgar Square in April 1919.  Its 
purpose was to raise awareness of the blockade’s devastating impact on the starving children of Europe, 
especially those in enemy countries like Germany and Austria.  Source: Clare Mulley, The Woman Who 
Saved the Children: A Biography of Eglantyne Jebb, Founder of Save the Children (Oxford: Oneworld  
Publications, 2009), Plate 16. 
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not take the time to educate themselves.  Either way, she persisted in educating the 
masses, wholeheartedly believing that “… every tin of babies’ food which private effort 
can send out comes as a token of sympathy and a message of new hope to some 
despairing mother.”549  Thus the Fight the Famine Council tried to appeal to the kindness 
and decency of most Britons, arguing it was a lack of public knowledge – not genuine 
hatred of the enemy – that allowed the blockade to continue unchecked.550   
Trafalgar Square, apart from being a very visible area in central London, was a 
known site for public protests dating back to 1848 when the working class Chartists took 
over the Square to protest parliamentary corruption.  For both reasons Jebb selected the 
site and she chose well, as thousands of leaflets were distributed that April afternoon.  It 
can be assumed that some passersby disposed of the leaflet without ever looking at its 
contents, while others may have glanced at the image of the starving baby and given it no 
further thought.  Others, still, might have been outraged that they were being unfairly 
asked to provide for the wellbeing of enemy children who “will only grow up to kill us 
again in twenty-five years.”551  She nevertheless wanted to let people in Britain know that 
widespread starvation was occurring at the hands of the Allies.    
One particular group whose attention Jebb caught was the Metropolitan  
Police.  Although public protesting was not an illegal act, the distribution of “seditious” 
material (i.e. the “Starving Baby” leaflets) was enough to arrest her under the Defence of 
the Realm Act (DORA).552  There is no doubt that the arrest was excessive, yet it actually 
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aided the Fight the Famine cause in a way that the Jebb sisters could never have imagined 
possible.  For instance, Jebb could have been fined £5 per pamphlet under the Defence of 
the Realm Act.  Several thousand were handed out in Trafalgar Square, but given that the 
court could not determine exactly how many leaflets were distributed, she was only fined 
£5 for the initial offense.  The value of the fine was, of course, more symbolic than 
punitive.  Yet she still had to stand trial for sedition the following month.  In front of a 
packed courtroom at Mansion House, the official residence of the Lord Mayor of 
London, Jebb maintained that she was innocent, brazenly telling the judge: “it never 
occurred to me that a purely humanitarian plea had anything to do with the defence of the 
realm.”553   
The judge, however, was unmoved by Jebb’s testimony and found her guilty of 
distributing political propaganda on 15 May 1919.  In recounting the verdict to her 
family, Jebb viewed the outcome of the trial as “equivalent to victory.”  Indeed, upon 
exiting the courtroom the prosecuting attorney felt compelled to reimburse Jebb the £5 
and insisted she use the money for famine relief in Germany.  That small yet symbolic 
donation was the first of many that Jebb collected in an effort to ameliorate the suffering 
of millions starving under the Allied blockade.   
Capitalizing on the publicity of Jebb’s recent trial, Buxton used her husband’s 
contacts to book the Royal Albert Hall as the venue to launch the creation of the Save the 
Children Fund (SCF) four days later.554  “Save the children!” was the phrase Jebb yelled 
to passersby as she distributed leaflets in Trafalgar Square; the name of the fund 
conveyed the urgency of the cause by focusing on a large segment of the enemy 
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population – young children – who were clearly not responsible for their government’s 
misdeeds.  The gathering at the Royal Albert Hall raised more than £30,000 for famine 
relief in Central Europe.  Furthermore, it brought national attention and political 
legitimacy to a cause that hitherto had been considered unpatriotic in Britain.555   
The next step was to bring international awareness to the humanitarian efforts of the SCF.   
Undoubtedly, Jebb’s “greatest fundraising coup” occurred in the winter of 1919 
when Pope Benedict XV lent his support to the Save the Children Fund with a donation 
of £25,000.  He had received a letter from the SCF several months before detailing the 
extent of the famine and agreed to meet with Jebb in Rome.  In addition to the private 
donation, Pope Benedict vowed that he would write an encyclical letter to Catholic 
bishops around the world asking that they take up a collection for the SCF in their 
dioceses on Holy Innocents’ Day.556  Benedict’s letter marked the first time in the history 
of the Catholic Church that the Vatican officially supported a non-denominational (and 
humanitarian) cause.  The result was impressive.  Catholic parishioners worldwide gave 
£400,000 – the contemporary equivalent of £13 million – to the Save the Children Fund 
by the end of December 1919.  As international awareness of the movement grew, so too, 
did the donations.  The SCF reached a landmark £1 million (more than £29 million by 
today’s standards) by its first anniversary and even counted David Lloyd George’s wife  
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among its more active members.557   
Jebb and Buxton’s history with the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom, helped inspire the League’s founder, Jane Addams, to work with Hoover in 
organizing a joint Quaker-ARA drive in the United States for famine relief.  The 
relationship with Addams sparked a very fruitful partnership with the American Friends 
Service Committee (a Quaker based organization established to help civilian victims of 
the First World War), which assumed the actual responsibility for feeding enemy 
children.558  By late 1920, the Quakers had built more than 3,300 child-feeding centres in 
88 cities throughout Germany.  These centres were essentially small soup 
kitchens/nutritional clinics that aimed to feed as many sick and undernourished children 
as possible.  Based on records from the American Relief Administration, the Quaker-SCF 
child-feeding program served 293 million meals to more than 1 million hungry German 
children by December 1921.559  Although the American Friends Service Committee 
halted countrywide operations in 1922, the program continued for another two years 
under the direction of Major General Henry T. Allen, the Commander of U.S. Army  
troops in the Rhineland.560    
Several conclusions can be drawn from the humanitarian relief work of 
organizations such as the Fight the Famine Council, Save the Children Fund, and the 
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American Friends Service Committee in the wake of the Allied decision to continue the 
blockade after 11 November 1918.  First, it points to the fact that knowledge of the 
famine in Central Europe was enough to convince many high profile social activists to 
protest its continuance.  Time and again, they publicly risked appearing unpatriotic in 
order to raise awareness of the ongoing starvation of the enemy.  Second, it was their 
emphasis on the needless suffering of children that struck a universal chord.  Thousands 
worldwide generously opened their wallets (and hearts) to a cause far greater than 
vengeance or retribution.  Morality was the overwhelming factor that motivated these 
non-governmental organizations to feed and clothe the children of the enemy.  In doing 
so, they established an international tradition of postwar relief work that continues to this 
day.561  
But that is only part of the historical narrative.  Charity was given to the Germans 
primarily out of guilt over the death of civilians.  Indeed, speaking as the newly 
appointed Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill was quoted in The Times as 
stating: “it is repugnant to the British nation to use this weapon of starvation which falls 
mainly upon the women and children, upon the old, the weak, and the poor, after all the  
fighting has stopped.”562  Famine relief was too little, too late to help the elderly and 
infirm.  Humanitarian organizations had to prioritize which mouths to feed.  Although 
German children were fed first in almost every instance of postwar famine relief, 
memories of the endemic hunger lingered long after the blockade was raised.  
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National Socialism and the Push for German Autarky   
The Allied naval blockade remained a potent “weapon of starvation” in German eyes for 
years to come.  Ultimately, it confirmed for German leaders how important it was to 
avoid starvation in the event of another European war and catalyzed the push for 
economic self-sufficiency in the 1920s and 1930s.  Similar to Britain and the U.S. in the 
years following the First World War, Germany turned inward after 1919 and focused on 
domestic politics.  This political shift – eschewing Realpolitik in favour of social and 
economic concerns – reflected urgent necessity.   
The Weimar Republic formally came into being after its first president, Social  
Democratic Party (SPD) leader, Friedrich Ebert, quashed a series of uprisings by the far 
right and the radical left.563  Ending the violence through the use of state sanctioned 
paramilitary groups,564 signing the peace treaty, and a new democratic constitution, were 
intended to bring much-needed stability to postwar Germany.  These actions, although 
well intended, nevertheless plagued the Republic with a sense of illegitimacy and 
reputation for unpopular compromises.565  The new republic was also isolated within the 
community of nations.  
Unlike the Congress of Vienna, where the victors sat around the peace table with  
the vanquished after Napoleon’s defeat, the Central Powers had deliberately been 
excluded from the peace talks.  Moreover, the Versailles settlement stipulated that 
Germany should be denied entry to the League of Nations, the newly formed 
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intergovernmental organization for collective security.  Although the League later 
overturned the decision in 1926 as part of a larger rapprochement with Germany, the 
Republic was born of defeat and, consequently, spent the next four to five years sidelined 
from international affairs.566    
It took Germany until late 1925 for industrial production to function at 83 percent 
of its prewar rate.  The interests of German agriculture and heavy industry, as in most 
countries, did not typically align.567  Prewar agricultural interests groups, such as the 
conservative-minded Agrarian League, competed with the titans of German industry – 
e.g. the steel company Krupp, chemical giant IG Farben, and electric company AEG – for 
political favour and a greater share of gross national product.  Yet the collapse of the 
Kaiserreich and the inherent constraints of a fragile postwar economy provided a rare 
opportunity for rural interests to finally align with the aims of big business.568  Both 
groups wanted the Weimar Republic to institute protectionist tariffs to promote the 
consumption of domestic goods over foreign imports.   
President Ebert and the Social Democrats, however, had already made it their 
priority to reintegrate Germany into the global postwar economy.  This meant promoting 
free trade and pan-European cooperation; in essence, a complete reversal of the 
protectionist policies of Imperial Germany and those espoused by the old Agrarian 
League.569  Ultimately, two political parties were able to capitalize on the economic and 
political uncertainty.  Both emerged out of the rubble of the First World War and 
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1939 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 84-85.  
569 The “new course” of Chancellor Leo von Caprivi c. 1890-1894, notwithstanding. 
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espoused similar extreme right-wing views on anti-Semitism, the Treaty of Versailles, 
and national or völkisch pride.570 
  The first organization founded in 1918 was the German National People’s Party 
(DNVP), who garnered much of the rural conservative vote in the 1925 Reichstag 
elections.571  The second political party founded in 1920 was the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party (NSDAP, more commonly abbreviated as the Nazis), who 
presented themselves as a “dynamic, modern totalitarian” movement compared to the 
flagging influence and popularity of the old elites.572  Here were two clear alternatives to 
the German Democratic Party (the moderate liberals), the Social Democrats, and even the 
resolute Catholic Centre.  Both the DNVP and the National Socialists appealed to the 
more ardent of German conservatives, but only one party actually translated the people’s 
discontent – both urban and rural and male and female concerns – into more electoral 
votes.       
The National Socialists were particularly able to capitalize on the widespread 
economic and political uncertainty after the stock market crash of October 1929.  They 
won more than 18 percent of the popular vote in the watershed federal election of 
September 1930 and became the second largest party in the Reichstag next to the SPD.  
Under the fanatical leadership of Adolf Hitler, party membership rose dramatically from 
                                                        
570 Dieter Gessner, “Agrarian Protectionism in the Weimar Republic,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 12, no. 4 (October 1977): 759-778.  The most complete English-language analysis of German 
hyperinflation is Gerald Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German 
Inflation, 1914-1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), esp. Parts IV and V.  See also,  
Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, The German Inflation, 1914-1923: Causes and Effects in International  
Perspective (New York: De Gruyter, 1986).  
571 The DNVP was formed in December 1918 through a merger of the German Conservative Party 
(DKP) and the Free Conservative Party (FKP).  Members of the recently dissolved Fatherland Party and the 
National Liberals also gravitated towards the DNVP in the wake of the German Revolution.     
572 Peukert, 279-280.  
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3,000 Germans in 1921 to 1.6 million in 1933.573  The appeal of National Socialism was 
exceptionally broad-based; what started out as a primarily urban phenomenon quickly 
developed into a full-fledged political ideology that attracted a wide cross section of 
voters and devout party members.574  
 In his insightful study of the Weimar Republic, the late German historian Detlev  
Peukert came to the conclusion that Germany’s defeat in the First World War was the 
greatest factor that contributed to the nation’s “reversion to authoritarianism” in the early 
1930s.  Unlike previous historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Germany, Peukert believed that there was no continuity in German history leading 
directly from Otto von Bismarck to Hitler.575  The key to understanding the Nazis’ 
seizure of power (Machtergreifung), then, was in realizing that demography played a 
significant and undeniable role in shaping Germany’s worldview.   
                                                        
573 Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London: Penguin Books, 
2005), 135.  
574 William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 
1922-1945, rev. edition (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984); Dee R. Wernette, “Explaining the Nazi Vote: 
The Findings and Limits of Ecological Analysis,” Working Paper no. 134, Center for Research on Social 
Organizations, University of Michigan (July 1976): 1-27.  This is not to suggest that the German 
Communist Party (KPD) did not appeal to many voters on the opposite end of the political spectrum.  See, 
Timothy S. Brown, Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists Between Authencity and Performance (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009), esp. 90-119. 
575 Peukert’s work is part of a larger historiographical debate on the Sonderweg or “special path” 
of German history.  Those who argued in favour of the continuity of German authoritarianism include: 
Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War; idem, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 
1914, trans. Marian Jackson (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975); From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: 
Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871-1945, trans. Roger Fletcher (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1986); Sebastian Haffner, Germany’s Self-Destruction: Germany from Bismarck to Hitler, trans. Jean 
Steinberg (London: Simon & Schuster, 1989); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans. 
Kim Traynor (New York: Berg Publishers, 1985).  Scholars who repudiated the Sonderweg thesis include: 
David Blackburn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); James J.  Sheehan, German 
Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Konrad H. Jarausch, 
“From the Second to Third Reich: The Problem of Continuity in German Foreign Policy,” Central 
European History 12, no. 1 (March 1979): 68-82; Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and the 
Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918-1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1988).  For a more comprehensive overview of the historiographical debate see, James N. Retallack, 
“Social History with a Vengeance? Some Reactions to Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s “Das Deutsche Kaiserreich,” 
German Studies Review 7, no. 3 (October 1984): 423-450; idem, Imperial Germany, 1871-1918 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 212 
 
 
 
Peukert identified four separate generations who wielded power throughout the 
Republic’s lifespan.  First was what he referred to as the “Wilhelmine” generation.  These 
were contemporaries of the Kaiser and felt most akin to the Prussian conservatism of 
Bismarck.  President Paul von Hindenburg (b. 1847) and Foreign Minister Walter 
Rathenau (b. 1867) were typical of this older generation.  Next came the “Gründerzeit” 
generation or those who were born in the era of unification (c. 1870).  These men often 
rose to positions of prominence in Weimar politics (e.g. President Ebert and Foreign 
Minister Gustav Stresemann), and were unlikely to share the reactionary views of 
National Socialism.  Instead, Peukert maintained that it was the “wartime” generation 
who had participated in the conflict (e.g. Hitler and Hermann Göring) or the 
“superfluous” generation, who grew up during those years, like Heinrich Himmler (b. 
1900), that were most affected by the postwar turmoil576 and most receptive to National 
Socialist authoritarianism.577   
Peukert’s demographic theory is by no means indisputable.  The vast majority of 
young German males and demobilized soldiers did not belong to violent paramilitary 
organizations like the anti-communist Freikorps or Stahlhelm.  Yet there is a definite 
correlation between what he termed the “superfluous” generation born around 1900 and a 
political tendency to align with revanchist views of Nazism.  More than half of all party 
members in 1933, in fact, belonged to this age category, while the next largest cohort 
belonged to the “wartime” generation who “served only a limited and usually bloodless 
                                                        
576 All four of these generational labels are Peukert’s own.  See, Peukert, 14-18.  
577 Historians Ian Kershaw, Peter Loewenberg, and Tom Taylor all agree that the appeal of Nazism 
was not a class-based, but rather generational, phenomenon.  See Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: 
Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Arnold, 1985), 145-147; Peter Loewenberg, “The 
Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort,” American Historical Review 76, no. 5 (December 
1971): 1457-1502; Tom Taylor, “Images of Youth and the Family in Wilhelmine Germany: Toward a 
Reconsideration of the German Sonderweg,” German Studies Review 15 (Winter 1992): 55-73. 
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tour” of combat.  These generations wanted to right the “wrongs” of 1918-1919 and, 
unlike the postwar youth in Britain, America, and even France, only in Germany and 
Austria had this generation endured mass starvation on the home front.578   
The First World War had a profound impact on these impressionable youths who 
formed the backbone of the Nazi Party.  It was not a coincidence that they prioritized 
German food supply after standing in long breadlines for small and tasteless quantities of 
rations during the war:      
Food shortages among soldiers on the front and civilians at home had deeply 
demoralized Germany towards capitulation in 1918.  It was both fear of a repeat 
of the disastrous decline in civilian morale and a powerful sense of the German 
people’s superior entitlement to food[,] which made the National Socialists  
determined that the German population would not go hungry during the [next]  
war.579  
In his never published 700-page follow up to Mein Kampf (1928), Hitler envisioned that  
portions of the Soviet Union would serve as the German version of the American 
West.580  Although the concept of “living space” was not a Nazi invention, it was 
certainly a longstanding component of Nazi ideology.  Lebensraum, as a form of cultural 
imperialism, entailed the confiscation of millions of acres of farmland in Eastern Europe.  
                                                        
578 Donson, 153, 237.  See also, Benjamin Ziemann, Contested Commemorations: Republican War 
Veterans and Weimar Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), esp. 198-234; 
Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1952); Adelheid von Saldern, The Challenge of Modernity: German Social and 
Cultural Studies, 1890-1960 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 69-70; David D. Roberts, 
The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 203-205; Maurice Hankey, ‘Memorandum on Blockade and the Laws of 
War re: Extracts from the Writings of German Leaders bearing its Results,’ 31 October 1927, TNA, ADM 
116/3619.  
579 Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (New York: 
Allen Lane, 2011) 4-5.  
580 Tooze, 658. 
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Hitler often spoke of the opportunities that awaited ethnic Germans who “heroically” 
colonized the East through farming.  The reality of attaining this living space, however, 
was far less noble.581  In the end, it was not German farmers who secured more territory 
for the Reich, but rather elite units of Wehrmacht soldiers tasked with the physical 
destruction of an “undesirable” race.  Once again, as in the First World War, food was 
used as a powerful weapon to disarm the enemy.   
Herbert Backe and the Nazi Hunger Plan  
The Germany that went to war in September 1939 was a nation far more prepared to feed  
its soldiers and civilians than the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm.  German military planners 
correctly predicted that Britain would implement a naval blockade in the event of war 
with the Reich.582  Thus, they brainstormed ways to overcome the inevitable loss, as they 
saw it, of global markets and access to foodstuffs.  As early as October 1936, for 
example, the office of the Four Year Plan was created to oversee the systematic planning 
and implementation of Germany’s bid for living space in the East.583  As Agriculture 
Commissioner of the Four Year Plan and State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture, forty-year-old Herbert Backe was one of the chief architects of the 
Nazis’ plan to economically exploit the Soviet Union.       
 Backe, like so many high-ranking Nazi technocrats, was part of the “superfluous” 
generation born around the turn of the twentieth century.  Too young to participate in the 
                                                        
581 Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler’s Green Party 
(Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1985) 159.  
582 Britain implemented its naval blockade against Nazi Germany on 4 September 1939.  Between 
1941 and 1942, only 12 ships managed to break through the Allied blockade.  Collingham, 35.  For a more 
detailed analysis of British naval strategy during the Second World War see, Stephen Roskill, The War at 
Sea, 1939-1945, 4 vols. (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1954-1961); idem, Naval Policy between the 
Wars; Middlebrook, Convoy; Beveridge, The Blockade and the Civilian Population, pp. 2-31, LHCMA. 
583 Joachim Lund, “Denmark and the New European Order, 1940-1942,” Contemporary European 
History 13, no. 3 (August 2004): 305-306; Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi 
Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), esp. 127-167.   
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war, yet old enough to remember the stain of defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, this 
generation of disaffected German youth often turned to political extremism in their 
twenties.  Backe first joined the SA or Stormtroopers (Sturmabteilung)584 in 1922 and 
then formally joined the Nazi Party three years later.  His formative years, however, were 
not spent on the German home front.  Instead, he was in the unique position of being born 
to a German family who lived in Russia since at least the 1890s.585  As successful 
German émigrés, his family found themselves the target of Russian distrust when the war 
broke out in August 1914.  They were immediately ostracized by the townspeople and 
Backe spent the next four years in an internment camp deep in the Ural Mountains.586  
His imprisonment in a country in which he had spent his entire life completely disabused 
him of any loyalty towards the Russian people.   
After the war, Backe’s family settled in Göttingen, Germany, where he studied 
agriculture at the local university and later attended graduate school in Hanover.  His 
dissertation on the Russian peasantry and international grain market was considered too 
radical by the deans at Hanover Technical University.  They ultimately rejected his thesis 
for its racially pejorative stance on the “inferiority” of the Soviet Union and denied him 
his doctorate.587  Yet his views on Russian society closely mirrored those espoused by 
Hitler and the Nazi Party.  Backe believed that Russia, as the breadbasket of Europe, had 
failed to live up to its economic potential because of inherent “Slavic backwardness” and 
a parochial outlook on the world.588  He thought that Germany, in contrast, was far more  
                                                        
584 The SA, known colloquially as the “Brownshirts,” was a right-wing paramilitary group 
instrumental in the Nazis’ rise to power.    
585 Though very little is known about Backe’s family prior to the First World War.   
586 Gerhard, 48.  
587 Ibid., 49.  
588 Gesine Gerhard, “Food as a Weapon: Agricultural Sciences and the Building of a Greater 
German Empire,” Food, Culture & Society 14, no. 3 (September 2011): 337-338. 
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innovative and racially “deserving” of territory presently squandered by the Russians.589   
In the months before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941  
(Operation Barbarossa), Backe self-published his dissertation and copies were distributed 
to the highest-ranking party members on the orders of the Führer.590  On the strength of 
his Russian “expertise,” he devised a ruthless plan to secure adequate food for the 
invading Wehrmacht troops and took measures to prevent Germans on the home front 
from going hungry.  The aptly entitled “Hunger Plan” was unveiled to senior Nazi 
officials at a secret meeting in Berlin on 2 May.  The plan called for the division of the 
Soviet Union into smaller, separate territories based on their economic productivity (i.e. 
the potential for economic exploitation).  
The various regions of the U.S.S.R. were classified as follows; Belarus and 
northern and central Russia were considered “deficit territories,” while southern Russia, 
the Caucasus, and Ukraine were labeled “surplus territories.”  The first category, as the 
name implied, encompassed less profitable areas – farmland was either scarce and/or 
urban centres were few and far between.  The surplus zone, however, was considered the 
crown jewel of the Soviet Union.  These regions formed the agricultural heartland of 
Eastern Europe and it was from this area that the Reich would establish an economic 
stronghold powerful enough to withstand the enemy blockade.591  What was to become of 
the deficit zone and how exactly did the Nazis intend to take over agricultural production 
in the East? 
                                                        
589 Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 512-
515; Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 
160-161.  
590 Gerhard, “Food as a Weapon,” 340.  
591 Alex J. Kay, “Germany’s Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 4 (October 2006): 685-687.  
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As was often the case with National Socialism, murderous policies were couched 
in odd euphemisms and bureaucratic language.  This is what the German-Jewish 
philosopher Hannah Arendt called the “banality of evil”592 – countries were invaded and 
lives were routinely eliminated by the Nazi regime all with the stroke of a pen.  Quite 
simply, it was as if items on a dinner menu were being discussed, rather than the 
calculated and deliberate extermination of an ethnic or political group.  The Nazi Hunger 
Plan was no exception.  The proposal boldly called for the deficit regions to be sealed off 
from the rest of the Soviet Union.  No food could leave the surplus zone unless it was 
intended for German soldiers or transported back to Berlin.  This effectively meant that 
people in northern and central Russia were left to starve to death.   
The famine in Eastern Europe was “unavoidable” because, as a 1941 Nazi 
memorandum on food policy explained, “the war can only continue to be waged if the 
entire Wehrmacht is fed from Russia during the third year of the war.  As a result, X [10] 
million people will undoubtedly starve.”  Ten million was a figure that far surpassed even 
the highest estimates of German casualties (750,000 civilians) on the home front from the 
Allied blockade; nor did it include the projected deaths of those living in the surplus 
zone.593  The population of Russia had increased by 30 million people since the outbreak 
of the First World War, which has led some scholars to speculate that the Hunger Plan 
intended to violently turn the clock back to when there were 30 million fewer Russians 
living in the East.  Regardless of which statistic was more accurate, Backe’s plan served  
                                                        
592 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking 
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as a brutal insurance policy so that Hitler could rest easy knowing that “no one can starve  
us again, as in the last war.”594     
Historians of the Second World War have only recently begun to examine the 
influence of Herbert Backe on the broader war of extermination (Vernichtungskrieg) that 
uniquely characterized Nazi occupation in the East.  Currently, there does not exist a 
single biography of the Reich food administrator, although he was highly instrumental in 
planning the mass murder of millions on the Eastern Front.595  The experience of the First 
World War ultimately brought senior Nazi officials to adopt extreme measures to 
circumvent the impending British blockade.  The search for Lebensraum was their 
hubristic attempt to outsmart geography and avoid a calamitous repeat of 1914-1918.  
Germany’s aggressive bid for autarky drove the invasion of the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1941 and marked the crossing of a “moral threshold” as its chance at victory 
faded on the battlefield.596 
It would be straying too far into counterfactuals and hyperbole to suggest that the  
Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War directly caused the deaths of 
millions in Eastern Europe twenty years later.  It did, however, establish a military and 
diplomatic precedent whereby food was used as a weapon to break the enemy’s will and, 
later, as a form of leverage throughout the peace process.  The hunger blockade 
demonstrated that the lives of civilians could be subordinated to the political and military 
objectives of nations in conflict.  Massive collateral damage was now merely part and 
                                                        
594 Kay, “Germany’s Staatssekretäre,” 689; Snyder, 161.  
595 There is a forthcoming book by German agrarian historian Gesine Gerhard, although its title 
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parcel of total war.597  It was a dangerous precedent especially when the defeated power 
could draw murderous inspiration from the experience to aid them in a future war of 
conquest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
597 Kramer, 4-5, 329.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE HUNGER BLOCKADE 
 
On 4 August 1914, Great Britain declared war on Imperial Germany following the latter’s 
“blank cheque” of support for Austria-Hungary against Serbia in the Balkans and the 
subsequent invasions of Belgium and France, which sparked the First World War.598  
Within two days of entering the conflict, the British Liberal government of H. H. Asquith 
launched a naval blockade of Germany in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean599 in 
order to exert economic pressure on the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
the Ottoman Empire) and lend immediate support to their allies (France and Russia) on 
the Continent.  
The naval blockade of Germany remained in place for the next 59½ months from 
6 August 1914 to 12 July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was finally ratified.  The 
Allies maintained the economic sanctions for almost eight months after the guns stopped 
firing on the Western Front and a ceasefire agreement had been reached between the 
victorious Allies and the vanquished Kaiserreich.  Archibald C. Bell’s British official 
history of the naval blockade (1937) estimated that its retention throughout 1914-1919 
caused the deaths of more than 750,000 German civilians.600   
Imperial Germany, like Britain, was heavily reliant on imports.  In 1913, for 
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example, three-quarters of German imports arrived by sea.601  Thus, denying the Germans 
access to essential goods such as oil, food, and textiles eventually caused the home front 
to experience a level of hunger and deprivation that was unknown on the Allied home 
fronts.  In fact, the term “hunger blockade” was first coined in the winter of 1916 to refer 
to the drastic reduction in German civilian rations from 1,900 calories a day to a 
starvation diet of 1,000 calories.602       
While pleading his case before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg 
on 14 July 1946, Admiral Karl Dönitz quoted a passage from Archibald C. Bell’s British 
official history of the naval blockade to remind the Allies that they, too, had engaged in 
wartime practices, which if scrutinized during peacetime would appear unnecessarily 
cruel.603  Even if one dismisses Dönitz’s claim as sensationalistic or hypocritical, it points 
to the negative long-term impact of targeting civilians in war for short-term goals or 
political concessions.   
This thesis set out to explain how the British naval blockade “ranks first,” to 
quote famed military writer Sir Basil Liddell Hart, among the reasons for the defeat of 
Germany in the First World War.604  It argues that the naval blockade ultimately hastened 
the Allied victory and helped make possible the historic, albeit fragile, peace that 
followed.  Chapter 1 provided an overview of the structure of the dissertation and 
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contextualized this work against the existing literature on the Allied naval blockade.  The 
central argument is that much of the previous scholarship focused too heavily on the 
initial decision to blockade Germany or merely analyzed the early work of Britain’s 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron at the expense of examining the evolution of Allied economic 
warfare over the course of the war.  
The naval blockade that Britain implemented in August 1914 was far more 
rudimentary and benign than the lethal “weapon of starvation” that Winston Churchill 
denounced as Britain’s Secretary of State for War in March 1919.605  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, it was not until an 11 March 1915 Order in Council that food was added to the 
list of contraband items bound for Germany.  Even then, the British Foreign Office found 
itself in a legal quandary when it tried to persuade neutrals against trading with the 
Central Powers.  The United States and the Northern Neutrals – Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – did not take kindly to outside interference 
from Whitehall.  Neither did British businessmen whose revenue was derived from the 
laissez-faire principle of a free market economy.  The main obstacle that the Allies faced 
in the early years of the blockade’s existence was that very few businesses wanted to turn 
their backs on Britain’s largest trading partner, Imperial Germany.606  Indeed, patriotism 
and morality only held so much sway when the policy of “business as usual” seemed far 
more profitable and even pragmatic. 
The French, meanwhile, attempted to clamp down on instances where domestic 
goods and exports from other countries indirectly made their way to the Central Powers 
via the Northern Neutrals.  The French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé was 
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instrumental in creating an inter-departmental committee (Comité de Restriction des 
Approvisionnements et du Commerce de l’Ennemi) to investigate which countries or 
French corporations disproportionally traded with neutral Europe compared to prewar 
trade statistics.  He recommended that the French parliament should allocate a portion of 
its war budget to pre-emptively stockpile certain goods from the Northern Neutrals 
(foodstuffs and potential war matérial) before the Germans could even purchase them.607  
However, both the French War Ministry and the parliament thought the idea was rather 
tedious and spendthrift.  The annual budget only stretched so far and, consequently, the 
collective buying power of France was not going to be used to stockpile Dutch meat or 
Swedish iron ore at the expense of aiding troops at the front.   
Even the sinking of the Lusitania, a British ocean liner carrying approximately 
2,000 passengers from New York to Liverpool on 7 May 1915, did not initially convince 
the U.S. Congress to declare war on Imperial Germany.  Ultimately, 1,200 passengers 
died off the coast of Ireland, including 128 Americans, when a German torpedo hit the 
ship as it approached the British Isles.  Although the Lusitania disaster signalled an 
intensification of the war at sea – following the introduction of unrestricted German 
submarine warfare in February 1915 – President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. State 
Department were torn between maintaining America’s position of neutrality and 
defending the country against wanton attacks by joining the Allies in their fight against  
the Kaiserreich.608 
It took another twenty-three months for the United States to enter the war and 
finally join the Allied blockade of the Central Powers.  During that time, as in 1914, 
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Britain and France encountered a rather steep learning curve in regards to mediating 
inter-departmental conflicts and forging political and economic ties with the neutrals in 
order to best exploit their command of the sea.  The tightening of the Allied blockade 
c.1914-1916 was very much an evolutionary process of learning what legal tactics 
worked and what proved too inflammatory in the eyes of the neutrals and profit-driven 
Allied businesses.  The growth of an efficient civil-military bureaucracy in Britain took 
several campaign seasons to refine.  Real change only occurred once it became clear to 
all parties involved that the policy of business as usual was hampering the Allied war 
effort. 
Chapter 3 explored how mounting criticism of the Asquith administration’s 
“timid” handling of the war effort helped refashion the blockade into a more potent 
weapon of war in 1916-1917.  John Jellicoe thought, for example, that the Foreign Office 
under Edward Grey worried far too much about offending the neutrals when, in fact, they 
should have demanded greater transparency and cooperation from them.  Admiral 
Jellicoe was not the only influential voice of dissent when it came to the strategic 
direction of the naval blockade.609  Robert Cecil also believed that his department needed 
to adopt a firmer stance on indirect trade with Germany via the Northern Neutrals.   
Conservative-leaning publications such as the Daily Mail and The Spectator 
capitalized on the prevailing anti-Grey sentiment by alleging that the blockade now  
“leaked at every seam.”610  In response to the growing criticism, and with the realization  
that his preservationist stance on neutral rights was deeply unpopular with both the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, Grey asked the prime minister on 23 February 1916 to 
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remove him from all matters relating to the trade war with Germany.  Asquith, for his 
part, was quite relieved that Grey voluntarily distanced himself from the day-to-day 
management of the blockade.  In his place, Asquith appointed Lord Robert Cecil to head 
a separate Ministry of the Blockade with the aim to stop unnecessary trade leakages at the 
source.611 
Cecil immediately reversed Grey’s tactic of championing neutral rights through a 
series of new policies that promoted Britain’s right to blockade the Central Powers.  The 
first policy (forcible rationing) insisted on rationing the Northern Neutrals to within an 
“acceptable” prewar level of imports from other countries.  In spite of lost imports and 
widespread resentment throughout Scandinavia, Cecil maintained that was the price they 
paid for neutrality in an increasingly global war.  The second policy (the Statutory List) 
involved compiling a list of international corporations with known ties to German 
businesses and financial institutions and placing them on a blacklist for embassies 
worldwide to monitor.  As a result, neutral and Allied businessmen quickly learned that 
blacklisted firms were far more trouble to deal with than officially permitted ones.   
The final measure that Cecil enacted in the first half of 1916 was the introduction 
of the navicert – a commercial passport issued to U.S. exporters in order to expedite trade 
between compliant American firms and the United Kingdom.  These policies signified a 
tightening of the naval blockade at a time when the hope of a short war had irreparably 
faded.  Allied policymakers such as Théophile Delcassé, Robert Cecil, and the soon-to-be 
British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, realized that they had to adjust their 
expectations and try new tactics when waging total war.  
                                                        
611 For a comprehensive overview of Robert Cecil’s political career, including his appointment as 
chairman of the Allied Blockade Committee and early proponent of the League of Nations, see, Gaynor 
Johnson, Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013). 
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Unbeknownst to the Allies, the tightening of the blockade occurred just as 
Germany experienced an early frost that culminated in the widespread failure of its potato 
crop.  The starchy vegetable was such a staple in the German diet that its absence proved 
troubling for many on the home front.  Although the public grudgingly turned to turnips 
as a substitute of carbohydrates, the lack of variety coupled with news of extraordinary 
casualties on the Western Front (namely, at Verdun and the Somme) made for a very 
weary and embattled home front.  As the “Turnip Winter” of 1916-1917 progressed, 
temperatures plummeted to record lows and government rations were slashed once again 
from 1,985 calories to only 1,000 calories a day – nearly two-thirds less than what the 
British Royal Society recommended the average adult should consume each day.612   
 It was during this particularly brutal winter that Britain’s blockade of Germany 
earned its notorious moniker of a “hunger blockade.”  The German High Command 
(OHL) responded by resurrecting the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare against 
Allied seaborne trade, primarily in the western approaches to Britain, in early February 
1917.613  Yet instead of starving the British into submission, Germany’s gamble 
convinced the United States to abandon its entrenched position of neutrality in favour of 
joining the Allies against the Central Powers.  America’s entry into the First World War 
on 6 April 1917 gave Robert Cecil the opportunity to tighten the naval blockade even 
further.  American cooperation ensured that virtually no goods passed undetected across 
the Atlantic Ocean.  Convincing neutral countries it was in their best moral and political 
interest to suspend trade with Germany was, however, only half of the battle.  The Allies 
also needed to convince the Germans that it was in their best interest to capitulate.   
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Chapter 4 discussed how the British press baron Lord Northcliffe skilfully 
exploited the increasing malaise in Germany over the last year of the war through the 
release of blockade related propaganda.614  In February 1918, Lloyd George personally 
selected Northcliffe to head the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries or, 
“Crewe House,” as it was more commonly known in government circles, with the sole 
purpose of convincing the enemy to lay down their arms as quickly as possible.  Lord 
Northcliffe believed that the surest way to end the war from a propaganda standpoint was 
to exploit the omnipresence of the hunger blockade.  Through a series of propaganda 
leaflets distributed by air balloons to enemy soldiers via the “Balloon Post,” Northcliffe 
reminded the German and Austro-Hungarians troops that they were desperately hungry 
and poorly equipped compared to their Allied counterparts.  At its height in late August 
1918, the Balloon Post delivered on average 100,000 pamphlets a day to weary enemy 
troops.615  The success of this propaganda effort lay in the candour of its message.  That 
is to say, Crewe House would not have been as effective had it distributed leaflets based 
on half-truths or fiction.  It was the discontent of the Germany army and populace that 
made it possible for Northcliffe’s propaganda to take hold in 1918.  But if the political 
and propagandistic impact of the blockade shortened the war in any way, its post-
Armistice retention brought the issue of morality to the forefront.  
Much has been written on the cataclysmic impact of war on society in the Second  
World War and it continues to be a topic of great interest for scholars of post-1945 
international relations.  The history of the First World War, however, has been written 
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almost without examination of civilian casualties.  Therefore, the second aim of this 
dissertation in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 was to reveal why the blockade was continued after 
the Armistice and examine how its retention impacted the peace conference or shaped 
postwar opinion.   
From the perspective of the French delegation, Germany could not be trusted to 
honour the ceasefire agreement without the threat of reprisal.  The blockade then was 
meant to serve as a reminder that the physical suffering would end once the Germans 
signed the peace treaty.  The prospect of revenge for the German siege of Paris in the 
winter of 1870-1871, as well as the brutality of the recent conflict, was also a motivating 
factor for some French politicians, including Georges Clemenceau.616   
Although not driven by the same retributive urge as the French, the U.S. and 
Britain were in complete agreement that the naval blockade needed to continue after the 
Armistice.  In a confidential memorandum circulated by the British General Staff, the 
Admiralty, Foreign and War Office made it plain that they believed,  “… with the 
abolition of the Blockade, and especially its machinery, we lose our power of coercion 
over Germany; we run the risk of seeing Germany crumble and become unable to pay 
any indemnity....”617  Intended as a cure-all to the social, political, and economic strife 
facing the Allies at the peace table, the naval blockade was retained solely for political 
reasons.   
But the decision to prolong the blockade was not without controversy and 
disagreement.  Herbert Hoover was in charge of the revictualling of postwar Europe as 
                                                        
616 Georges Clemenceau to the Supreme War Council, 13 January 1919, in Bane and Lutz, 218-
219.  
617 ‘Memorandum Embodying the Views of the General Staff Respecting the Continuance of the 
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the Allied Food Director and the head of the American Relief Administration (ARA).  
From December 1918 to February 1919, he devised several international aid plans – 
known collectively as the “Hoover Plan” – to allow foodstuffs into Germany to prevent 
further revolutionary upheaval and discontent.  The population of Europe stood at 
approximately 420 million people in late 1918.  Hoover, therefore, understood the great 
urgency with which his agency needed to transport food to Europe in the wake of the 
First World War.  It was his rationale that the Allies ought to lift the crippling economic 
sanctions against the Central Powers in order for their respective governments to 
purchase food.  This action, in turn, would allow Hoover to focus his efforts and that of 
the ARA on feeding the rest of Europe in a timely manner.618   
After witnessing the desperation and extreme hunger first hand, Second Army  
Commander General Herbert Plumer informed the British P.M. that his men were giving 
their rations to the enemy in order to prevent further starvation.  Like Hoover, Plumer 
recommended that the Allied blockade must be lifted at once.  Unlike the Allied Food 
Director, though, his reasoning was based on seeing the level of deprivation on the 
German home front and knowing the moral dilemma that his men faced when hearing 
innocent civilians say that “an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation.”619  
Plumer’s report to David Lloyd George on 8 March 1919 finally forced the British 
government to see the blockade for what it had become – a regrettable “weapon of 
starvation.” 
Faced with undeniable proof that the continuation of the blockade was 
exacerbating the poor living conditions of Germans on the home front, the Allies 
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convened an emergency meeting to discuss the necessity of provisioning the enemy.  On 
13 March 1919, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, the U.S., and Belgium met 
with German diplomats in Brussels to negotiate a payment plan in order to purchase food.  
The Brussels agreement was intended to signify the end of the Allied economic warfare  
in preparation for the coming peace treaty and the reconstruction of Europe after the war.  
Nevertheless, Clemenceau thought it “…useful to remind the Germans that the blockade 
shall cease at the same moment as the state of war [i.e. upon signing the peace treaty and 
not a moment sooner].”620  True to his word, not a single shipment of food reached 
German ports until after 12 July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was formally 
ratified.  Meanwhile, nearly 800 German civilians died each day the hunger blockade was 
maintained after the Armistice.621   
This was not what the British Admiralty or Committee of Imperial Defense 
envisioned when implementing the naval blockade at the start of the war.  Nor did the 
blockade’s early inefficacy hint at its latent power and eventual use as a political 
bargaining chip after 11 November 1918.  This transformation occurred over time.  The 
concept of threatening starvation was first proposed in 1917 but quickly dismissed as too 
dangerous.  It ultimately took Northcliffe and the Balloon Post to exploit the rampant 
hunger in Germany by offering an end to wartime suffering.  Perhaps the Paris peace 
settlement could have retained more of its legitimacy had the Allies followed Hoover’s 
advice to Woodrow Wilson: “we should not be led into joining in a food blockade against 
Germany as a method of forcing peace.”622  Hindsight, of course, is 20/20 and the reality 
                                                        
620 Vincent, 115. 
621 ‘Inter-Allied Scientific Food Commission,’ in the Graham Lusk Papers Box 1, f. 1, HIA. 
622 Memorandum from Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson re: Food Blockade of Germany, 14 
May 1919, in the Herbert Hoover Subject Collection, HIA. 
 231 
 
 
 
of international relations is that prompt, definitive decision-making often takes 
precedence over cautious and even-handed treatment of the enemy.  
This thesis does not attempt to simply castigate British and Allied policymakers 
for using food as a weapon against Germany.  Rather, by highlighting the politics, 
propaganda, and morality of the naval blockade, it underscores the nuances and political 
considerations behind their Realpolitik decision.  There is no direct line from the First 
World War to the Second World War.  It is therefore counterproductive to imply as 
Patrick Buchanan does that Britain’s blockade irreparably damaged relations with 
Germany and directly caused the rise of National Socialism.623  It is regrettable that a 
traditional weapon of war was used to garner political victory in 1918-1919.  But one 
should be mindful, as Vincent notes in The Politics of Hunger, not to “manipulate such 
findings and thereby speculate that the critically undernourished generation of children 
from World War I logically grew up to become the loyal Schutzstaffeln of the 1930s.”624   
Thus Chapter 7 traced the postwar legacy of the blockade in order to glean how 
the rampant hunger and political instability in Germany was regarded in postwar Britain, 
America, and Germany itself.  The issue of morality figured quite prominently in the 
Allies’ decision to finally lift the post-Armistice blockade.  It also conditioned the 
postwar relief efforts of Hoover’s American Relief Administration and social activists in 
Britain to feed the starving mouths of Europe – be they German or otherwise.  This issue 
of humanitarian food relief has yet to be examined by other historians of the naval 
blockade.  Yet the charitable work of activists like Eglantyne Jebb and the Fight the 
Famine Council, which evolved into the internationally recognized Save The Children 
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organization, offered valuable insights into the prevailing March 1919 opinion that it was 
needless and immoral to use food as a weapon.625   
 The humanitarian relief work of Anglo-American organizations like the SCF and 
the ARA suggests that many people in Allied countries were compelled to donate money 
and/or their time to help feed children of the enemy.  Yet famine relief was offered too 
late to erase the memories of the brutal Turnip Winter and endemic hunger that persisted 
throughout the remainder of the blockade’s existence.  
In 1992, celebrated Weimar historian Detlev Peukert identified a generational link 
between one’s age (i.e. Germans born at or just after the turn of the twentieth century) 
and an affiliation with paramilitary groups and high-ranking placement within the Nazi 
Party.  These “superfluous” youths, as Peukert termed them, were too young to 
participate in the First World War yet were old enough to remember the social and 
political upheaval on the home front.  These young men witnessed their country’s defeat 
at the hands of the Allies and became increasingly disaffected after the war.626   
While there was nothing inevitable about the rise of Adolf Hitler and his 
murderous Weltanschauung in the course of Germany history, the Nazi quest for living 
space in the East was influenced, in part, by a conscious decision to avoid a repeat of 
1914-1918.  In contrast to the First World War, German military planners did not want to 
engage in a two-front war with Britain, France, and the United States on the one hand and 
the Soviet Union on the other.627  But it was the potential for exploiting Russia’s vast 
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resources that shaped the Nazis’ approach to food policy and their overall eastern strategy 
in the lead-up to the war with Russia.  In fact, the Reich Minister for Food and 
Agriculture, Herbert Backe, developed a ruthless “Hunger Plan” in early 1941, which 
called for the division of the Soviet Union into two zones based on their potential for 
economic exploitation.  The Ukraine and southern Russia were ultimately identified as 
prime land for the German army to violently confiscate grain and other vital resources.628 
 Only recently have historians of the Second World War started to analyze the 
conflict through the lens of food and agrarian politics.  Fine works like Lizzie 
Collingham’s The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (2011) and 
Gesine Gerhard’s two articles on Germany’s aggressive bid for autarky in the 1930s and 
early 1940s highlight some of the broader implications of the Allied decision to maintain 
a naval blockade of Germany throughout 1914-1919.  Research, of course, is still needed 
to discover if the legacy of the hunger blockade influenced more contemporary historical 
events.  Did the origins of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), for instance, stem from an 
Allied desire to right the wrongs of the Armistice and the Paris peace settlement?  What 
role did the blockade play in George C. Marshall’s decision to extend aid to former 
enemy countries following the Second World War?  Did the U.S. Secretary of State learn 
directly from Herbert Hoover’s experience that “famine is the mother of anarchy” and, 
thus, prioritize food relief as a result?  Only time and further enquiry will tell.  Although 
a century has elapsed since Britain first implemented the naval blockade of Germany, 
these questions and others still remain.  
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